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ABSTRACT
The thesis defends the view that the concept of a priori knowledge can be naturalised
without sacrificing the core aspects of the traditional conception of apriority. I proceed
by arguing for three related claims.
The first claim is that the adoption of naturalism in philosophy is not
automatically inconsistent with belief in the existence of a priori knowledge. A
widespread view to the contrary has come about through the joint influence of Quine
and the logical empiricists. I hold that by rejecting a key assumption made by the logical
empiricists (the assumption that apriority can be explained only by appeal to the
concept of analyticity), we can develop an account of naturalism in philosophy which
does not automatically rule out the possibility of a priori knowledge, and which retains
Quine's proposals that philosophy be seen as continuous with the enterprise of natural
science, and that the theory of knowledge be developed within the conceptual
framework of psychology.
The first attempt to provide a theory of a priori knowledge within such a
framework was made by Philip Kitcher. Kitcher's strategy involves giving an account of
the idea of "experience-independence" independently of the theory of knowledge in
general (he assumes that an appropriate account of the latter will be reliabilist). Later
authors in the tradition Kitcher inaugurated have followed him on this, while criticising
him for adopting too strong a notion of experience-independence. The second claim I
make is in qualified agreement with this: it is that only a weak notion of experience-
independence will give a viable account of a priori knowledge, but that the reasons why
this is so have been obscured by Kitcher's segregation of the issues. Strong reasons for
adopting a weak notion are provided by consideration of the theory of knowledge, but
these same reasons also highlight severe problems for the project of providing a
naturalistic theory of knowledge in general.
The third claim is that a plausible naturalistic theory of knowledge in general can
be given, and that it provides an appropriate framework within which to give an account
of minimally experience-independent knowledge.
I conclude with a consideration of some of the problems that an account of
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Consider how we would come to know the following propositions: all humans are
inquisitive; and 5+7=12. Assuming the first to be true, the most direct means of
coming to know it would be to gather evidence about the psychology of humans.
Since it would be impractical to examine each and every individual human, we
would proceed by sampling the human population and making an inductive
generalisation based on that sample. Whether we finally come to know that all
humans are inquisitive through this method depends on the size and quality of the
sample we gather. The sample must based on observations of many humans; but it
must also be drawn from a wide range of times, places and social contexts: in other
words, it must be representative of the human population as a whole. It is not at all
easy to say precisely what is the relationship between a sample and the inductive
knowledge drawn from it, but in general terms the following must be true: the
larger the sample, and the wider the variation in parameters that it sustains, the
better our chances of deriving knowledge from it.
Contrast this with the typical way in which we come to know the second
proposition: that is, through the use of mental arithmetic. Note first that our
knowledge that five and seven make twelve is not totally insensitive to evidence
from the senses. It seems reasonable to say that someone who has just counted two
(disjoint) sets of five and seven bananas respectively may sometimes be in a better
position to know 5+7=12 than another who has not. Perhaps the second person
slips up in his mental arithmetic; the first, using the bananas as a guide, is less likely
to have made a mistake. But the counting of the two sets of bananas stands in a
completely different relationship to our knowledge that 5+7=12, than does the
sampling process with respect to our knowledge that all humans are inquisitive.1
For in the case of arithmetic, it seems unnecessary, even wrong, to continue making
observations about the numerical relations between sets of objects beyond an initial
check. We would not look favourably on someone who said "I have seen that five
1 See Kim 1981.
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and seven bananas make twelve bananas, but before I commit myself to the claim
that five and seven make twelve in all cases I would want to check with other
objects, preferably non-bananas." In contrast, it would be reasonable to withhold
judgement as to whether all humans were inquisitive after having been shown, say,
that all children were inquisitive, or all dustmen were inquisitive: in this case it is
entirely in order to want to see whether some further sample, preferably in
appropriate respects quite different from ones already seen, supports the relevant
claim.
We seem to have illustrated two different types of knowledge. We can label
the difference: knowledge based on a process of sampling and generalisation is a
posteriori knowledge; knowledge based on mental arithmetic is a priori knowledge.
More generally, our examples illustrate the truisms that a posteriori knowledge is
based on sense experience2, whereas a priori knowledge is in some fundamental
sense independent of sense experience. On initial reflection it seems that the
subjects of which we might have a priori knowledge are among the areas of central
interest to philosophy: it seems that knowledge of logical and mathematical truths,
moral and metaphysical principles, as well as knowledge of our own mental states,
have the best chance of being shown to be a priori. The questions of whether, and
how, a priori knowledge is possible are therefore of central interest to philosophy.
Broadly speaking, we can gather the proposed responses into two groups, each
group being associated with an influential tradition in the history of philosophy.
The traditions in question differ over the emphasis they place on the senses in
delivering information about the world.
Rationalists are optimistic about the possibility of knowledge about the
world which is not based on the senses. Put crudely, the rationalist accepts that a
priori knowledge is possible and postulates a special faculty, a capacity for
"intellectual intuition", through the exercise of which we are supposed to acquire a
2
By "sense experience" I mean the data delivered by the five senses as traditionally individuated. If
reason was found to expand the list of the senses - perhaps by including proprioception, or because
cases of telepathy were finally confirmed - then this would result in a corresponding increase in the
scope of a posteriori knowledge. Knowledge through telepathy, I assume, would still be a posteriori
knowledge, although nothing in this thesis depends on this assumption.
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priori knowledge. The rationalist typically supposes that the use of this faculty can
yield a priori knowledge about the world: a priori knowledge of the existence of
god, the relation between numbers construed as Platonic objects, and the modal
structure of the universe being historially prominent examples. But the rationalist
explanation of how a priori knowledge is possible has not been widely favoured in
recent years3: critics of rationalism have claimed that the notion of "intellectual
intuition" is mysterious, and that the postulation of such a faculty to explain a priori
knowledge is ad hoc.
Empiricists, in contrast, reject the possibility of knowledge about the world
which is not based on sense experience. Accordingly, they tend to do one of two
things: accept the possibility of a priori knowledge while construing it in a way
which minimises the conflict with their basic principle; or adopt a sceptical position
with respect to the a priori, denying its possibility altogther, and explaining away
by other means the appearance of a distinction between a priori and a posteriori
knowledge.
The nonsceptical empiricist strategy for explaining how a priori knowledge
is possible grows directly out of the adoption of the verificationist theory of
meaning, around which early twentieth century empiricists rallied. On the
verificationist theory, the meaning of a sentence is identified with the set of
experiences which would indicate that it was true or that it was false. From this, a
criterion for meaningfulness is drawn: if no experiences could show a sentence to be
true, or false, then that sentence is meaningless.4 In the category of meaningless
sentences, these empiricists placed imperatives, expressions of like and dislike (to
which they assimilated moral propositions) and religious and metaphysical
statements. The remaining meaningful sentences were divided into two groups:
those on whose truth value some but not all experiences bear; and those which
every experience shows to be true (those which are, in Quine's figure, "vacuously
3 BonJour is perhaps its most vocal recent defender (BonJour 1998).
4 These characterisations of the verificationist theory of meaning and criterion for meaningfulness are
meant to be rough. It is extremely difficult to arrive at a formulation of these ideas which allows them
to play the role that verificationists intended for them. See Ayer's 1936 comments on the formulations
of the principles in the first edition of Language Truth and Logic for an illustration of the difficulty;
Miller 1998 gives a useful survey of objections to various formulations of the principles.
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confirmed").5 Into the first category of meaningful sentences, these empiricists
placed all and only propositions about the world, a set they took to be identical
with the set of propositions which, if true, would be knowable only a posteriori. In
the second category were placed all and only those truths which could be known a
priori. The empiricists justified this strategy on the basis of a theory of how a priori
knowledge is possible. They supposed that all a priori knowledge is at root
knowledge of the meanings of words; since the meanings of words are determined
by social convention, a priori knowledge is supposed to be knowledge of facts
created by convention. But these facts created by convention, it was claimed, are
not facts about the world: in this way, by supposing that a priori knowledge is
exclusively knowledge of such conventional truths, the empiricists hoped to
reconcile their acceptance of a priori knowledge with their strictures against
knowledge of the world not gained through the senses. Drawing from Kant, the
empiricists labelled the facts constituted by convention "analytic truths"; the
empiricist project of explaining the a priori became the project of explaining how
convention could make something true - that is, explaining analyticity - and then
using the concept of an analytic truth to explain all cases of a priori knowledge.
This empiricist project was pretty much discredited by the 1960s, though in
fact the decisive objection - in Quine's "Truth by Convention" - was already in print
before the second world war. The core of the difficulties faced by the project
concerned explaining how convention could create truth. But this problem was
exacerbated by the failure of writers in the empiricist tradition clearly to distinguish
the concepts of analyticity, necessity and apriority. Where efforts were made to
disentangle these concepts, empiricist authors still held that the concept of
analyticity could be used to explain both apriority and necessity. The extremely
5 There are also the sentences which every experience shows to be false, that is, the negations of
analytic truths; it seems that these should be treated as meaningful if analytic truths are, though it is not
clear whether the empiricists would have been comfortable claiming that "2+2^4" is meaningful.
(Intuitively, they should be: this seems to be a perfectly meaningful, though necessarily false,
sentence.) We should note in passing that not all verificationists agreed that the vacuously confirmed
propositions should be treated as meaningful: the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, from which many
logical empiricists drew inspiration, treated analytic truths as meaningless, though assigned them a
pragmatic value as regards the transformation of other expressions.
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strong notion of analyticity needed to play such an explanatory role was also
extremely vulnerable to criticism, and after Quine's influential attacks in "Two
Dogmas of Empiricism", "Carnap and Logical Truth" and Word and Object, found
few defenders.6
With the collapse of the theory of a priori knowledge in terms of the concept
of analyticity came the collapse of attempts to allow for a priori knowledge within
empiricism. For an empiricist, the only remaining option is scepticism about a
priori knowledge. For such a sceptic all knowledge is supposed a posteriori,
essentially dependent on sense experience. The appearance of a distinction
between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is explained psychologically: our
willingness to accept that five and seven make twelve on the basis of so few
observations is put down to an ingrained inability to imagine counterexamples.
Our imaginations are not so limited in the case of propositions like all humans are
inquisitive, and there we need to see a representative sample before we will accept
that the possibility of error has been excluded, and that we know.
Scepticism about a priori knowledge is often closely linked with the
philosophical position called naturalism. Some authors even define naturalism as a
philosophical position which rejects a priori knowledge.7 But on another
characterisation, naturalism is taken as the view that philosophy is not
fundamentally different from science: philosophy is seen as high level, abstract
science, and philosophical theories are required not to appeal to concepts which are
not generally scientifically accredited. The second characterisation is obviously the
more neutral with respect to the question of whether a priori knowledge is possible,
and one might well wonder whether the two characterisations are really
perspectives on the same position. (Certainly, if we assume that it is a necessary
condition for an item of knowledge to be scientific knowledge that it be a posteriori,
then the second characterisation will indeed issue in scepticism about the a priori:
but this assumption does not seem obviously true.) The close association of the two
6 Grice and Strawson (1956) buck the trend most notably.
7 Devitt 1998 and Kitcher 1992, for example.
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characterisations of naturalism may be in part an historical accident. Quine is
centrally responsible for the current popularity of naturalism, and he advanced his
arguments in favour of naturalism on the basis of a critique of analyticity. If
analyticity is not clearly distinguished from apriority, it might seem that rejection of
a priori knowledge is a necessary condition of the adoption of naturalism. But to
conflate apriority and analyticity would be a confusion. There might be cogent
reason for supposing that naturalism and a priori knowledge are fundamentally
opposed, and then again there might not be. But the question of whether it is right
to think that naturalism automatically rules out a priori knowledge is an important
one, and is the central concern of this thesis. On the one hand, as we have already
suggested, the way in which we approach a great many philosophical questions
will be influenced by whether we allow there to be a priori knowledge. On the
other hand, in the current philosophical climate, many feel that a concept has to be
found naturalistically acceptible if it is to be legitimately employed. To appeal to a
priori knowledge without indicating how it can be naturalised seems
uncomfortably close to appealing to discredited concepts such as destiny,
phlogiston, astrological influence, and the like. The intention in this thesis is to
support the claim that acceptance of naturalism is compatible with belief in the
possibility of a priori knowledge. In my view, the arguments for thinking that
naturalism must entail scepticism about the a priori are based on misconceptions of
the concepts of apriority and naturalism. The purpose of this thesis is to clear away
some of these misconceptions and the problems they have caused. What this thesis
does not seek to do is to show that the naturalist has no difficulty in giving a theory
of knowledge in general. In fact, our considerations of the nature of a priori
knowledge will reveal serious problems for the project of giving a naturalistic
theory of knowledge in general; the best I can do is identify these problems, not
solve them on the part of the naturalist. The conclusion to be drawn is that those
naturalists who believe that it is possible to give a naturalistic analysis of the




The argument in the thesis is structured as follows. In the last part of this
chapter I draw some introductory distinctions which will structure the ensuing
discussion. In chapter two I discuss a representative example of a theory of a
priori knowledge in terms of the concept of analyticity in order to see the problems
which it faces, and to highlight the way in which apriority and analyticity became
entangled by the early empiricists. In chapter three I discuss Quine's radical
empiricist critique of the concept of analyticity. I maintain that although Quine's
attack is not wholly successful, it has been influential in two relevant ways. First,
because it reinforces the view that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge;
and second, because it engenders the view that naturalism is a position which
essentially rejects a priori knowledge. In chapter four I discuss accounts of
naturalism, and pick out a formulation which seems plausible and which is not
obviously inconsistent with belief in the possibility of a priori knowledge. I identify
the two central reasons why naturalism has been thought to exclude a priori
knowledge. The first of these stems from the conjunction of the tendency to think
that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge with the plausible suggestion
that naturalism requires all (or, practically all) knowledge to be revisable. The
second arises from doubts as to whether we can make any naturalistic sense of the
idea of knowledge that is independent of experience. As a framework within which
to discuss these questions, I introduce Kitcher's naturalistic theory of a priori
knowledge. Kitcher approaches the concept of a priori knowledge through the
concept of a priori warrant (where an a priori warrant is, roughly, a belief forming
process producing a priori knowledge); he helps himself to the notion of warrant in
general, and proceeds by setting conditions which a warrant must meet for it to be
an a priori warrant. For Kitcher, the concept of the a priori is perfectly coherent and
naturalistically acceptable - thus vindicating the view that naturalism is not
automatically hostile to apriorism - but his interpretation of the idea of "experience-
independence" results in a conception of a priori knowledge on which very little is
known a priori. I proceed by criticising Kitcher's conception of experience-
independence, and by highlighting the difficulties raised by his segregation of the
theory of warrant in general from the theory of a priori warrant. In chapter five I
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discuss Kitcher's claim that beliefs warranted a priori are unrevisable - equivalently,
that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge. I argue that there is no reason
why apriorists should be committed to the unrevisability of a priori knowledge. In
chapter six I discuss Kitcher's claim that for a warrant to be a priori it must be
infallible: that is, that no false beliefs are ever warranted. I argue from the point of
view of general epistemology that, contrary to what many of Kitcher's critics have
supposed, all warrant is infallible. The concept of infallibility is therefore not
available for drawing a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
This, however, raises the serious question of how any naturalistic theory of
knowledge can respect the requirement that all warrant be infallible. In chapter
seven I discuss Goldman's reliabilist theory of knowledge, on which naturalistic
theories of a priori knowledge are based, and argue that his latest formulation of it
does not meet the requirement that warrant is infallible. In chapter eight I
propose a modification of Goldman's framework, drawn from recent contextualist
theories of knowledge, which allows him to respect the requirement of infallibility
without sacrificing the main features of his theory that make it useful for
formulating a naturalistic theory of a priori knowledge. I discuss whether the
contextualist version of reliabilism meets the requirements of naturalism, and
conclude that this is doubtful. This raises serious problems for the naturalist project
in epistemology generally; but the point remains that while naturalists hold out the
hope of giving a naturalistic account of knowledge they have no special reason to
be hostile to a priori knowledge. In chapter nine I address some of the problems
faced by a minimalist theory of a priori knowledge - that is, one not couched in
terms of unrevisability or infallibility. I discuss and criticise two recent minimalist,
naturalist, theories of a priori knowledge.
The claims I make are limited: I suggest only that the main reasons to doubt
the compatibility of naturalism and apriorism stem from the assumptions that a
priori knowledge must be unrevisable knowledge and that a priori warrant is
distinctively infallible; once these confusions are removed it does not seem
impossible that the a priori could be naturalised - provided that knowledge can be.
I do not offer a worked-out theory of the a priori: my discussion primarily concerns
8
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what the notion of a priori knowledge ought to involve, rather than how a priori
knowledge is possible. The two questions are obviously linked, but we cannot
make headway with the second until we have addressed the first.
Conceptual framework
As we have already mentioned, the empiricists tended to run together the concepts
of analyticity, necessity and apriority. Following Kripke, these concepts have been
sharply distinguished.8 Analyticity is a semantic property of a sentence; roughly
speaking, a sentence is analytic just in case its truth value is determined solely by its
meaning, and not by the world. Necessity is a metaphysical property, foremost of
propositions.9 A proposition is necessarily true just in case it could not possibly be
false. Apriority is an epistemological concept, concerning the conditions under
which knowledge arises. But it is not immediately obvious just of what apriority is
a property; for there are two ways of construing the following sentence:
S knows p a priori.
On one reading, apriority is taken to be a property of a proposition: on this view,
the sentence above should be read as claiming:
S knows p, and p is an a priori proposition.
On the other reading, apriority is taken to be a property of a way of knowing: on
this view, the sentence "S knows p a priori" should be read as claiming:
S knows p in an a priori way.
If we adopt the first interpretation of "S knows p a priori", an explanation of
apriority will be an explanation of what property a proposition must have for it to
be a priori. If we adopt the second reading, our goal will be to determine which
8
Kripke 1980.
91 pass over discussion of essential properties.
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ways of knowing are a priori ways of knowing. The way in which we conduct our
investigation into a priori knowledge is therefore highly sensitive to our decision as
to what "a priori" attaches to. It is arguable, however, that the second conception
must be fundamental, that is, that apriority is fundamentally a property of a way of
knowing. For, let pvq be a compound proposition consisting of the disjunction of a
mathematical truth p, and an empirical truth q.w Knowledge of either p or q allows
us to infer pvq by disjunction introduction, and it is very plausible that a logical
operation such as disjunction introduction preserves the epistemic status of the
input beliefs: that is, if p is known a priori, then pvq will be known a priori; if p is
known a posteriori then pvq will be known a posteriori. So the epistemic status of
the disjunction will depend on which of the disjuncts it is derived from: we have a
single proposition that can be known either a priori or a posteriori, depending
which inferences the belief in it is based on. But if the status of the disjunctive
proposition can vary without any change in the proposition itself, what determines
its epistemic status cannot be a feature of the proposition.
This, then, is strong evidence that "a priori" is fundamentally a property of a
way of knowing, not of a proposition. To say "S knows p a priori" is to say that S
knows p in an a priori way: to prefigure terminology that we have not yet properly
introduced, it is to say that S's belief in p is a priori warranted. If we had an account
of what it is for a way of knowing to be a priori we would be able to define a
derivative notion of what it was for a proposition to be a priori: however, this is a
matter of some delicacy. As Kripke pointed out, it will not do to say that a
proposition is a priori just in case it can only be known in an a priori way. For we
must bear in mind that to claim that an item of knowledge is a priori does not rule
out the possibility that it could be known through methods more usually associated
with a posteriori knowledge. If we are lazy, we can use a calculator to solve
arithmetic problems which we could have done in our heads with a little effort. As
Kripke pointed out, the arithmetical knowledge derived from the calculator is best
regarded as a posteriori knowledge, for our knowledge that the calculator has
produced the right answer is based on our knowledge of the way the machine was
10 For example: (2+2=4) v (grass is green). This argument is based on Kripke 1981: 35.
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constructed, the physical laws on which it depends, etc. But this sort of knowledge
is a posteriori knowledge, and it seems right to say that knowledge based on a
posteriori knowledge will also be a posteriori.11
The right way to define a derivative notion of the apriority of a proposition
is to say that a proposition is a priori just in case it could have been known a priori.
That is, the idea of apriority construed as a property of a way of knowing is related
to the idea of the apriority of a proposition by the following equivalence:
p is a priori iff 03S(S knows p a priori).
This introduces the problem of specifying just what is meant by "possibly" in this
context. What is impossible for a human may be possible for a Martian, but it is not
at all clear whether we would want to say that a proposition was a priori if it could
be known a priori by a Martian but not by us. Who knows what Martians can know
a priori? These are difficulties which we will put aside, however. For the purposes
of this thesis we will focus on the idea of an a priori way of knowing, reverting to
talk of a priori propositions only when to do otherwise would cause too many
problems in our discussion of an author.
This completes the introduction of distinctions which the argument of this
thesis will take for granted. We have seen that the concepts of apriority, necessity
and analyticity are distinct12, and that the notion of a way of knowing being a priori
is more fundamental than the idea of a proposition being a priori. In the next
11
Kripke 1981: 35.
121 have passed over discussion of proposed instances of necessary a posteriori, and contingent a
priori, truths. Although I am strongly inclined to think that there are such propositions, the point that
necessity and apriority are distinct concepts does not hang on whether proposed examples are upheld.
The property of being necessary is distinct from the property of being knowable a priori, just as the
property of being a creature with a heart is distinct from the property of being a creature with kidneys.
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chapter we will look more closely at the empiricists' attempt to explain a priori
knowledge, and the difficulties associated with clarifying the notion of analyticity.
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Carnap's account of a priori knowledge
Chapters two and three are concerned to show that Quine and Carnap, despite their
differences regarding the viability of the concept of analyticity, agree on one crucial
issue: that an appeal to this concept is essential to the explanation of a priori
knowledge. (We will call the project to provide an explanation of a priori
knowledge in terms of analyticity, the project to find an analytic theory of a priori
knowledge.) In the chapters that follow, much work will be done to rid the concept
of a priori knowledge of the overtones it acquired through liaison with the analytic
theory; but the present purpose is to decribe that theory, and the controversy over
its central concept: analyticity. We begin with an overview of empiricist theories of
a priori knowledge.
There are three distinct empiricist strategies for dealing with the problem of
a priori knowledge.' The first of these, associated in particular with British
Empiricists such as Locke and Hume, need not detain us, being in effect no strategy
at all. This account affirms the importance of experience for knowledge, while
simultaneously recognising a class of a priori knowable propositions2 (most
famously recorded in Hume's distinction between "matters of fact" and "relations of
ideas"). However, no serious attempt is made to provide an epistemology for these
propositions: they are dismissed as "trivial" and the problem of accounting for our
knowledge of them in a way consistent with empiricism ignored.3 There is,
therefore, little to interest us here as regards theories of a priori knowledge.
The second strategy is associated primarily with the logical empiricism
which arose out of the Vienna Circle. Accounts of a priori knowledge which adopt
this strategy have been termed "moderate empiricist".4 The strategy here is to
account for a priori knowledge by co-opting Kant's notion of analyticity. In the
' I ignore Mill's thoroughgoing empiricism (or "low inductivism", in Kim's phrase) about logical and
mathematical knowledge. Mill's low inductivism is not generally considered viable (see Kim 1981).
2
A general definition of the apriority of a proposition is given in chapter one.
3
Dancy 1985.
4 The terminology is drawn from BonJour 1998.
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standard formulation, a sentence is analytic just in case it is true solely in virtue of
its meaning and independently of matters of fact. Logic and mathematics being the
most prominent bodies of a priori knowledge, the moderate empiricist hopes in
particular to show that the propositions thereof are analytic; more generally, it is
hoped that the concept of analyticity can be explained in such a way as to
substantiate the claim that all and only a priori propositions are analytic
propositions.5
The third strategy characterises the radical empiricist account developed by
Quine; this account arises out of Quine's famous critique of moderate empiricism,
advanced particularly in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", "Carnap and Logical
Truth", and "Truth by Convention". Quine develops an epistemology in which the
existence of a priori knowledge is specifically excluded.
The discussion in this chapter concerns accounts of the second type; chapter
three discusses Quine's arguments for radical empiricism. The intention is not to
give an exhaustive catalogue of different notions of analyticity and their failings;
rather, I am primarily concerned to trace the dialectic running from the adoption of
the analytic theory to scepticism about a priori knowledge.
Moderate empiricism: the analytic theory of a priori knowledge
For the purposes of dramatising the challenge posed to empiricism by the existence
of a priori knowledge, we can gloss the central principle of empiricism in the
following slogan: all knowledge is dependent on experience. But a priori knowledge is
experience-independent knowledge. Hence it is crucial for those empiricists who
wish to retain the intuition that certain propositions are knowable a priori - as do
the moderate empiricists - that they find a way to reconcile the existence of such
propositions with their general principles. Dancy suggests that the general idea
behind moderate empiricist accounts is to relax the requirement that all knowledge
is dependent on experience, requiring instead that all factual knowledge is
5 Cf. BonJour 1992.
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dependent on experience." A priori knowledge, the suggestion goes, is not to be
thought of as knowledge of facts.
On the most literal reading of this suggestion, it appears as an injunction to
treat putative a priori propositions as non-truth-evaluable. Such an account can be
called noncognitivist. An approach like this may be familiar from moral philosophy:
some moral philosophers have held that putative moral judgements are really no
more than disguised expressions of like or dislike. However plausible this strategy
may be in moral philosophy7, it is not an option that will be considered here. A
noncognitivist reading of a priori knowledge would run strongly counter to our
intuitions that there can be genuine truth and falsehood in logic and mathematics.
Noncognitivist accounts of logical and mathematics have been offered in the past:
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus denies that the theorems of propositional logic have
meaning, and asserts that mathematical truths should be read as rules for the
transformation of expressions. However, such a reading should be considered a
variety of scepticism about a priori knowledge. Knowledge is by definition always
of truths; a fortiori a priori knowledge is always of truths. Where there is no truth,
there can be no knowledge and therefore no priori knowledge. The noncognitivist
interpretation of Dancy's suggestion should therefore be rejected.
Dancy's suggestion should rather be interpreted as a call for a division
within the set of all facts. The moderate empiricists' proposal is that this distinction
is to be drawn on semantic grounds. This is where the concept of analyticity is
meant to help. The empiricists suppose that it is intuitively obvious that there are
analytic sentences, that is, sentences which are true just in virtue of what they mean
and independently of matters of fact. Quine suggests that the intuition that the
inclination to believe in analytic truths8 arises naturally out of the truism that the
truth of a sentence depends jointly on meaning of the sentence (that is, the
proposition it expresses) and the facts." If the word "killed" meant begat, Quine
points out, then the sentence "Brutus killed Ceasar" would be just as false as if,
reverting to normal meanings, Caesar had not been killed by Brutus. Given this
6
Dancy 1985.
7 It is not very plausible: it faces the "Frege-Geach" problem (Cf. discussion in Miller 1998).
8
An "analytic truth" is a true sentence which is analytic.
9
Quine 1953: 36; 1966: 101; 1970: 95.
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double dependence, there is a natural inclination to think that there could be
expressions in which the factual component is nil: and these are the analytic truths.
The idea of an analytic proposition is meant to be an intuitive one, and it seems that
that appeal to this concept has the potential to avoid the problems with
noncognitivism: analytic truths are indeed true, but their truth is thought to be fixed
in some special way.
Analyticity is, therefore, a semantic concept which is pressed by the
moderate empiricists into service in an epistemological role. A successful analytic
theory of a priori knowledge would have two features. First, it would entail the
truth of the following equivalence:
(1) Vp (p is a priori <-» p is analytic) .10
Second, it would provide a satisfying explanation of why (1) was true. A key test
for the analytic theory will be whether the truths of logic and mathematics can be
shown to be analytic.
It is worth noting, albeit in passing, that the moderate empiricists often
appealed to the concept of analyticity in a second capacity: that of providing an
analytic theory of necessity. To a certain extent, no doubt, this strategy was adopted
through failure clearly to distinguish the concepts of necessity and apriority. There
may, though, have been a more legitimate motivation for the theory. For to many
modern philosophers it has seemed that knowledge only of the material truth of a
proposition was given in experience; knowledge of the modal status of a
proposition was not thought to be so given. So it seems that knowledge that a
proposition is necessarily true must be a priori knowledge. This might seem to give
reason to adopt the following claim11:
10
Analyticity is a semantic property and therefore attaches to sentences, not propositions. The
apparent predication of analyticity of a proposition in (1) is shorthand for the claim that the
proposition is expressed by a sentence which is analytic.
1 Not good reason, though: the biconditional (2) claims that all and only necessary truths are
knowable a priori; whereas the rough considerations offered in support of (2) were to the effect that
knowledge that a proposition was necessarily true had to be a priori. The biconditional talks of the
16
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(2) Vp (p is necessary e-> p is a priori) .
The moderate empiricists' assumption of the analytic theory of the a priori then
lends support to the idea of an analytic theory of necessity, since (1) and (2) together
give us
(3) Vp (p is necessary <-> p is analytic) .
For philosophers sceptical about necessity (such as Quine) this provides an
opportunity to bring anti-metaphysical arguments to bear against the view that
there are analytic truths. However, as noted in the introduction, the chief concern
in this thesis is epistemological and from here on the analytic theory of necessity
will be set on one side.
The account of analyticity offered so far is vague and unenlightening: we
have no idea how analyticity so defined is meant to help explain the possibility of a
priori knowledge. To discuss exhaustively concepts of analyticity would be a large
and largely fruitless task: a great many versions of the concept of analyticity appear
in the literature, and the distinctions between them are not always recognised by
the authors themselves (Ayer's chapter "The A Priori" in Language, Truth and Logic is
an example of a particularly bad case of conflation of non-equivalent definitions).12
In assessing the moderate empiricist programme I propose to concentrate on
Carnap: first, because his account of of analyticity is well worked-out and its
shortcomings therefore clearer; and second, because the chief critic of analyticity,
Quine, focuses on Carnap's writing. The goal of the discussion of Carnap is to find
an account of analyticity which will vindicate the analytic theory of a priori
knowledge. The search will end in failure, but the process of seeing it fail will
highlight the conceptual independence of apriority and analyticity, and will place
knowledge of a proposition; the support for the biconditional talks of the knowledge of the modal
status of a proposition. But there is no need for us to address this problem here.
12 The task of cataloguing and criticising a wide variety of definitions of analyticity is well carried out
by BonJour 1993/1998. BonJour, however, shows little sympathy for empiricism.
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us in a position to observe Quine's own tacit denial of this difference in his own
assumption of the analytic theory.
Carnap's account of language and analyticity
Carnap tries many times to give an account of analyticity which will vindicate the
analytic theory. Briefly stated, his most worked out attempt to explain the concept
of analyticity appeals to what he sees as the conventional nature of syntactical
linguistic rules (that is, rules for the formation of linguistic expressions): a sentence
will be analytic just in case it is provable purely on the basis of such rules. In this
way, Carnap hopes to give an epistemology for logic and mathematics which does
not appeal to obscure rationalist principles such as those adopted by Russell13, and
which we discussed briefly in chapter one. Conventions are chosen on pragmatic,
not evidential, grounds: this, it is hoped, will give conventions the independence
from experience needed to explain how all and only a priori truths are analytic. In
what follows, Carnap's proposals will be looked at in more detail, and we will see
that the deficiencies of the account of analyticity in terms of conventional syntactic
rules drives him to introduce a new, less perspicuous notion of analyticity. In
trying to show that this latter notion supports the analytic theory of a priori
knowledge, he has to assume that logical and mathematical truths are analytic in
this revised sense. This assumption will be seen to vitiate his attempt to establish
the analytic theory.
Carnap thinks the notion of analyticity is intuitively clear. He believes that
his theory of language reconstructs the concept and successfully assigns it a
technical role. In common with many authors of his period Carnap holds that
natural language is hopelessly vague and riddled with confusion: for scientific
work, he asserts, it is necessary to construct new languages which meet adequate
standards of clarity.'4 To speak of a class of entity x, we need to set up meaning rules
13 This point is made by Creath 1992.
14
Most notably, perhaps, Tarski (Tarski 1956).
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for forming and transforming expressions containing references to x. These rules
compose linguistic frameworks; such frameworks can deal with any kind of entity or
phenomenon we choose, whether abstract or physical. The apparatus of such
frameworks allows Carnap to identify what he takes to be an ambiguity with
respect to questions of existence. The question "does x exist?" can be interpreted in
two ways: as an internal or as an external question. Interpreted as an internal
question, it is resolvable using the meaning rules of the language. Questions about
the nature of the things which exist can likewise be decided by appeal to the rules,
or, where the language deals with physical phenomena and the question concerns
empirical facts, through a combination of application of the rules and empirical
investigation. Interpreted as an external question, however, the situation is
different; read as an external question Carnap holds that the question "does x exist?"
can only be understood as "is it reasonable to adopt a linguistic framework in which
there are xs?"15 This is crucial for Carnap's analytic theory of a priori knowledge: for
the central tenet of Carnap's theory of a priori knowledge is that questions
regarding the reasonableness of adopting a given linguistic framework are
pragmatic questions. It is reasonable to adopt a framework which contains a given
group of entities just in case the adoption of that framework will efficiently and
fruitfully perform the tasks for which it was developed: such a task might be the
communication of knowledge'6, or, for a scientific language, the prediction and
explanation of phenomena. Carnap's distinction between internal and external
questions allows him to classify metaphysical questions as nonsense: questions such
as "are there physical objects?" or "are there numbers?" are paradigm cases for
disambiguation as just outlined. Taken as internal questions, there are physical
objects or numbers just in case the language we adopt contains the apparatus for
constructing expressions which contain symbols for such entities. In Carnap's
opinion, however, such questions are not normally meant as internal ones, nor are
they meant as pragmatic questions concerning the adoption of linguistic
frameworks; in which case, he writes, the questions do not have a clear cognitive
15
Carnap 1956: Appendix A passim, though esp. 206.
16 Ibid. : 208.
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content: they are "pseudo questions".17 However, while maintaining this strict
distinction between internal and external questions, Carnap suggests that we
should be generous in allowing the development of linguistic frameworks. It is a
philosopher's job to assess frameworks for consistency, carefully to distinguish
internal from external questions, and to resolve those internal questions which can
be resolved purely through application of the meaning rules, but where that
application is complex. A philosopher has no say over which linguistic frameworks
should be adopted, since this is a matter for decision by those who will use them.
Carnap expresses this in his Principle of Tolerance.
It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions. [...] In
logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his
own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he
wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules
instead of philosophical arguments.18
The rules of a linguistic framework are to be considered implicit definitions of the
expressions that they introduce. A sentence A of some language L is an implicit
definition just in case A cannot be false without becoming a sentence of a language
different from L; equivalently, the truth of A is constitutive of the meaning of a term
that it involves.19 We implicitly define a term by assigning truth values to sentences
involving the term. If the implicit definition is successful, the term in question will
thereby be assigned whatever meaning is necessary for the sentences in which it
occurs to be true. As a consequence, linguistic frameworks cannot directly be
compared. Where some name "t" is defined one way in a language L,, and defined
differently in another language L,, L, and L2 do not conflict over the nature of ts,
because "t" in L, refers to something different from "t" in L,. To adapt an example of
Carnap's, we can consider two languages, one of which defines the spatial metric guv
as a constant, the other as a variable.20 These two languages do not disagree over
the nature of the spatial metric; rather, the expression "guv" means something
17 Ibid.: 209. See also Carnap 1937: 281ff.
18
Carnap 1937: 51-2.
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different in each language. So the claim "guv is a constant" can be made truly in the
first language, and the claim "guv is a variable" made truly in the second language,
without contradiction.
However, there are two less direct senses in which linguistic frameworks
can be compared.21 First, they can be compared with respect to their practical utility
in discharging the tasks for which they were constructed. Secondly, they can be
compared in point of how well the concepts they contain match intuitive concepts.
For Carnap, where a constructed concept has a meaning sufficiently close to that of
an intuitive concept already in use, the constructed concept can be considered an
explication of that intuitive concept. Although failure by a framework to provide
explication of intuitive concepts would not tell against that framework, frameworks
can be compared indirectly with respect to the degree to which they provide
explications of concepts already in use.
As suggested earlier, Carnap holds that his system of linguistic frameworks
allows him to explicate the intuitive concept of analyticity. His most developed
attempt to provide such an explication is that presented in The Logical Syntax of
Language.22 Ideally, Carnap would like a sentence to be analytic just in case it is
provable solely on the basis the syntactic rules of the linguistic framework.23 The
syntactic rules are supposed to be conventions for communication, adopted on
pragmatic, not evidential, grounds. Knowledge that a syntactic rule holds is
therefore supposed to be knowledge based not on experience, but on grasp of what
conventions have been adopted; and this independence from experience is meant to
transfer to all the theorems of the rules of the framework. If a sentence is provable
by reference to the syntactic rules, knowledge of it is at root knowledge of
conventions, and hence independent from experience, and hence a priori.
For Carnap's conventionalist account to be distinguished from
nonfactualism, it is important we establish that analytic sentences on Carnap's
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attempted model do in fact express genuine propositions, capable of being true or
false; if they are not truth-evaluable, a priori propositions would not be truth-
evaluable either, and we have argued that this position amounts to scepticism about
the existence of a priori knowledge.24 Clearly, for some analytic sentence p in a
linguistic framework L, Carnap would treat the question "is p true?" as a paradigm
case for disambiguation via the distinction between internal and external questions.
Treated as an internal question, the answer to the question is clearly "yes"; treated
as an external question, the question must be taken to mean "are there pragmatic
reasons for adopting L?", to which specifically philosophical considerations are not
relevant. Therefore, within Carnap's own framework, analytic sentences clearly
possess truth values.
But it is not necessary to lean too heavily on Carnap's own system to give a
positive answer to the question of whether analytic sentences regarded as
expressions of conventions are in fact true. As noted above, the rules of the
linguistic frameworks are to be considered implicit definitions of the terms they
introduce; that is, the terms gain their meaning through conventional decisions
regarding the truth values of the sentences in which they occur. This procedure
therefore involves assigning truth values to sentences: but the bearers of truth
values are propositions, and a sentence cannot have a truth value unless it expresses
a proposition. The procedure of implicit definition, therefore, guarantees that the
admissible sentences of a linguistic framework will express propositions.
Carnap's account therefore seems able to explain our a priori knowledge of
logical and mathematical propositions through appeal to a concept of analyticity
cashed out in terms of conventions, and in a way that avoids noncognitivism.
However, his account faces two problems.
First, it is incomplete. In a linguistic framework with the resources to
express facts about the physical world, there will be syntactical rules which are
designed for the formation of expressions which state empirical truths. If
provability by a linguistic rule was all there was to Carnap's account, these rules
24 See page 15.
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and the sentences derivable from them would have to be considered analytic truths.
But, of course, one of Carnap's goals in setting up his system of linguistic
frameworks is to explain the intuitively privileged epistemic status of truths of
mathematics and logic25; his goal will not be achieved should his version of the
analytic theory have the consequence that intuitively empirical facts have the status
of analytic truths. He therefore needs to identify, within the set of sentences
provable on the basis of linguistic rules, a distinction which corresponds to the
intuitive distinction between logico-mathematical truths and empirical truths.
An example might make the problem clearer. Consider a linguistic
framework set up for the purposes of expressing facts about Newtonian dynamics.
Such a linguistic framework, we might suppose, would be composed of rules
allowing the formation of expressions which, suitably interpreted, would express
logical and mathematical truths, and also facts involving properties of
spatiotemporal location, mass, velocity and the relationships set up between these
properties by the Newtonian framework. Some of these rules, let us suppose, allow
symbols to be combined to create the formula: "force=mass x acceleration". Other
rules will allow the combination of symbols to create the formula "2+2=4". From a
syntactic point of view, both of these formulae will be on a par: both are derivable
from the rules of the framework. However, given the obvious interpretation, the
latter intuitively will be, while the former intuitively will not be, an a priori truth. If
Carnap's system of frameworks is to explain our intuitions about the special
epistemic status of mathematical propositions he needs to identify some principled
difference between these two.
The second problem is particularly pressing: Carnap's system of linguistic
frameworks is unable in principle to account for the epistemic status of logic itself.
This important result - that logic cannot be true by convention - was established by
Quine in his 1936 paper "Truth by Convention".26 The significance of Quine's result
warrants an extended discussion of his paper; afterwards, we will see how Carnap
25 Stressed by Friedman, in Aspray and Kitcher 1988.
26
Reprinted in Quine 1966: 70-99.
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modified his system of linguistic frameworks so as to limit the damage to his project
which arises from Quine's argument, and how he tried to address the first problem.
Quine's "Truth by Convention"
Quine's 1936 paper is concerned to distinguish two types of convention. The
first of these can be called notational convention, and is the subject of section I of the
paper. Here, Quine discusses the possibility of constructing mathematics out of
logic through defining mathematical terms in terms of a small set of logical terms;
to be adequate, the definitions must proceed in such a way that the prior truth
values of mathematical sentences remain unchanged by the transformation into
sentences containing only logical vocabulary. The project of demonstrating that
mathematics is so constructible out of logic through definitions is known as the
logicist programme. Quine opines that the results of Russell and Whitehead's
Principia Mathematica demonstrate that the logicist programme poses no technical
problems, although the project was yet to be completed; in fact, there turned out to
be significant obstacles in the way of the completion of the logicist programme but
these do not here concern us. Of most interest for present purposes is the status of
the definitions which reduce mathematical expressions to expressions containing
only logical vocabulary; these definitions are conventions of notation. Quine
writes:
If for the moment we grant that all mathematics is thus definitionally
constructible from logic, then mathematics becomes true by convention in a
relative sense: mathematical truths become conventional transcriptions of logical
truths.27
The element of convention enters here since, assuming that all mathematics is
expressible in a purely logical vocabulary, we avail ourselves of non-reduced
mathematical expressions purely for the purpose of convenience: simple numerical
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definitions supporting the construction of mathematics from logic are therefore
conventions for transforming truths; what Carnap requires, however, are
conventions for creating truths.28 Conventions of notation can confer on
mathematics the epistemic status of logic; however, such conventions cannot help
to explain the epistemic status of logic itself. Trivially, logic is reducible to logic
through conventions of notation: no epistemic insight to the nature of logic is
afforded by this observation. If appeal to conventions is to afford insight into the
epistemic status of logic, then, a different sort of convention will have to be
employed; we can call this truth by convention proper. Section II of Quine's paper
discusses the possibility that logic can be thought of as conventional in this sense.
Section II considers the problem of how a reduced set of logical axioms can
be rendered true by convention. Quine selects for discussion axioms governing the
operators for negation, material conditional and universal quantification. It can be
shown that these operators are adequate for generating a complete system of
quantified first-order logic29; if, through the conventional introduction of linguistic
rules which assign them meaning, these concepts can be reconstructed within a
linguistic framework in such a way as to capture their customary usage, it may
seem reasonable to assert that the theorems of quantified first order logic are true by
convention. As we have seen in our earlier discussion of implicit definition, given
an undefined symbol "t" we can implicitly define it through assigning truth values
to certain expressions containing "f". Given uninterpreted symbols "not",
"if...then..." and "for every...", we are to assign them a meaning by specifying which
formulae containing them are true. This will be done by assigning truth values in
the first instance to formulae containing only the logical symbols essentially.
However, as Quine notes, we cannot simply list the expressions which are to be
true.
It would appear that we sit down to a list of expressions and check off as
arbitrarily true all those which, under ordinary usage, are true statements
involving only our logical primitives essentially; but this picture wanes when we
reflect that the number of such statements is infinite. If the convention whereby
28 Ibid.: 81.
29 See for example Hunter 1996.
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those statements are singled out as true is to be formulated in finite terms, we
must avail ourselves of conditions finite in length which determine infinite
classes of expressions.30
This requirement will be met by appealing to axiom schemas. The intention is to
appeal to axioms already in use, and to exploit these in order to assign truth to
infinite classes of expressions containing the as-yet undefined logical symbols
essentially. Quine takes as an example the schema
(i) If if p then q then if if q then r then if p then r .3I
An infinite class of expressions are then assigned the value true by the adoption of
the following convention:
(I) Let all results ofputting a statement for 'p', a statement for 'q', and a statement for
V in (i) be true.32
Two further conventions suffice to fix conventionally the meaning of the symbols
"not" and "if....then..." in such a way as to reflect ordinary usage, and generate a
system of propositional logic. These are (taking the symbol to stand for the
symbol "not"):
(II) Let any expression be true which yields a truth when put for 'q' in the result of
putting a truth for 'p' in 'Ifp then q'.
(III) Let all results of putting a statement for 'p' and a statement for 'q', in 'If p then if
~p then q' or 'If if ~p then p then p', be true .
Quine observes that the three conventions generate all and only expressions which
under ordinary usage are truths involving only the logical operators "if...then..." and
"not" essentially.33 All of these expressions are thus rendered true by convention;
30
Quine 1966: 84-5.
31 This corresponds to the principle of transitivity: p-^q, q^r |- p-*r .
32 Ibid.: 85. (Note: Quine refers to our proposition (i) as (1)).
33 Ibid.: 89. The proof of this is a variant on the completeness proof for the propositional calculus.
For details see Hunter 1996.
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and the derivation of theorems can be considered the unfolding of the conventions
we have adopted.
The system of propositional logic thus generated could be expanded into a
system of quantified logic. This would involve the adoption of further conventions
governing the assignment of truth to expressions containing the symbol "every",
and so implicitly defining that symbol, but we need not enter into the details of this
here. However, as Quine points out in section III, the expansion need not stop
there. Geometry can be rendered true by convention, by conventionally assigning
truth to the axioms of a suitably axiomatised system of geometry.14 And further
conventions could be set up which assigned to symbols such as "mass", "velocity"
etc., a meaning which matched the meaning already in use for these symbols,
rendering empirical propositions true by convention as well. Quine concludes:
If in describing logic and mathematics as true by convention what is
meant is that the primitives can be conventionally circumscribed in such fashion
as to generate all and only the accepted truths of logic and mathematics, the
characterisation is empty; our last considerations show that the same might be
said of any other body of doctrine as well.35
This of course is just the problem with Carnap's system of linguistic frameworks
which we mentioned not far back: in order to give substance to the claim that the
special epistemic status of logic and mathematics is to be accounted for by appeal to
conventions, he has to identify a principled difference between logico-mathematical
truths construed conventionally and empirical truths so construed. Carnap's
attempt to locate such a difference will be turned to shortly; Quine's conclusion in
the final pages of his 1936 paper must be set out first, as it seriously affects the
strategies available to Carnap in drawing the required distinction.
In the last five pages of the 1936 paper, Quine addresses the possibility that
logic can be considered true by convention in the sense that conventions actually
create the truths of logic. As we noted, there are an infinity of contexts in which the
logical connectives can appear, and therefore the conventions adopted in assigning
34
Quine appeals to Huntingdon's axiomatisation of geometry, (Huntingdon, E.V, 1913. "A Set of




Carnap's account of a priori knowledge
meaning to the logical constants must assign truth to infinite classes of expressions
at once. The conventions will therefore be general. But the application of a general
convention to a specific case will require an inference; and this inference must
appeal to the logical concepts implicitly defined by the conventions themselves.
To make this problem clear, we shall follow through Quine's example of
inference construed as the unfolding of conventions.16 Quine's example is as
follows. From
(3) If time is money then if time is not money then time is money
and
(5) If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if
time is not money then time is money then time is money then if time is
money then time is money
we can derive:
(6) If if if time is not money then time is money then time is money then if time
is money then time is money .37
The convention expressed in (II) requires that we adopt as true any expression
which yields a truth when put for 'q' in the result of putting a truth for 'p in 'If p
then q'. (6) has this property. Therefore, (6) is true by convention also. That is, (II),
in conjunction with (3) and (5), directs us to adopt the convention:
(7) (6) is to be true.
36 I have renumbered the propositions in Quine's example to be continuous with the numbering of
propositions in this chapter overall.
37
Quine's example is hard to follow; but by writing "P" for the sentence "time is money", and inserting
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This inference, if construed as the unfolding of conventions, masks an infinite
regress. For the inference of (6) from (3) and (5) must be interpreted as an inference
from the general convention (II), plus the premise that (3) and (5) are true, to (7). To
expose the regress, Quine proposes an uncontentious rewriting of (II) as follows:
(IT) No matter what x may be, no matter what y may be, no matter what z may be, if x
and z are true [statements] and z is the result ofputting xfor 'p' and y for 'q' in 'If
p then q' then y is to be true.
The additional premise, required for the deduction of (7), is:
(8) (3) and (5) are true and (5) is the result of putting (3) for 'p' and (6) for 'q' in
'If p then q'.
From (IT) and (8) we can infer (7). Quine:
This inference is obviously sound logic; as logic, however, it involves use of (II')
and others of the conventions from which logic is supposed to spring.18
Following through this inference on the basis of the conventional account of logic
reveals the regress. Suppose we have a convention (IV), introduced as an implicit
definition of the symbol "every", which allows us to perform universal instantiation
- that is, to infer specific instances from universally quantified expressions. Three
applications of convention (IV) on (IT) allow us to infer the following:
(9) If (3) and (5) are true and (5) is the result of putting (3) for 'p' and (6) for 'q' in
'If p then q' then (6) is to be true.
Then (7) can be inferred from (8) and (9), via the following application of
convention (IT):
(10) (8) and (9) are true and (9) is the result of putting (8) for 'p and (7) for 'q' in
'If p then q'.
38 Ibid.-. 96.
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But to infer (7) from (10) and (IF) we have to go through just the procedure needed
to get (6) from (8) and (IF). The regress is evident. Quine concludes:
In a word, the difficulty is that if logic is to proceed mediately from conventions,
logic is needed for inferring logic from the conventions.39
The difficulty can also be seen by focusing on the requirement, mentioned briefly
earlier, that the symbols to be conventionally defined as logical operators start off
uninterpreted; to interpret the symbols we need recourse to a metalanguage which




This result poses serious problems for the moderate empiricist attempt to motivate
(1). Intuitively, logical truths are knowable a priori; the demonstration that
knowledge of logical truths cannot be explained by appeal to convention thus puts
an infinite class of propositions outside the remit of the conventionalist programme.
The force of Quine's argument is such that moderate empiricist responses to it are
essentially exercises in damage-limitation. Often this damage limitation amounts to
little more than a retreat into obfuscation: it is common, for example, in
introductory books on philosophy to find logical truths described as "true in virtue
of what they mean" without any effort to explain how this appeal to analyticity is
supposed to help. This is not the approach taken by Carnap, however, who in The
Logical Syntax of Language assigns quantified first order logic a special status.
Carnap's strategy here has been well set out by Friedman.41 The idea was to
39 Ibid.: 97.
40 In asserting this conclusion I pass over the possibility of giving a conventional account of logic
whereby logic proceeds immediately by convention. In an influential article, Dummett interprets
Wittgenstein as offering such an account (Dummett 1959). However, this type of radical
conventionalism has not been thought to be promising, and I will not discuss it. (See also Putnam
1983).
41 Friedman in Aspray and Kitcher 1988.
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respond to Quine's demonstration that no conventionalist epistemology could be
given for quantified first order logic by showing that no such epistemology was
needed. Friedman writes that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, attempted to show that
the logic of Frege's Begriffsschrift (that is: first order quantified logic) is built into
thought itself, being built into any system of representation that could be called a
language.
...from Wittgenstein's point of view, the Begriffsschrift rests on two basic ides
[sic]: Frege's function/argument analysis of predication and quantification, and
the iterative construction of complex expressions from simpler expressions via
truth-functions. So any language in which we can discern both
function/argument structure - in essence, where there are grammatical categories
of intersubstitutable terms - and truth-functional iterative constructions will
automatically contain all the logical forms and principles of the new logic as
well. Since it is plausible to suppose that any system of representation lacking
these two features cannot count as a language in any interesting sense, it makes
perfectly good sense to view the new logic as delimiting the general conditions
of any rational thinking whatsoever. For the new logic is now seen as
embodying the most general conditions of meaningfulness (meaningful
representation) as such.42
On this view, Friedman writes, it makes no sense to sense to enquire into the
foundations of logic:
Logic rests on no facts whatsoever, and certainly not facts about the meaning or
usages of English (or German) words. Rather, logic rests on the abstract
combinatorial possibilities common to all languages as such. In this sense, logic
is absolutely presuppositionless and thus absolutely uncontentious.43
Given that Carnap, as a moderate empiricist, is committed to producing an analytic
theory of a priori knowledge, we should read this strategy as an attempt to shore up
the theory that logical truths are analytic in the face of Quine's critique of
conventionalism. But the sense in which logic thereby becomes "analytic" is, in
spite of Friedman's comments, very unclear. The analyticity of logical truths, it
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perhaps intuitively plausible to say that such a view attributes analyticity to logical
truths; certainly they are "true in virtue of meaning" in some sense. But the sense in
which they are true in virtue of meaning is hard to precisify and evaluate. We shall
shortly see, in Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", general criticisms of the
concept of analyticity which may tell against the present notion. For the moment,
though, the shored-up account faces more pressing problems.
Carnap's position is that with this one concession to Quine's anti-
conventionalist arguments, he can proceed to define "analytic" in such a way that
the truths of mathematics and of logical systems other than quantified first order
logic do come out as analytic in the sense of being derived from conventions. Now,
one problem with the account of "non-conventionalist" analyticity derived from the
Tractatus is that the logic whose epistemic status is thereby supposedly assured is
too weak to allow for the formalisation of anything more than primitive recursive
arithmetic.44 If the concept of analyticity was exhausted by the notion of analyticity
in play in the Tractatus, then the moderate empiricists' commitment to (1) would
require them to prescind from claiming a priori status for anything more than
primitive recursive arithmetic. Carnap recognises this and proposes to use
quantified first order logic as a metalanguage in which more powerful formal
systems can be set up. The intention is to show that formulae provable by the
linguistic rules of these more powerful systems will be counted as analytic in the
sense of being derived from conventions. The linguistic framework equivalent to
quantified first order logic Carnap calls Language I; the epistemic status of this
language is supposed secured by the Tractarian considerations discussed above.43
Language I forms the meta-language with which the linguistic rules of other
linguistic frameworks can be set up. In line with the Principle of Tolerance46, the
linguistic frameworks set up using Language I as a metalanguage can be such as to
44 Ibid.: 92. See also Quine 1966: 110.
45
Carnap breaks with Wittgenstein in allowing that the syntactic rules of Language I are expressible
within Language I. Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, believed that this was impossible, holding that the
rules could be "shown" but not "said", and that expressions of the syntactic rules of logic amounted to
meaningless tautologies. Carnap, on the other hand, takes the work of Hilbert and Godel to have
refuted this view. See Carnap 1937: 281-84; Friedman in Aspray and Kitcher 1988: 85.
46 See page 20.
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form sentences about any kind of phenomenon, physical, mathematical or
otherwise; and we have already had occasion to note that this leaves Carnap with
the difficulty of distinguishing, within the set of propositions expressed by
sentences provable by the linguistic rules of a given language, the intuitively a
priori propositions. We now turn to examine Carnap's attempted solution to this
problem.
The problem of logical and physical rules
Following Carnap, we shall call a syntactic rule of a linguistic framework an L-rule
just in case it is a rule for the formation and transformation of sentences of logic and
mathematics; a P-rule will be a syntactic rule of a linguistic framework that is not an
L-rule.47 P-rules govern the formation and transformation of sentences referring to
physical, that is, non-logico-mathematical, phenomena. It is intuitively plausible
that there is such a distinction, but as it stands it has been drawn in terms of what
terms refer to, that is, on semantic grounds. For Carnap, the problem of providing a
moderate empiricist epistemology of a priori propositions is that of finding a
syntactic criterion which will divide up the set of rules for a given linguistic
framework in a way which matches the intuitive, semantic, distinction. Carnap
believes that this criterion can be developed on the basis of a prior distinction
between logical and descriptive vocabulary. This latter distinction also has intuitive
plausibility, but while it remains at the level of intuition it is too vague and informal
to do epistemological work.48 It can, however, be clarified.
But if we reflect that all the connections between logico-mathematical terms are
independent of extra-linguistic factors, such as, for instance, empirical
observations, and that they must be solely and completely determined by the
transformation rules of the language, we find the formally expressible
distinguishing peculiarity of logical symbols and expressions to consist in the
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A sentence of a linguistic framework is determinate just in case it is either a logical
consequence of the empty set or a contradiction.50 This appeal by Carnap to the
concept of logical consequence, as opposed to the concept of syntactic consequence,
is significant and will be returned to shortly. Given this definition of "determinacy",
Carnap defines the set of logical expressions as the largest set R of atomic
expressions such that every sentence which can be sub-divided solely into members
of R is determinate.31
The distinction between L- and P-rules is intended to be defined on the basis
of this definition. Note that it will not suffice to define a P-rule simply as any rule
which contains descriptive vocabulary, since there can be rules with instances
containing descriptive vocabulary which must be counted as logical. For example,
where D is a descriptive predicate, the following expression is an instance of an L-
rule52:
(11) Dx—>(~Dx—>Dx) .
To set up a definition of "L-rule" we need some new terminology.53 A substitution
for vocabulary within a sentence is grammatically admissible just in case vocabulary
is substituted for by expressions of the same grammatical category; a substitution is
uniform just in case the same value is assigned to equal variables. (4) is an L-rule
because it is true, and remains true under any uniform grammatically acceptable
substitution for the descriptive predicate D. In essence, then, an L-rule is a true
sentence of a linguistic framework such that either (i) it contains only logical
vocabulary or (ii) it contains descriptive vocabulary and remains true for any
uniform grammatically admissible substitution for that descriptive vocabulary.54
50 Ibid.: 173.
51 Ibid.: 177-8. This definition is not satisfactory. 3x3y xty meets Carnap's definition of a determinate
sentence and yet it does not appear to be a matter of logic alone that there is more than one thing in the
universe. Carnap does not appear to address this problem in The Logical Syntax ofLanguage. (For
discussion see Etchemendy 1990.)
52
Carnap 1937: 180-1.
53 The terminology is not Carnap's own: it is drawn from Etchemendy 1990.
54 Ibid., and Carnap 1937: 180-1.
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By classing a sentence as analytic just in case it is an instance of an L-rule of
a language, Carnap hopes to substantiate his intuition that all and only a priori
propositions are analytic. The problem for this account lies, however, with his
appeal to the concept of logical consequence in his account of the distinction
between logical and descriptive vocabulary. As Carnap is well aware, Godel's
incompleteness theorem states that for a suitably strong formal system, the set of
logical consequences of that system will be larger than the set of syntactic
consequences - that is, there will be truths of that system which cannot be proved.
It is only for first order predicate logic and systems weaker than this that the sets of
syntactic and semantic consequences coincide.'5 The segregation of logical and
descriptive vocabulary for a linguistic framework L (where L instantiates a formal
system to which Godel's incompleteness theorem applies; that is, it is one whose
logical consequences outstrip its syntactic consequences) cannot therefore be
established purely on the basis of the syntactic rules of that language. There is
therefore no purely syntactic guarantee that the set of logico-mathematical
vocabulary so defined will correspond to the intuitive set of logico-mathematical
vocabulary. But Carnap cannot define a sentence as analytic just in case it is a
logical consequence of L, since this fails to address the problem of distinguishing
the L- and the P-consequences of the framework. Instead, in giving his general
definition of analyticity56, Carnap gives a recursive definition analogous to Tarski's
recursive definition of truth.5' Such a recursive definition of a property (p is
intended to be able to establish, for any given expression p of a language L, whether
tpp. Now, for a language L, Tarski defines truth-in-L within a metalanguage L'
composed of L augmented by a list of all the true atomic expressions of L.58
Analogously, Carnap has to define analytic-in-L within a metalanguage L' which
contains all the atomic expressions of L that are analytic. But we have access to
such a metalanguage just in case we have already determined which atomic
expressions of L are analytic.
55 Hunter 1996.
56
Carnap 1937: 1 10-12.
57 Cf. "The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages", reprinted in Tarski 1956.
58 For simplicity, I assume that L is a propositional, not a quantified, language.
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In giving a recursive metalinguistic definition of "analytic-in-L" which will
have the consequence that logic and mathematics are analytic, Carnap has to
assume that logic and mathematics are analytic. Quine maintains that this decision
is made arbitrarily, and that any other set of propositions could have been chosen
for inclusion in the definition of "analytic". Given this decision, he writes,
...the thesis that logico-mathematical truth is syntactically specifiable becomes
uninteresting. For, what it says is that logico-mathematical truth is specifiable in
a notation consisting solely of [names of signs, an operator expressing
concatenation of expressions], and the whole logico-mathematical vocabulary
itself. But this thesis would hold equally if "logico-mathematical" were
broadened[...] to include physics, economics, and anything else under the sun;
Tarski's routine of truth definition would still carry through just as well. No
special feature of logic and mathematics has been singled out after all.59
This last sentence, though, is tendentious. Carnap, we might think, includes logic
and mathematics in the metalinguistic definition precisely because he thinks they
have a special status; namely, that they are a priori. To be sure, this assumption
vitiates his argument that logic and mathematics are a priori because analytic, but it
is important to be clear why this is so. In broad, schematic outline, we can see
Carnap as wanting to prove
(12) The propositions of logic and mathematics are a priori.
He does this by assuming (1) and then giving an account of analyticity which has
the consequence that
(13) The propositions of logic and mathematics are analytic.60
But to prove (13) he has, in effect, to assume (12)! Someone who was well disposed
to the existence of a priori knowledge might find it plausible to say that (12) is
simply a datum and can well be assumed: the mistake, it might be thought, is to
59 Quine 1966: 118.
60 That is: they are expressed by sentences which are analytic.
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think that it needs justifying by appeal to (1) and (13). Carnap is in effect trying to
give a reductive definition of the concept of apriority; his failure to provide one
could be seen as evidence that the concept is simply independent of the concept of
analyticity. Quine sees things differently, however. As we will see, Quine does not
distinguish between apriority and analyticity; from his perspective, Carnap has
simply assumed that logic and mathematics are analytic in order to prove that they
are analytic.
Whatever interpretation we adopt, Carnap is unable to give any formal
substance to his prior intuition that all and only logico-mathematical sentences are
analytic; so his system of linguistic frameworks cannot help to explain analyticity in
such a way as to demonstrate the truth of (1). In effect, in trying to formalise the
distinction between logical and descriptive language, Carnap depends on the very
intuition he is trying to formalise. Even granted a special epistemic status for
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Quine writes that the analytic theory goes "sturdily on" in the face of the doubts
aired in the previous chapter.1 This is unsurprising: since the moderate empiricists
are committed to giving an analytic theory of a priori knowledge, they cannot take
failure to give an account of analyticity that vindicates that theory as evidence that
the theory itself is false. Quine's disparaging of the analytic theory might make it
appear that he actually does reject it; this chapter casts doubt on this appearance.
A principled rejection of the analytic theory would involve, at the very least,
the citing of counterexamples to (l)2; a more satisfying rejection would add to this
an account of why an appeal to analyticity is inappropriate in giving an explanation
of the nature of a priori knowledge. I argue in this chapter that Quine attempts
only to do the latter. The claim he tries to establish is in effect the following: the
severe problems with the concept of analyticity render it unsuitable for playing any
explanatory role at all, and a fortiori unsuitable for explaining a priori knowledge.
But there is no evidence that Quine rejects (1). Indeed, it seems he must accept it,
for "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", the locus classicus of doubts about analyticity,
begins with a critique of analyticity, and ends with an endorsement of what has
come to be called "naturalised epistemology". Naturalised epistemology is often
glossed as epistemology which rejects a priori knowledge; so, we might think that
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" contains an inference from the noninstantiation of
analyticity to the noninstantiation of apriority; and the most natural way to do this
is via the assumption of the left-to-right component of (1):
Vp (p is a priori —» p is analytic) .
Since the right-to-left component, that is,
1
Quine 1966: 119.
2 The claimed equivalence between apriority and analyticity cited in chapter two.
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Vp (p is analytic -» p is a priori)
is independently plausible, it would seem that Quine does not cite counterexamples
to (1); and since it is plausible that the citing of such counterexamples is a necessary
condition for a principled rejection of the analytic theory, he does not really reject
the analytic theory. In fact acceptance of the theory is central to his epistemological
project. If this is right, we might expect to see traces of the analytic theory in the
theories of more recent philosophers who have reflected on a priori knowledge
from a Quinean perspective. The following chapter will vindicate this expectation.
The present chapter, however, is concerned with the role of the analytic theory in
the development of Quine's own epistemology, and with showing that Quine's
doubts about analyticity should not be construed as doubts about the analytic
theory itself. Having done this, I go on to suggest that the widespread tendency to
treat a priori knowledge as unrevisable knowledge3 arose because of Quine's own
acceptance of the analytic theory; and I raise problems for the analytic theory which
are independent of Quine's considerations. For now, however, these suggestions
need bearing out with a close discussion of Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".
Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
We will discuss "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" with two aims.
The first aim is to assess his critique of analyticity. This will involve three steps:
(i) Identification of the notion of analyticity which Quine attacks. We have
already seen that the conventionalist account is not the only possible way of
clarifying the concept of analyticity. We have seen two further options
already: the attempt could be made to explain analyticity by appeal to the
concept of necessity; or, following the ideas about the status of logic
identified by Friedman in the Tractatus and the Begriffsschrift, an attempt
3 A belief is unrevisable, roughly, if there is no situation in which it is rational to give it up. A detailed
definition is proposed in chapter five.
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could be made to explain analyticity directly through appeal to the concept
of meaning, without cashing out the latter concept in terms of conventions.
Thus, there are a number of non-equivalent accounts of analyticity available;
which of these, then, is Quine attacking? Or does he rather intend his
considerations to apply to any account of analyticity whatsoever?
(ii) Identification of the anti-analyticity thesis that he endorses. As Grice and
Strawson stress4, there are a number of ways of criticising a distinction:
It can be criticised for not being a sharp distinction (for admitting cases
which do not fall clearly on either side of it; or on the ground that the
terms in which it is customarily drawn are ambiguous (have more than
one meaning); or on the ground that it is confused (the different meanings
are habitually conflated)/
As they point out, Quine's aims in criticising the concept of analyticity are
not of this sort. Adopting recent terminology, we can draw a distinction
between a nonfactualist thesis and an error thesis about a putative class of
entities, say, the class of as.6 To adopt a nonfactualist thesis about as is to
maintain that the concept of an a is incoherent, and hence that expressions
containing apparent references to as are without a truth value. On an error
thesis about as, it is allowed that the concept of an a is coherent: a strong
error thesis would then claim that, despite this, the property of being an a is
necessarily uninstantiated; a weak error thesis claims that there is serious
and widespread error in our beliefs about as, such that the vast majority of
our beliefs about as are false. Given that Quine does not advance a modest
critique of analyticity of the sort described by Grice and Strawson, which of
these two more radical theses does he propound?
(iii) Determination of whether Quine's attacks, suitably clarified, are cogent.
There is particular concern that the arguments in sections 1 to 4, to the effect
4 Grice and Strawson 1956.
5 Ibid. : 141.
6 The terminology to be introduced drawn from Boghossian 1996/1997.
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that the concept of analyticity admits of no non-circular definition, fail to
establish any strong anti-analyticity thesis7; and there is also concern that a
striking picture of language and meaning is advanced in the last two
sections without significant argument or detail.
The second aim is to assess Quine's position on the analytic theory. Only once the
above issues have been addressed will we be in a position to judge whether Quine's
discussion in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" bears directly on the analytic theory.
We will see that Quine doesn't question the analytic theory itself.
The structure of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is apparently quite simple;
this simplicity, as we have already suggested, masks underlying difficulties of
interpretation. The two theses of empiricism Quine attacks are (i) that there is a
privileged class of analytic truths and (ii) that verification conditions can be given
for individual expressions of a language (this is the thesis of "atomic
verificationism"). The arguments against (i) take up sections 1 to 4 of the paper. In
these sections Quine examines and rejects a series of attempts to clarify the concept
of analyticity. The apparent conclusion is that there is no way of giving a definition
of "analytic" that does not appeal to concepts which are as much in question as the
concept of analyticity itself. Section 5 considers the verification theory of meaning
and argues briefly against the view that verification conditions can be given for
expressions individually. Section 6 sketches a type of verificationist semantics, the
adoption of which is apparently incompatible with maintaining the existence of a
class of analytic truths; he then discusses the implications of adopting such a
semantics for general philosophical and scientific issues.
However, once we try to give an interpretation of Quine's paper which goes
beyond the superficial level things become more contentious. We therefore need to
examine Quine's paper in more detail.
7 See for example, Grice and Strawson 1956, Dummett 1978, Priest 1979, Wright in Butterfield 1986.
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Quine begins in section 1 by considering and rejecting two suggestions
made by Kant. The first is that we can define "analytic" by appeal to the concept of
self-contradiction. The idea would be that a sentence is analytic just in case it is
self-contradictory to deny it. This, he concludes, simply shifts the burden of
explanation onto the notion of self-contradictoriness, a notion in just as much need
of clarification as the concept of analyticity.8 He finds equally unhelpful Kant's
definition of an analytic judgement as one in which the predicate is contained in the
subject. This is rejected as being applicable only to judgements and appealing to a
notion of containment which is merely metaphorical. Quine draws from Kant,
however, an expression of the intuitive notion of analyticity, namely that "a
statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of
facts."9 The problem with this intuitive definition is that the concept of meaning it
appeals to itself stands in need of clarification. Two distinct notions are typically
conflated under the heading of "meaning". The first is reference (or "extension"), the
reference of an expression being, in the standard formulation, that entity for which
it stands. The second is sense (or "intension"), the sense being that feature of the
meaning of the expression which determines its reference. Expressions with the
same reference can have different sense: for example, the expressions "creature with
a heart" and "creature with kidneys" are co-referring but differ in sense.
For reasons made clearer at a later stage in the paper10, and to which we will
shortly return, the concept of analyticity cannot be clarified through appeal to a
concept of meaning cashed out in terms of extension or reference. Analyticity,
therefore, is a property at the level of sense. "Meaning", as used in the rest of
Quine's paper, refers to sense; I will follow Quine's usage. Quine then expresses
doubts that the theory of meaning can be understood as a theory of the properties of
certain entities called "meanings": he asserts, without argument, that the theory of
meaning is exhausted by the study of synonymous and analytic linguistic forms.
Once the theory of meaning is sharply distinguished from the theory of
reference, it is a short step to recognizing as the primary business of the theory of
8
Quine 1953: 20.
9 Ibid. : 21.
10 Ibid.: 30-1.
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meaning simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of
statements; meanings themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, may well be
abandoned.11
Granting Quine this point, the lack of explanatory value of the intuitive definition
of "analyticity" becomes clear: the appeal to "meaning" masks an appeal to the very
concept which is to be explained.
Dropping discussion of the intuitive definition of analyticity, Quine
distinguishes two classes of analytic sentences: there are the logical truths, which
are those true sentences which preserve their truth through all uniform
grammatically admissible substitutions for their nonlogical particles, and which
Quine, in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", treats as unproblematic12; and there are
those sentences which are reducible to logical truths through intersubstitution of
synonyms.13 For convenience, and not following Quine's own usage, I shall call
sentences of the latter type "Frege-analytic".14
Frege-analytic expressions are synonymous with logical truths. Since Quine
takes the analyticity of logical truths for granted, it seems we can give an account of
Frege-analyticity just in case we can give an adequate account of synonymy. Quine
accordingly turns, in sections 2 and 3 of the paper, to a discussion of attempts to
define "synonymy".
Section 2 is given over to accounts of synonymy in terms of definition.
Definitions, he points out, express prior relations of synonymy and hence cannot be
appealed to in explaining synonymy. Much the same is true for Carnap's notion of
explication. Explication does not restrict itself to reporting existing relations of
synonymy, but attempts to improve the concept to be defined by refining its
meaning; however, this process also appeals to, and therefore cannot explain, the
concept of synonymy.
11 Ibid.: 22.
12 We pass over, as does Quine, the problem of defining what it is for an expression to be a logical
particle. An early discussion of this problem can be found in Tarski's essay "On The Concept of
Logical Consequence" (in Tarski 1956).
13
Quine 1953: 22.
14 After Frege's definition of "analytic" in Foundations ofArithmetic (Frege 1950). The terminology is
used by Boghossian 1997.
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Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as wholes, are clear and
precise enough to be useful; and the purpose of explication is to preserve the
usage of these favoured contexts while sharpening the usage of other contexts. In
order that a given definition be suitable for purposes of explication, therefore,
what is required is not that the definiendum in its antecedent usage be
synonymous with the definiens, but just that each of these favoured contexts of
the definiendum, taken as a whole in its antecedent usage, be synonymous with
the corresponding context of the definiens.15
We must note, however, that Quine admits of certain cases of definition in which a
relation of synonymy is indeed set up: this is where a definiendum is introduced
specifically for the purpose of being synonymous with the definiens. Quine calls
this "the explicitly conventional introduction of novel notation for purposes of
sheer abbreviation."16 He claims, however, that this is a special and rare case of
definition and cannot help to explain synonymy generally.
In section 3 Quine considers whether synonymy can be defined by appeal to
the concept of interchangeability. He begins by considering whether two
expressions will be synonymous just in case they are interchangeable in all
linguistic contexts without change of truth value (in Leibniz' phrase:
"intersubstitutable salva veritate"). This idea requires refinement, however, since
even for intuitive cases of synonym pairs such as "bachelor" and "unmarried man"
there are contexts where intersubstitutability salva veritate fails. For example, the
expression "she is a bachelor of arts" can be turned false (or ungrammatical) by
substitution of "unmarried man" for "bachelor". Quine proposes to set aside such
anomalous cases, provisionally by treating "bachelor of arts" and analogous
expressions as a single word. We then modify our proposed definition of
"synonymous" as follows:
(i) Expressions a and (3 are synonymous just in case a and (3 are
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As Quine points out, the suggestion assumes that we have an account of what a
word is, but by reducing the problem of synonymy to the problem of wordhood we
would have made progress.
Quine now considers how interchangeability might be used to explain
synonymy. We assume for the sake of example that "bachelor" and "unmarried
man" are interchangeable within the constraints given in (i). Then, taking the
obvious truth
(ii) Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors.
we can substitute for one occurrence of "bachelor" to generate:
(iii) Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men.
This is, Quine asserts, equivalent to saying that the following sentence is analytic:
(iv) All and only bachelors are unmarried men
and if (iv) is analytic then 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are synonymous. Hence,
it seems, interchangeability, suitably constrained, can be used to define
"synonymy". However, the difficulty, Quine says, is that this argument makes free
use of the concept of necessity. Quine's position in the 1951 paper is that the
concept of necessity can itself only be explained by appeal to the concept of
analyticity. A language containing the adverb "necessarily" is an intensional
language, and Quine holds that intensional languages make sense just in case the
concept of analyticity makes sense. To appeal to necessity in defining "synonymy"
would presuppose that we have already made sense of analyticity, but the attempt
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to define synonymy was embarked upon in order to make sense of analyticity.17
Interchangeability salva veritate cannot be used to define a notion of synonymy
appropriate to giving an account of analyticity.
A purely extensional language is characterised by co-referring expressions
of the language being interchangeable in all linguistic contexts without change of
truth value. While a purely extensional language avoids the obscurities Quine
associates with necessity, in such a language intersubstitutability except within
words salva veritate does not provide a criterion for synonymy, as there is no way to
distinguish statements that are true and well established, from those which follow
from prior relationships of synonymy. For example, assuming that for ingrained
social and biological reasons, marriage, and marriage alone, was the source of
happiness: then "no bachelors are happy" and "no bachelors are married" are both
true, but no concept of necessity or analyticity is available with which to draw a
distinction between the types of truth which they possess.
These considerations exhaust Quine's discussion of the possibility of
explaining analyticity via an account of synonymy. In section 4 he addresses the
possibility that the concept of analyticity might be explained through appeal to the
semantical rules of formalised languages. We have already discussed an early
attempt on these lines, namely Carnap's attempt to define "analytic" using a
syntactic criterion, and Quine's comments in the present section of the 1951 paper
parallel the objections we have already seen raised against Carnap's project.
Quine considers two ways in which an appeal to the rules of artificial
languages might help explain the concept of analyticity. First, he considers a
language L whose rules just are the set of all analytic sentences of L; it seems, then,
that for L we know precisely which sentences are analytic. But in the absence of an
account of analyticity, Quine says, this procedure is empty: it attributes a property
to the rules of L which has not yet been explained. It might be thought, however,
that the set of rules of L at least can be used to frame a definition of "analytic-for-L":
17 Ibid.: 29-30. Quine's identification of the concepts of necessity and analyticity comes out clearly in
his paper "Reference and Modality", reprinted in Quine 1953. See also his "Three Grades of Modal
Involvement" in Quine 1966.
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that is, a sentence S will be analytic-for-L just in case it is one of the rules of L. This
procedure segregates a set of sentences of L and assigns a property to them, but
does not help us pick out the analytic sentences of other languages, does not give us
a general criterion for analyticity, and so, Quine thinks, does not help us
understand the concept of analyticity at all.18
The second way in which artificial languages might be thought helpful is as
follows. A semantical rule of a language can be thought of as implicitly defining a
term within it by stipulating that some class of sentences containing that term are to
be true (we discussed Carnap's early formulation of this idea above). We could,
then, try classifying a sentence as analytic just in case it is true, and true in virtue of
being assigned the value true by a semantical rule. But this procedure depends for
its informativeness on our having some antecedent way of determining which are
the semantical rules of a language. Not all sentences of a language can be
semantical rules, on pain of making all true sentences of the language analytic. But
the selection of a subset of true sentences of a language to be the semantical rules is
done on the basis of convention and does not reflect any interesting property which
can be used to define "analytic".
Semantical rules are distinguishable, apparently, only by the fact of appearing on
a page under the heading "Semantical Rules"; and this heading is itself then
meaningless.19
The present strategy, Quine suggests, is driven by a confusion of the role of
postulates in setting up axiomatised formal systems. A formal system can be
axiomatised by selecting as axioms certain theorems of that system which are then
useful in deriving other results. The selected theorems are postulates, chosen on
conventional and pragmatic grounds relative to some aim in setting up the system -
perhaps, economy of formalisation. Those who try to define "analytic" by reference
to semantical rules are treating semantical rules as postulates to the extent that
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thereby made true by convention. Yet it is the latter property which would be
required in order to arrive at a definition of "analytic" which corresponded to the
intuitive notion.20
These considerations exhaust Quine's attempts to find a definition of
"analytic". He concludes by remarking on the naturalness of inferring from the
double dependence of truth on language and fact, to the existence of a class of
analytic truths which are true just in virtue of language. But this inference is
mistaken:
For all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic
simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is
an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.21
The direct discussion of analyticity over, Quine turns in section 5 to the
verification theory of meaning, with which the second dogma is associated. The
verification theory of meaning we have already mentioned in chapter one: roughly
speaking, it is the view that the meaning of a sentence is closely associated with the
set of observations which would confirm or infirm it, though a thoroughgoing
definition is hard to come by. Quine discusses several modes in which the
verification theory can operate. The earliest verificationist semantics, which Quine
calls "radical reductionist", is that associated with Locke and Hume. On this view,
the meaning of every term of a language is in some sense identified with a set of
experiences, and the meaning of a compound expression is a function of these
experiences. Such an account requires, in effect, every term to be counted as a name
of certain experiences, and this view, though perhaps plausible in the case of proper
names, is much less plausible when applied to such categories of terms as
predicates, logical operators etc. A more plausible verification theory, developed by
Frege and Bentham, attributes verification conditions only to entire sentences: that
is, the sentence becomes the smallest unit of meaning. This we can call an
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"attenuated reductionist" thesis, since the strict term-by-term reduction of Locke
and Hume has been abandoned. This view, Quine says, is identical with the view
that there is a special class of analytic truths: the analytic truths will be those
expressed by sentences which are confirmed by every experience.
The verification theory of meaning, which has been conspicuous in the literature
from Peirce onward, is that the meaning of a statement is the method of
empirically confirming or infirming it. An analytic statement is that limiting
case which is confirmed no matter what.22
The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated form, is intimately
connected with the other dogma - that there is a cleavage between the analytic
and the synthetic. We have found ourselves led, indeed, from the latter problem
to the former through the verification theory of meaning. More directly, the one
dogma clearly supports the other in this way: as long as it is taken to be
significant in general to speak of the confirmation and infirmation of a
statement, it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement
which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; and such a statement
is analytic.
The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical...23
Quine proposes that the move from radical to attenuated reductionism does
not go far enough: the attenuated account still takes too narrow a view of the units
of meaning. Sentences, Quine suggests, only have meaning as part of a body of
sentences24; and on the next page he goes further, stating that the body of sentences
within which individual sentences have meaning is identical with the totality of
scientific theory.23 Quine's position, that only in the context of the entirety of science
does a sentence have meaning, can be termed "holistic verificationism", and is
returned to in section 6. The grade of reductionism intermediate between "radical
reductionist" and "holistic" can usefully be termed "atomic verificationism".26
In the sixth and final section of the paper, Quine fills out some details of the
holistic semantic theory and draws some consequences from it. Quine's theory of
22 Ibid.: 37.
23 Ibid. : 41.
24 Ibid. : 41.
25 Ibid.: 42.
26 See F0llesdal in Guttenplan (ed.) 1975.
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language is commonly explained through the introduction of the metaphor of a
"web of belief", though in fact this metaphor is not used in the 1951 paper. Quine
does appeal to two different metaphors - that of the totality of knowledge as being a
"man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along its edges", and of total
science as being a "field of force whose boundary conditions are experience" - but
this is in the context of giving an account of the revision of beliefs which is for the
most part uncontentious. Quine describes the properties of the system of beliefs as
follows.
A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the
interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our
statements. Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of others,
because of their logical interconnections...27
This is simply a picture of belief-revision induced by experience, and constrained
by requirements of consistency within the belief-set. The picture is augmented,
however, in three significant ways.
First, and without argument, Quine adds that the logical connections
between sentences can also be revised on the basis of experience. The quotation
begun above continues:
Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because of their
logical interconnections - the logical laws being in turn simply certain further
statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having
reevaluated one statement we must reevaluate some others, which may be
statements logically connected with the first or may be the statements of the
logical connections themselves.28
Second: the core and the periphery of the system of beliefs29 are to be
distinguished by reference to the degree to which specific experiences bear on the





Quine talks of the revision of statements, rather than beliefs. However, I think the idea of the
revision of a belief is more intuitive than the idea of the revision of a statement, and I have recast my
commentary on Quine accordingly.
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which could lead us to revise it; more central beliefs can be revised in response to
indefinitely many different experiences.30 However, this distinction is limited in the
following ways. Quine asserts (a) that any belief can be held true come what may:
that is, even beliefs close to the periphery can be retained by corresponding
adjustments deeper in the system; (b) that no belief is immune to revision: that is,
even beliefs in logical laws can be revised under certain circumstances.
Third, Quine suggests that these observations are meant to apply, not just to
the system of knowledge and belief, but to language and meaning.
If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an
individual statement - especially if it is a statement at all remote from the
experiential boundary of the field.31
This is a significant addition. For while the remarks about the holistic nature of the
relation between theory and evidence are uncontentious, the adoption of a holistic
verificationism has profound and counterintuitive consequences.
Quine draws two consequences from this account of knowledge and
meaning. First, from points (a) and (b) it follows that that there is no sense in
distinguishing a special class of analytic sentences.
...it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold
contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what
32
may.
Second, his account of knowledge and meaning entails that the distinction between
metaphysical frameworks and scientific theory, enshrined by Carnap's distinction
between internal and external linguistic frameworks, must be abandoned.33
Postulation of metaphysical entities, such as physical objects, forces or abstract
entities, is as much a part of the general project of fitting experience into a
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thought of as metaphysical postulates differ from scientific theories only in point of
how ingrained they are in our ways of thought. It follows that metaphysical claims
are open to empirical disconfirmation in the same way as scientific theories; again,
the difference lies only in the relative immunity to counterevidence which we
afford metaphysical claims, due to their centrality within the system of language
and knowledge.34
Interpretation and discussion
With a detailed account of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" now before us, it is time to
attempt the task of evaluation. The first major task we set ourselves was to assess
Quine's critique of analyticity; the first step in doing this was to identify the concept
of analyticity which Quine attacks. In section 1, Quine states explicitly that he is
interested in sentences which are reducible to logical truths through
intersubstitution of synonyms - that is, the Frege-analytic sentences. Since the
concept of synonymy is central to the notion of Frege-analyticity, the fact that Quine
takes up the bulk of sections 2 and 3 with a critique of synonymy bears out his
claim to be centrally interested in this notion of analyticity. However, Quine also
makes comments which bear on three other notions of analyticity.
First, in reducing the study of meaning to the study of synonymous and
analytic linguistic forms, Quine may be blocking an appeal to the sort of Tractarian
notion of analyticity appealed to by Carnap to secure the special epistemic status of
logic in the face of Quine's "Truth by Convention". This suggestion has to be
hedged since, as we remarked, it is not altogether clear what this notion actually is.
But if Quine is right about the study of meaning being reducible in this way, he is
indirectly blocking accounts of analyticity which seek to deploy the notion of
meaning "unreduced".31
34 Ibid. : 44-5.
35
Contemporary theories of intentional content could perhaps be thought of as giving an account of
meaning "unreduced", in the present sense. If this is right, then Quine's equation of the study of
meaning with the study of analyticity and synonymy may pass over possibilities for accounting for
analyticity. Jerry Katz could perhaps be seen as offering an account on these lines; certainly
Boghossian 1997 seeks to give such an account. See chapter nine.
53
Quine's critique of analyticity
Second, in section 4 Quine puts the notion of synonymy aside, and discusses
attempts to define "analytic" by appeal to semantical rules. Quine argues that the
explication of "analyticity" in terms of semantical rules would be informative only if
the concept of analyticity were already understood. Here, then, Quine also
discusses a non-Fregean notion of analyticity; essentially, he is discussing accounts
related to Carnap's conventionalist account, discussed in the previous chapter.
Third, section 3, though primarily concerned with the possibility of giving
an account of synonymy in terms of intersubstitutibility, does contain a lemma to
the effect that we can understand what it is for a language to contain the adverb
"necessarily" just in case we can understand the concept of analyticity. This follows
from Quine's assumption, expressed in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and
elsewhere, that a sentence of the form "necessarily, p" is true if and only if p is
analytic.36 Quine, therefore, concerns himself tangentially with an account of
analyticity in terms of necessity. From a contemporary perspective, his claim that
the concept of necessity and the concept of analyticity are equivalent has very little
plausibility. If Quine were right, there would indeed be little point in appealing to
necessity in defining "analytic"; however, work in modal metaphysics done since
1951 has shown that the concept of necessity does afford of a characterisation
independent of the concept of analyticity.37 As already mentioned, for space
reasons I intend where possible to skirt metaphysical questions in this thesis.
However, it is worth mentioning that although Quine is wrong to think that the
concept of necessity can only be defined through appeal to analyticity, it turns out
that his claim that intersubstitutibility salva veritate cannot be appealed to in
defining synonymy retains plausibility. For it seems unlikely that, for all p and q, if
p is necessarily equivalent38 to q then p and q are synonymous. For example,
Goldbach's conjecture is presumably either necessarily true or necessarily false, but
we do not know which. It follows that one of these two propositions is true:
(1+1=2 ++ Goldbach's conjecture is true)
36 For a general account of Quine's scepticism about necessity, see his paper "Necessary Truth",
broadcast by the Voice of America in 1963, and reprinted in Quine 1966.
37 The classic work being Kripke 1980.
38 That is: if (pe+g).
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(1+1=2 <-> Goldbach's conjecture is false).
If necessary equivalence was indeed sufficient for synonymy, we must say that one
of the pairs (1+1=2, Goldbach's conjecture is true), (1+1=2, Goldbach's conjecture is
false) is a synonym pair: but we do not know which. And it stretches credibility to
claim that there can be synonym pairs which we are unable to recognise as such.
True, some logicists have been willing to claim this, and say that mathematical
discovery consists in the "unfolding" of hidden synonymy relations3'', but this idea
has never seemed a plausible account of mathematical advance. Commitment to
this view seems sustained mainly by antecedent commitment to the analytic theory
of a priori knowledge. Suffice to say that it is indeed difficult to give an account of
synonymy in terms of necessity, though for reasons not considered by Quine.
Hence, although Quine's chief interest lies with Frege-analyticity, his
arguments also bear on other interpretations of the concept. However, his concern
with these remains tangential to the main theme of sections 1 to 4 which is that the
notion of synonymy is no better understood than the notion of analyticity, and that
the problems with the latter transfer over to the former. We might feel that very
compelling grounds would have to be offered before we would be willing to do
something as counterintuitive as adopt a non-factualist or error thesis about
synonymy. This reaction, I think, is appropriate, and we will discuss it shortly.
The second step towards assessing Quine's critique of analyticity requires
that we determine the nature of Quine's anti-analyticity thesis. Two of Quine's
comments seem to indicate that the thesis he advances is not a non-factualist thesis;
that is, he is not trying to show that the concept of analyticity is incoherent.
First, in section 1 he seems to allow that logical truths are analytic, and then
sets them on one side for the purposes of the discussion in the rest of the paper.40




Quine's critique of analyticity
Second, in section 2 he allows that there is one case of definition which
really does set up a relation of synonymy between definiens and definiendum,
namely the "explicitly conventional introduction of novel notation for purposes of
sheer abbreviation".41
From these two claims it would appear that Quine does allow for the
existence of isolated cases of analyticity and synonymy. If this appearance is
upheld, and if it is also the case that Quine endorses a nonfactualist thesis about the
concept of analyticity and synonymy, then it might seem that Quine's position is
unintelligible.42 One way to avoid attributing unintelligibility to Quine would be to
construe him as advancing, not a nonfactualist thesis about analyticity, but a weak
error thesis. To hold a weak error thesis about analyticity is to hold that, in general,
our beliefs about analyticity are misguided and full of error, and that the vast
majority of propositions naively thought to be analytic truths turn out to be
synthetic truths. It is consistent with maintaining a weak error thesis that we allow
there to be isolated cases of analyticity and synonymy. One way of motivating the
attribution of an error thesis to Quine, then, might be to reflect on the two
comments just cited.
However, we might well doubt whether Quine's admissions in those two
comments are indeed inconsistent with his maintaining a nonfactualist thesis. With
regards the first comment, on a closer inspection of the text it appears that Quine
does not allow that logical truths are analytic.43 What he actually says is that the
substitutional definition of logical truth renders the notion of logical truth
unproblematic, and also that logical truths are analytic "by popular acclaim". This
does not amount to an admission that logical truths are analytic truths.44
Likewise, with regards the second comment, we might doubt whether
allowing for cases of abbreviative definition really amounts to acceptance of a
distinction between synonymous and nonsynonymous linguistic forms. What
Quine actually says is that the idea of abbreviative definition is unproblematic, but
that reflection on such cases does not provide a way of characterising "synonymy"
41 Ibid: 25-6.




Contra, in particular, Hunter 1995.
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in general.45 To have a clear and coherent distinction we require more than just a
single class of cases which are alleged to fall on one or the other side of it. We also
need a procedure for deciding in general where relevant cases fall with respect to it.
The claim that cases of abbreviative definition are cases of synonymy does not help
us in developing such a procedure. Hence, we should not take Quine's comments
as being in tension with a nonfactualist thesis about synonymy.
Although the preceding considerations do not establish that Quine endorses
an error thesis about analyticity, it is arguable on different grounds that it is
appropriate to attribute such a position to him. For we must recognise that a
nonfactualist thesis about analyticity also induces a nonfactualist thesis about
syntheticity. That is, since "analytic" and "synthetic" are correlative terms, there
cannot be no facts about where one term applies without there being no facts about
where the other term applies. But a synthetic claim is, roughly, one that is open to
experiential confirmation and disconfirmation; and we have seen that Quine holds
that all claims are so open, even mathematical, metaphysical or logical claims. Thus
Quine's conclusion in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" appears to be precisely the
claim that all truths are synthetic truths. This position is inconsistent with
maintaining a nonfactualist thesis about analyticity. Quine's anti-analyticity thesis
must therefore be taken to be an error thesis. Further, we should take him to be
maintaining a strong error thesis, to the effect that the properties of analyticity and
synonymy are necessarily uninstantiated: for Quine's holistic semantics rules out
the possibility of any sentence which is confirmed come-what-may.
Having determined what notion of analyticity Quine is criticising and what
the substance of his criticism is, we turn to evaluating his arguments. Many authors
have found Quine's arguments in the 1951 paper unconvincing.46 Dummett in
particular finds it strange that Quine should spend four sections arguing that there
is no way of giving an informative definition of "analytic", and then turn to a
discussion of a semantic theory, namely atomic verificationism, on which the
45
Quine 1953:25-6.
46 See for example Dummett 1978, Priest 1979, Wright in Butterfield 1986.
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concept of analyticity can be given a clear definition, viz.: as a statement which is
verified by any and every experience ("vacuously confirmed").47 Accordingly,
Dummett suggests that "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" divides into two parts. The
first part, consisting in sections 1 through 4, propounds the thesis that "the concepts
of analyticity and syntheticity are spurious, on the ground that it is impossible to
give non-circular definitions of the related terms."48 If this were all there was to the
argument it would be weak, for there is no obvious reason why we should object to
the adoption of terms which are defined in such a way.49 Not all concepts must be
reducible to be legitimate, on pain of infinite regress, and Quine gives us no reason
to think that the concept of analyticity is not such an atomic concept. Dummett
suggests that Quine's real doubts about analyticity arise in the second part of the
paper, composed of sections 5 and 6, where analyticity is linked with atomic
verificationism, and atomic verificationism is itself challenged. The principal
contribution to the philosophy of language made by "Two Dogmas of Empiricism",
Dummett thinks, is the presentation of holistic verificationism."0
Dummett's interpretation makes "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" out to be
unconvincing. It makes the arguments in the first part seem not only weak, but
irrelevant to the work done in the second part. Moreover, the argument in the
second part also appears to be weak, even nonexistent, for as we have seen, holistic
verificationism is put forward with very little argument. The immediate motivation
for this holism seems to be nothing more than the adduction of an empiricist
tradition of enlarging the units of meaning: from words, to entire sentences, and
hence, Quine suggests, to the whole of knowledge. And in section 6 the more
detailed account of holism in language turns out to be an uncontentious view of
holism in epistemology, that is, holism in the way theory and evidence interact,
which is then augmented without argument with three nontrivial theses (that the
logical laws are just more statements in the system of knowledge; that any
statement can be held true come what may and no statement is immune to revision;
and that the epistemological picture applies to language and meaning). Dummett
47 Dummett 1978: 375.
48 Ibid.
49 See also Grice and Strawson 1956.
50 Dummett 1978: 376.
58
Quine's critique of analyticity
concludes that Quine's 1951 account of holistic verificationism is too sketchy to be
evaluated and turns to Quine's other works, primarily Word and Object, for a more
informative account.51
But Dummett's interpretation may be uncharitable to Quine. If we recall
Quine's insistence that the two dogmas are at root identical, we may be able to
reconstrue the structure of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in such a way that the
argument therein gains in plausibility.
If the two dogmas are identical, then an argument against the one is also an
argument against the other; hence Dummett's claim that holistic verificationism is
presented without an argument to support it may be unfair. Quine takes it that the
adoption of holistic verificationism is forced by the rejection of atomic
verificationism; so if Quine is right that acceptance of atomic verificationism is
identical with acceptance of the existence of analytic truths, arguments against the
analytic/synthetic distinction will tell against atomic verificationism and so in
favour of Quine's holism. Problems raised for the analytic/synthetic distinction
transfer over to atomic verificationism via the thought that it would be odd, given
that atomic verificationism makes it so natural to talk of sentences that are
vacuously confirmed, that we should have no coherent intuitive account of what
these sentences are. But sections 1 to 4 indicate that no account of the intuitive
notion is forthcoming: hence, we might conclude, perhaps the notion of vacuous
confirmation is chimerical, and there is something wrong with the semantics -
atomic verificationism - which allows for such things.
The flaw, of course, is that 1 to 4 do not establish that no account of the
intuitive notion of analyticity is forthcoming: as noted, Quine's argument that the
concepts of synonymy, necessity and analyticity can only be defined in terms of
each other fails to establish negative conclusions about them: in particular, it leaves
open the possibility that analyticity is an atomic concept. However, the proposed
identity between the two dogmas may be appealed to once more, to lend
plausibility to Quine's arguments in sections 1 to 4.
51 Ibid.: 377ff.
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In sections 5 and 6 we see Quine claiming that no feature internal to a
sentence determines its confirmational status: depending on the context, any belief
can be treated as vacuously confirmed, and with a shift in context it can lose that
status. It is clear, though, that the classical notion of analyticity requires a truth to
be confirmed in all contexts if it is to be analytic. The claim that any belief can be
taken as not-vacuously-confirmed trumps the claim that any belief can be taken to
be vacuously-confirmed; the element of decision Quine perceives in the
determination of the confirmational status of beliefs should be taken as showing
that properly speaking, no belief is vacuously confirmed. If Quine is right, and the
property of being vacuously confirmed is indeed uninstantiated, then it is at least
odd to claim that the concept of analyticity is atomic. Atomic concepts, we might
think, have a particularly fundamental role in our conceptual scheme, and refer to
properties of particular significance - goodness, truth, causation, etc. It is hard to
see how an uninstantiated property could come to have such significance for us;
hence if analyticity is uninstantiated it is hard to see how it could be an atomic
concept.
This suggestion is, of course, inconclusive. No strong reason has been given
to think that our histories could not have furnished us with a spurious atomic
concept. The point in raising it, though, is to suggest that Quine's arguments
against the two dogmas might gain in plausibility through being construed as
standing in a relation of mutual support. The argument that there are problems
with the definition of "analytic" supports Quine's claim that atomic verificationism
is false; atomic verificationism is taken to be identical with the doctrine that some
sentences are vacuously confirmed; and the suggestion that there are no sentences
that are vacuously confirmed (that is, that all beliefs are revisable) supports the
claim that there are problems with the definition of "analytic".
But, while the relation of mutual support envisaged may allow two
individually inconclusive arguments to lend plausibility to each other, it will not
help against the stronger claim that the arguments are not merely inconclusive but
fundamentally flawed. And there are serious problems with Quine's arguments.
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Our reading Quine as maintaining that the concept of analyticity cannot be
defined, and is not atomic, is in tension with our decision to take him as defending
an error thesis about analyticity. Arguments that there are serious problems with
the very definition of the notion of a thing, a, tend to establish that expressions
containing apparent reference to a are actually meaningless: but this is an extreme
non-factualist thesis.
The natural way of responding to this worry is to read Quine as maintaining
a strong error thesis about synonymy based on his defence of holism. If individual
expressions do not have a unique meaning then there is no sense in comparing
individual expressions with respect to their meaning. However, the very idea of
synonymy is not thereby taken to be incoherent, since the notion of meaning itself is
not taken to be incoherent (just misapplied). Indeed, we might introduce instances
of synonymy by stipulating that two expressions are synonymous just in case they
make the same contribution to the meaning of the total system." This explains, I
think, Quine's proposal to allow rare cases of synonymy through explicitly
conventional introduction of new terminology.
However, our intuitions about synonymy are deeply ingrained; very
compelling reasons must be offered if we are to give them up; and there is reason to
think that Quine's holism does not provide reason enough.
First, the project of giving a worked out holistic semantics faces serious
technical problems. Holism entails that no sentence of a subject's idiolect has a
meaning of its own: its meaning depends on all the other beliefs the subject has, on
all the other inferences that she is making. Hence, no (verbal, somatic, etc.)
expression by the subject has a content independent of the rest of the speaker's
beliefs. This generates severe problems for understanding how communication is
possible: communication presumably depends on recognition of shared meanings,
and it is hard to see how any meanings can be shared if holism is true. Rather, the
contents of expressions will be radically idiosyncratic, and will be interpreted
52 This suggestion is close to Grice and Strawson's proposal that we can take two expressions to be
synonymous just in case any experiences which, on certain assumptions about the truth values of the
rest of the system of expressions, confirm or infirm the one, also, on the same assumptions, confirm or
infirm the other. Grice and Strawson 1956: 156.
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idiosyncratically by the hearer.53 There are of course responses to this problem
(foremost the work of Davidson), though there is no consensus on whether these
responses are adequate. Suffice to say here, however, that the filling out of the
holistic framework is a nontrivial task.
Second, and more generally, Dummett has claimed that the adoption of a
holistic semantics amounts to an admission that the project of giving a theory of
meaning cannot be successfully completed. A theory of meaning aims to present an
algorithm which would, for any expression, generate another expression giving the
meaning of the first.34 If no expression has a meaning of its own, this project is a
non-starter. In many of his works, including "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", Quine
argues for a general scepticism about meaning which would, if upheld, count
against the possibility of giving a theory of meaning; but we will not here discuss
Quine's arguments, or the controversy they have provoked.55 The consensus is that
Quine's attempt to establish scepticism about meaning is unconvincing: the very
fact that the arguments Quine offers would, if sound, establish such scepticism, has
tended to seem reason enough to reject them.36
Third, and analogously to the previous point, Boghossian has suggested that
the clearest reason to reject holism is precisely the scepticism about synonymy it
engenders. This suggestion has great force: our intuitions about synonymy run
deep, and as we have just seen, holistic verificationism cannot claim an equivalent
status. 1 conclude that Quine's attempt to establish an error thesis about Frege-
analyticity via considerations of semantic holism, fails. Quine gives us no
overwhelming reason to reject synonymy; hence, it seems that if logic is analytic,
there is indeed a class of further sentences which are also analytic.
But our rejection of Quine's anti-analyticity arguments leaves two main
issues untouched. The first of these concerns Quine's legacy: his attack on
53 Cf.: Fodor and LePore 1992.
54 Cf.: Miller 1998.
55 There is an enormous body of literature on this point: see in particular Wright's recent survey paper,
Wright 1997.
36 This point is made by Boghossian 1997.
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analyticity has been extremely influential, and features of the way in which he
argues recur in even the most recent discussions of a priori knowledge. The second
issue concerns the status of the analytic theory of a priori knowledge. While this
theory stands, the vicissitudes of the concept of analyticity infect the concept of
apriority. If we wish to discuss these separately, the analytic theory must be
rejected.
Quine's legacy
Quine's influence on the development of theories of a priori knowledge can be
discussed under two headings: first, the unrevisability of a priori knowledge;
second, the promotion of naturalism in philosophy and epistemology.
Regarding the first point, Quine's account of analyticity in terms of vacuous
confirmation nicely encapsulates a crucial epistemic feature of analytic truths: being
confirmed by every experience, no experience can count against their truth. Hence,
where S believes in a proposition p which is expressed by an analytic sentence,
there is no evidential situation in which it is rational for S to give up her belief in p.
That is to say, roughly, that beliefs in analytic propositions are unrevisable.57
Given the analytic theory, the unrevisability of beliefs in analytic truths will
entail the unrevisability of beliefs in a priori truths. From here it is a short step to
the claim that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge. This must be
considered Quine's major legacy to theories of the a priori.
The second aspect of Quine's legacy follows closely on the first. The view
that a priori knowledge is unrevisable, coupled with the arguments in 5 and 6 of
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism", to the effect that all knowledge is revisable,
engenders scepticism about a priori knowledge. Such scepticism has been taken to
be central to - and even as the defining feature of - epistemological naturalism. If
Quine is right, then the possibility of giving a nonsceptical naturalistic account of a
priori knowledge is ruled out. We will discuss this scepticism in detail in the next
chapter.
57 The notion of unrevisability is discussed in depth in chapter five.
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Evaluating the analytic theory
We suggested earlier that there are two ways of offering a principled rejection of the
analytic theory of a priori knowledge; the minimum requirement would involve the
citing of counterexamples to the proposed biconditional relationship between
propositional analyticity and apriority (proposition (1) of chapter two). A more
satisfying rejection would add to this an account of why the appeal to analyticity is
incapable of explaining a priori knowledge. Quine, we should note, does only the
second of these: on his view, analyticity is incapable of explaining anything. He
does not, though, offer counterexamples to (1). That is, Quine's argument against
analyticity does not meet the minimum necessary condition for it to be an argument
that the analytic theory of a priori knowledge is false. So he does not really reject
the analytic theory at all.
If we wish to challenge the analyticity theory, our first task is to see if
counterexamples are forthcoming. I suggest that they are. In the first place, as
many anti-empiricist authors have pointed out, there are a series of propositions
such as
Red is a colour
VxVi/(If x is later than y then y is earlier than x)
No surface can be entirely red and blue simultaneously,
which, though intuitively known a priori, do not seem to be analytic.
Examples such as these, however, are controversial; some have claimed
these propositions to be analytic, and the unclarity about what the concept of
analyticity actually involves tends to sustain this controversy.58 Boghossian, for
58 See for example discussion between Boghossian 1996 and Harman 1996.
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example, suggests that such propositions can be considered implicit definitions of
certain component terms.59
However, I do not think that we have to rest much on these disputed
examples. Our recent considerations regarding unrevisability offer us a more
promising route. Consider an extremely complicated logical truth p, which S
proves only after great mental effort. For simplicity, let us say that p is a theorem of
a propositional logic system with set of axioms PL. Having proved p, S knows p a
priori. According to the analytic theory p is an analytic truth, and hence S's belief in
p cannot be given up without change of language. Some time later, let us suppose,
S reads in an authoritative journal of cognitive psychology a paper which claims
that the majority of people who try to construct proofs of the sort that S used in
proving p succumb to a subtle logical trick and end up proving the opposite of the
truth. Reading this, and being unable at the time to rule out the possibility that she
has succumbed to that trick, but realising that it is likely that she has in fact
succumbed to it, S reasonably revises her belief in p: she now believes -p. Let us call
the evidence that engenders this belief revision, e. p, since it was revised, is not
analytic; nevertheless, before the reception of e, it was known a priori.
The moderate empiricist might respond to this that p, since revisable, was
not known a priori to start with. This response is not obviously wrong: a priori
knowledge is experience-independent knowledge, and there is clearly a sense in
which revisable knowledge is not knowledge which is independent of experience.
Chapter five will be centrally concerned with whether a priori knowledge is
unrevisable knowledge. We will eventually conclude that there is a crucial sense in
which a priori knowledge is not unrevisable: if this conclusion is right, the analytic
theory is blocked.
If the moderate empiricists want to deal with this case without assuming
that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge, they will have to allow that p
was known a priori, but that the revision of S's belief in p engenders a change in S's
language. The reasoning behind this is that, since beliefs in analytic truths are
unrevisable without change of language, and S's a priori knowledge of p was
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revised, S's language must have changed along with change in her beliefs with
regard to p. Let's call the language she speaks before receipt of e, Lt, and the
language she is supposed to speak after receiving e, L2. Clearly this shift from Li to
L2 must be imperceptible to S, since she would not agree that her language had
changed, though the idea of an imperceptible change in language does not seem to
be too problematic. There are more serious problems, however. We can stipulate
that, before and after receiving e, S is fully aware of, and has entirely true beliefs
about, the basic truth-tabular definitions of the logical connectives. Since the truth
tables give the meaning of the connectives of propositional logic, it seems plausible
that if S's language changes in point of logic, this change must show up in her
beliefs about the meanings of the logical connectives. But since her true beliefs
about the truth-tabular definitions of the connectives remain unchanged, it seems
extremely implausible to hold that S speaks a different language after revising her
belief in p. A more plausible interpretation of S's predicament is that in revising her
belief in p upon receipt of e, and so coming to believe -p, S's belief set gains an
inconsistency. S believes in all the axioms of the system of propositional logic she is
using, but believes -p, even though {PL} f- p. But it is hard to see how the moderate
empiricist can accommodate this view. First: the inconsistency induced in S's belief
set by her revision of her belief in p is an inconsistency couched in language L^ It is
simply not clear whether this inconsistency holds in language L2, since we do not
know enough about it. But the very fact that it is not clear whether the
inconsistency holds is a strike against the moderate empiricist's treatment of the
case of revision of a priori knowledge. Second, S does not notice the change in
language the empiricist must say is forced by the reception of e, and so does not
notice that she no longer shares a language with her former self. But if
communication depends on the possession of a shared language by those
communicating, it is hard to see how S can understand her past utterances, or those
of others who speak Lt. An imperceptible proliferation of languages is the
consequence of adopting the empiricist account of apriority, and this just seems to
be a very implausible view of language. We should conclude that S's knowledge of
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p is a priori, but that p is not an analytic truth. If this is right, the analytic theory of
a priori knowledge is false.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Naturalism and a priori knowledge
In concluding the previous chapter we argued that the analytic theory of a priori
knowledge fails for reasons independent of Quine's doubts about analyticity.
Quine, indeed, has nothing to say about the analytic theory itself, and, it seems,
simply assumes it to be true. Further, we argued that Quine fails to establish a
strong negative thesis about analyticity, with the consequence that even if the
analytic theory were true, he would fail to establish any strong conclusions about a
priori knowledge itself. However, we also noted two ways in which Quine's work
has influenced subsequent thinking about a priori knowledge. First, he promotes
the view that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge; second, he promotes a
naturalistic approach to philosophy in general, and epistemology in particular,
which many have taken to rule out a priori knowledge.
If Quine is right that naturalised epistemology rules out a priori knowledge
then the project of naturalising a priori knowledge is a non-starter. So, if we are to
develop a plausible naturalistic theory of a priori knowledge we need to find an
appropriate account of naturalism within which to frame it. The primary aim of
this chapter is to sketch such a framework. Having done this, we will look at an
influential theory of a priori knowledge which is naturalistic in the sense that we
endorse: this is the theory offered by Philip Kitcher in The Nature of Mathematical
Knowledge.
Overview of theories of the a priori
It is standard in the literature to assume that any possible theory of a priori
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Naturalism and a priori knowledge
The first of these is associated with the moderate empiricists, and has
already been rejected. In the previous chapter it was argued that although all
analytic truths may well be knowable a priori, not all a priori knowledge is of
analytic truths.
Rationalists adopt the view that a priori knowledge cannot be explained
using the same conceptual apparatus as employed in explaining knowledge in
general. Accordingly, they postulate a new epistemic capacity, through the exercise
of which we have a priori knowledge.2 Rationalists are often charged with appeal
to obscurities; it is claimed that the new epistemic capacity, often explained through
analogy with perception, cannot be taken beyond the level of analogy.3 These
charges may be unfair, since there are some well worked-out rationalist positions
available4: however, I do not discuss the rationalist response in this thesis. My
concern is with whether there is an interesting notion of a priori knowledge which
is explicable within the framework of scientific and epistemological concepts we
currently have available: accordingly, accounts which require significant
augmentation of that framework will be ignored.5
Having rejected both the analytic theory and rationalism, the standard view
as set out above would require that we adopt scepticism: that is, that we deny that
there is any a priori knowledge. A cluster of theories which are thought to give rise
to scepticism standardly go under the term "naturalism". Scepticism about a priori
knowledge is associated with naturalism because of the influence of Quine: as
suggested in the previous chapter, and as we will see in more detail below, Quine's
own naturalism is inseparable from his doubts about analyticity and apriority.
However, Quine's version of naturalism is not uniformly shared: one does not have
to be a Quinean to be a naturalist.
2 See for example BonJour 1993/1998; Russell 1912: 105 (discussed in Creath 1993: 143).
1
For criticisms see for example Harman 1996; Boghossian 1997; Creath 1993.
4 See Brown 1993, and BonJour 1993, 1998, for example.
5 This terminology is not uniformly adopted: Peacocke's "moderate rationalist" account of a priori
knowledge explicitly eschews appeal to unexplained properties of intuition and the like, and tries to
explain a priori knowledge through reference to the conditions which a subject must meet if they are to
count as possessing a concept. On my classification, Peacocke's theory would count as naturalist. It is
structurally similar to Boghossian's account of a priori knowledge in terms of implicit definition, and I
discuss Boghossian's account in chapter nine.
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A recent paper by Devitt provides an exceptionally blunt illustration of the
perceived connection between naturalism and scepticism about a priori knowledge.6
Devitt's paper is specifically concerned to defend the view that a priori knowledge
is incompatible with naturalism. Outlining what he means by "naturalism", Devitt
writes:
The naturalism in question is an epistemological doctrine that I take from Quine:
there is only one way of knowing, the empirical way that is the basis of science
(whatever that way may be). So I reject "a priori knowledge". I do not give a
detailed account of my rejection but I do give two reasons[...]: Briefly, first, [...]
we lack a strong motivation for thinking that mathematics and logic are immune
from empirical revision; and, second, the idea of a priori knowledge is deeply
obscure, as the history of failed attempts to explain it show.7
The first sentence of this quotation, taken in isolation, suggests that Devitt simply
defines naturalism in such a way that it will exclude a priori knowledge. But
clearly, such a strategy will not provide a strong motivation for scepticism about the
a priori: for, faced with it, the apriorist will just seek a redefinition of "naturalism"
which removes this scepticism, and the debate threatens to become purely verbal.
If the question of whether naturalism is inconsistent with a priori knowledge is to
become substantive, we need two things: (i) an account of naturalism which has
prima facie plausibility; (ii) demonstration that that account of naturalism poses
problems for a priori knowledge. Devitt realises this, for he goes on to give two
reasons to be sceptical about a priori knowledge. The first, essentially, is that we
have reason to think that all knowledge is revisable; the second is that we have
reason to think that the concept of a priori knowledge is obscure. Neither of these
reasons is convincing as it stands. Clearly, if the first reason is to establish
scepticism, it needs supplementing with an argument that a priori knowledge is
unrevisable knowledge; while the support adduced for the second reason is an
induction from past failures of attempts to define a priori knowledge, and does not
establish an anti-a priori thesis that is specifically naturalistic. Further, if by




Naturalism and a priori knowledge
"obscure" Devitt means "incoherent", his anti-a priori thesis faces a problem
analogous to that which we have argued afflicts the non-factualist version of the
anti-analyticity thesis. Since "a priori" and "a posteriori" are correlative terms, an
argument that the concept of a priori knowledge is incoherent would also be an
argument that the concept of a posteriori knowledge is incoherent. But Devitt does
not want to claim that the concept of a posteriori knowledge is incoherent: in the
quotation above he states explicitly that he takes all knowledge to be a posteriori
knowledge (assuming only that Devitt follows common practice in taking
"empirical knowledge" to be a synonym for "a posteriori knowledge"). The
challenge that I think Devitt poses is not to show that the concept of a priori
knowledge is coherent, but rather, granting that the notion of experience-
independent knowledge can be made acceptably clear, to explain how there ever
could be such knowledge. This problem has been posed most forcefully by
Benacerraf, whose arguments we will look at shortly. Kitcher's account of a priori
knowledge, which will concern us closely, proceeds by giving a precise definition of
a priori knowledge and then arguing that none of our knowledge in fact meets the
standards embodied in that definition.
The task we have to undertake, then, is to find a formulation of a naturalist
position which we seem to have good reason to accept; then we will see if either of
Devitt's two reasons to reject a priori knowledge can, within the context of that
account, motivate scepticism about a priori knowledge.
We proceed by looking more closely at naturalism. Devitt distinguishes two
varieties of naturalism.3 The first, which he calls "epistemological naturalism", is the
view that all knowledge has the same epistemic status as scientific knowledge,
which is supposed to be a posteriori knowledge. The second, which he calls
"metaphysical naturalism", he claims is equivalent to physicalism, which we can
gloss as the view that the ontological claims made by physics constitute a complete
and true account of the ontology of the world. We will discuss each of these in turn,
to see if they meet both of the following requirements: (i) they are interesting and
8 Ibid.: 46.
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plausible philosophical positions, and (ii) they pose problems for a priori
knowledge.
Epistemological naturalism
Since Devitt explicitly links his scepticism about a priori knowledge with
epistemological naturalism, it is natural to begin with the latter; and since Devitt
calls this version of naturalism Quinean, it is natural to discuss Quine's own
account of naturalism.
Quine develops his view of naturalised epistemology through contrast with
epistemology as traditionally construed. According to the traditional account, the
project of epistemology is to reconstruct knowledge, to distinguish between that
which we know and that which we only think we know, to expose false beliefs and
confer certainty on what remains.9 This project is, in Kitcher's phrase, meliorative.10
In distinguishing the certain from the doubtful, traditional epistemology was
thought to enable us to improve our epistemic practices, revealing flaws and
helping us to overcome them. It often seems that philosophy as a whole is
identified with this project, which is inherited from Descartes. Transposed into the
context of moderate empiricism, epistemology gains a distinctive methodology:
Descartes' project is to be carried out by exhibiting the connection between
knowledge and experience; a claim to know p is to be evaluated through
determining whether the experiences that would verify p had actually occurred.
Quine sees traditional epistemology as a combination of two projects: the
reduction of complex concepts to simpler components, and the proof of some
knowledge claims by appeal to others." In conjunction, these two projects yield a
strategy of analysing complex sentences into simple components which have
intuitively clear truth conditions; the clarity of the latter is then supposed to transfer
up the analytical chains and confer equivalent epistemic status on the complex
sentences. This process is supposed to "validate" scientific knowledge. In effect,
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claims to scientific knowledge, which are considered contentious, are to be reduced
to uncontentious claims to nonscientific knowledge, concerning sense experience
and analytic truths.
The two projects, however, have met with at best limited success.
Conceptual investigations have yielded insight into the foundations of mathematics
and the relations between logic and mathematics, but have provided sparse insight
into aspects of a posteriori knowledge. The conceptual reduction of physical objects
to sets of experiences proposed by Hume, for example, does not greatly improve the
epistemic status of knowledge claims concerning physical objects. As regards this
project Quine writes:
What then of [...] the justification of our knowledge of truths about
nature? Here, Hume despaired. By his identification of bodies with impressions
he did succeed in construing some singular statements about bodies as
indubitable truths, yes; as truths about impressions, directly known. But general
statements, also singular statements about the future, gained no increment of
certainty by being construed as about impressions.12
Quine takes his semantic holism to present a general problem for traditional
epistemology. He sees traditional epistemology as proceeding by taking individual
knowledge claims and seeing if they are based on the experiences which would
verify them. But the thesis of semantic holism is, as we saw in the last chapter, just
that sentences of a language do not have verification conditions individually. If this
is true, and if traditional epistemology is inextricably wedded to atomic
verificationism as Quine assumes, then traditional epistemology is an attempt to
carry out the impossible.
Faced with this, epistemology must at least be extensively modified, perhaps
even abandoned. Quine's proposal is that the Cartesian project to reconstruct
knowledge should be abandoned, but that epistemology should be retained,
construed now as the project of understanding the relationship between experience
and knowledge. Epistemology, in fact, just is a branch of empirical psychology on
Quine's view. As he writes:
12 Ibid.: 71-2.
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Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of
psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a
physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain
experimentally controlled input - certain patterns of irradiation in assorted
frequencies, for instance - and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as
output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The
relation between the meagre input and the torrential output is a relation that we
are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted
epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence is related to theory, and in
what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence.13
This reconstrual, Quine thinks, engenders a rethinking of the limits we impose on
what we may appeal to in looking for this understanding: in particular, we should
not disallow an appeal to psychology as a possible way of understanding how the
construction of knowledge from experience really proceeds.
As Quine points out, from the point of view of traditional epistemology such
an appeal to scientific knowledge in the process of carrying out the epistemological
project was thought to induce circularity. The project of traditional epistemology
was to vindicate claims to knowledge and until that project has been carried out,
scientific knowledge should be considered sub judice. To appeal to such knowledge
in the process of vindicating our claims to possess it seems to presuppose that
which we are trying to establish: namely, that our claims to this knowledge are
valid. We are supposed to be reducing scientific knowledge claims to non-scientific
knowledge; this project is defeated if scientific knowledge is also allowed to be
present in the reduction base. Thus traditional epistemology, as carried out by the
moderate empiricist, seems to be a uniquely philosophical enterprise: it is meant as
an assessment of knowledge claims that by its very nature rules out contributions
from the sciences. Philosophy, in fact, is considered to be an autonomous
discipline, exclusively concerned with analytic truths.14 The hazy chain of reasoning
underpinning this view is something like the following. The project of philosophy
is to vindicate knowledge claims; therefore, it can only avail itself of knowledge
which does not need vindicating, that is, a priori knowledge. The analytic theory,
13 Ibid.: 82-3.
14 Cf. Kitcher 1992.
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assumed by the traditional epistemologists, then engenders the view that
philosophy is concerned only with the relations between concepts. The study of
philosophy is, it is supposed, nothing more than the study of language. Following
the title of Descartes' revolutionary prolegomena to the mechanical philosophy, his
Meditations on First Philosophy, traditional epistemology is often called "first
philosophy", and the slogan "no first philosophy" characterises much thinking post-
Quine which takes the failure of the traditional project, and the circularity involved
in Quine's naturalistic reconstrual, simply to rule out epistemology.15 Quine,
however, holds that the bar against this form of circularity falls simultaneously with
the project of traditional epistemology. Traditional epistemology has to disallow
appeal to science precisely because it seeks a reconstruction of scientific knowledge
in non-scientific (and so supposedly more perspicuous) terms; for Quine, to drop
the goal of reconstruction is also to drop the view that epistemology requires
reductive analysis of scientific knowledge.
If the epistemologist's goal is validation of the grounds of empirical science, he
defeats his purpose by using psychology or other empirical science in the
validation. However, such scruples against circularity have little point once we
have stopped dreaming of deducing science from observations. If we are out
simply to understand the link between observation and science, we are well
advised to use any available information, including that provided by the very
science whose link with observation we are seeking to understand.16
But the dropping of the bar against circularity is not the only consequence
stemming from Quine's view of naturalised epistemology. In the previous
quotations we see no hint that the meliorative aspect of traditional epistemology is
to be retained. Quine marginalises this aspect when he says that the goal of seeing
how evidence relates to theory, central to naturalised epistemology, was also the
fundamental motivation of traditional epistemology. For Quine, naturalised
epistemology drops the normative aspect of epistemology: it settles for scientific
description of the way knowledge stems from sensory inputs; it does not seek to
l:>
Quine cites Polanyi, Kuhn and Russell Hanson in this tradition (Quine 1969: 87). More recently,
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determine whether the evidence really does justify our knowledge claims, and it
does not seek ways to improve our epistemic practices.
Quine's naturalism, then, can be said to have two aspects: denial of the
autonomy of philosophy; and abandonment of the normative project of traditional
epistemology in favour of description.
The rejection of analyticity is central to Quine's argument that his version of
naturalism should be adopted. As we saw in the last chapter, he believes that the
rejection of analyticity forces a move to a holistic verificationist semantics, and it is
this semantics which is meant to undermine traditional epistemology. But, by the
analytic theory, the rejection of analyticity is also a rejection of a priori knowledge.
Quine's naturalism and his scepticism about a priori knowledge are therefore
connected through the common root of the rejection of analyticity.
However, it is precisely at this point that the conclusions from the last
chapter are relevant: we have argued both that Quine fails to make a convincing
case that analyticity should be rejected, and, moreover, that the analytic theory of a
priori knowledge is false. If these arguments are sound, Quine's case for
naturalising epistemology is undermined. But, though Quine's arguments for
naturalism may fail, much of his insight into the nature of philosophy can still
stand. Naturalism as a position can be extricated from the arguments Quine uses to
motivate it.
For, in the first place, traditional epistemology as reconstructed by the
moderate empiricists, from which the autonomy of philosophy is meant to flow, is
hopeless flawed. It faces technical problems - no serious progress had been made in
assigning verification conditions to individual knowledge claims17; conceptual
problems - the central concept of a "sense datum", an entity whose essence is to be
an appearance, is deeply suspect18; and motivational problems - it is simply not clear
17 See Quine's comments on Carnap's attempts in this direction, Quine 1966: 74-7.
18 See especially Sellars' influential essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", reprinted in
Sellars 1963.
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that knowledge claims need vindicating in the way traditional epistemology
assumes.19
More generally, though, the claim that philosophy is autonomous is
undermined precisely by the failure of the analytic theory of a priori knowledge.
The autonomy of philosophy is supposed to be secured by claiming philosophy to
be concerned exclusively with analytic truths. But this stipulation about the remit
of philosophy is not meant to be arbitrary: the proponents of this view, taking for
granted the analytic theory, presumably assume that by making this stipulation
they secure the traditional view that philosophy is concerned with a priori
knowledge. But with the failure of the analytic theory, proponents of the autonomy
of philosophy must face a dilemma. The set of analytic truths and the set of a priori
truths are distinct, and a decision must be made about which of these sets
philosophy is chiefly concerned with: either philosophy is fundamentally about
analyticity, or philosophy is fundamentally about a priori truth. The first option
preserves autonomy by trivialising philosophy: for philosophy remains the study of
linguistic truths but there are no longer good grounds to think that the study of
linguistic truths is the study of important truths, such as those known a priori. The
second option preserves the importance of philosophy by undermining its
autonomy: philosophy is concerned, as traditionally thought, with a priori
knowledge, but it has nowhere been shown that science too is not also concerned
with such knowledge. This leads naturally to the view that no firm distinction can
be drawn between science and philosophy on epistemological grounds, that is, on
the grounds of what sort of knowledge they are concerned with. Only a general
distinction can be made: science is typically more concerned with a posteriori
knowledge than is philosophy. A key aspect of Quine's naturalism therefore
stands: philosophy and science are engaged in the same project, that of
understanding the world, and philosophy should not isolate itself from the sciences
in pursuing this project. Kitcher writes that this impulse to deny the autonomy of
philosophy is what unifies the diverse naturalist positions.20 I take this view of the
19 To drop the project of validating knowledge claims is not to drop the meliorative project entirely:
we can seek to evaluate and improve our epistemic practices without seeking a total reduction of
knowledge to sense data, logic and set theory.
20 Kitcher 1992: 55.
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relationship between philosophy and science to be central to the plausible naturalist
position relative to which we will discuss a priori knowledge.
What of the other aspect of Quine's naturalism, that of rejecting the
meliorative, normative aspect of traditional epistemology in favour of a project of
pure description? This has not been widely thought to be compelling.21 A second
unifying feature of much naturalism post-Quine has been to retain the meliorative
project, while seeking reductions of normative and epistemic concepts to
scientifically acceptable terms.22 What counts as a "scientifically acceptable term"
will be addressed shortly. The second aspect of our plausible naturalist position is,
then, that it retain the meliorative project of traditional empiricism.
We now turn to see whether the sketch of naturalism we have before us
poses problems for a priori knowledge. The first of Devitt's reasons for rejecting a
priori knowledge seems most relevant here. Devitt's charge, we recall, was that a
priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge and that there is no room in a
naturalised epistemology for unrevisable knowledge. Now, the latter claim is
plausible. The view that we should never treat any scientific belief as immune to
possible refutation is associated most strongly with C.S. Peirce. Rescher describes
this position as follows.
We would like to think of our science as "money in the bank" - as something safe,
solid, and reliable. Unfortunately, however, history militates against this
comfortable view of our scientific theorizing. In science, new knowledge does
not just supplement but generally upsets our knowledge-in-hand. We must
come to terms with the fact that - at any rate, at the scientific level of generality
and precision - each of our accepted beliefs may turn out to be false, and many of
our accepted beliefs will turn out to be false.23
21 Cf. Foley 1994. As Foley points out, Quine himself retracts this aspect of naturalism in later
writings.
22 Kim 1988 sees this as a project to show how the normative, and specifically the epistemic,
supervenes on the non-normative.
23 Rescher 1984: 83.
79
Naturalism and a priori knowledge
Rescher suggests that this Peircean fallibilism24 applies to science but not to our
ordinary common sense beliefs.25 Intuitively, this is strange: we might naturally
think that the procedure of scientific discovery produces results which are less
rather than more vulnerable to error. In any case, it is plausible that fallibilism also
applies in areas such as common sense beliefs, and even in mathematics and logic.
Errors can be made in calculation, deceptions perpetrated, and the number of
beliefs which seem immune to such difficulties seems extremely small.26
But what of the assumption that unrevisability is the defining feature of a
priori knowledge? As suggested in the previous chapter, this view is a hangover
from the analytic theory of a priori knowledge, and we have not yet seen any
independent support for it. We should note that the fact that epistemological
naturalism renders it likely that all knowledge is revisable indicates a constraint on
the theory of a priori knowledge which we will go on to develop: the theory should
not have as a consequence that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge.
However, Devitt's argument ultimately fails because we will find no good reason to
hold that unrevisability is the mark of a priori knowledge.27 We will discuss it in
detail with respect to Kitcher's definition of a priori knowledge.
Metaphysical naturalism
It appears that no immediate problems for a priori knowledge are posed by the
epistemological version of naturalism; so we turn to the metaphysical version.
Devitt, we recall, identifies metaphysical naturalism with physicalism, the view that
physics provides a true and complete account of ontology. However, physicalism
should really be considered a special case of metaphysical naturalism in general,
which we can take as the view that philosophy should look to science to answer the
question of what exists: that is, we should include in ontology only things which are
24 To be distinguished from the sort of fallibilism of warrant to be discussed in chapters seven and
eight.
25 See Rescher's entry on "Fallibilism" in Honderich 1995.
26
Chapter five contains an argument for a related form of fallibilism based on the details of the
naturalist epistemological framework.
27 This is also urged by Rey in his companion piece to Devitt's paper (Rey 1998); this view of a priori
knowledge as revisable is increasingly popular, as the following chapters will demonstrate.
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scientifically acceptable. For the physicalist, the scope of the scientifically
acceptable is limited to the ontology of physics. Physicalism is controversial,
however, and unduly restrictive for our purposes. We can perhaps view the choices
available to us in characterising the "scientifically acceptable" ontology as governed
by two parameters. The first parameter concerns the degree of intertheoretic
reduction we require. A strict stance as regards the first parameter would restrict
the scientifically acceptable ontology to the ontology of physics; to be acceptable, an
entity must be shown to be metaphysically reducible to some combination of
entities countenanced by physics. A more permissive stance would allow
unreduced appeal to objects, properties or relations of higher level sciences,
ascending through chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, etc. The second
parameter concerns whether we admit only currently accepted entities, or whether
we allow entities that seem potentially scientifically acceptable. A strict stance here
would require that only properties, objects and relations that appear in current
scientific theories may be appealed to; a permissive stance would allow entities to
count as scientifically acceptable if they seem to have potential to be brought into
scientific theory. For example, the cranial pulse is recognised by osteopathy, but
not by orthodox medicine; but there seems to be no fundamental barrier to prevent
the phenomenon from becoming generally taken up in mainstream medical science.
Devitt's physicalism seems to take a strict stance on both parameters: he
restricts the scope of the scientifically acceptable to the ontology of actual physics;
Papineau's physicalism takes a strict stance on the first and a more permissive
stance on the second, being couched in terms of a "future completed physics".28
Fodor would take a permissive stance on the first parameter, allowing unreduced
appeal to the entities of the special sciences.29 It is not easy to generalise about what
a permissive stance on the second parameter will allow, but one point seems clear:
long standing metaphysical commitments debar appeal to normativity in science.
Ffence the naturalist programme is one of eliminating normative concepts, or
showing that they are reducible to concepts referring to non-normative properties.
In particular, epistemic concepts cannot be appealed to unreduced by naturalists.
28
Papineau 1993.
29 See also Botterill and Carruthers 1999.
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Devitt's second reason for rejecting a priori knowledge was that the concept
was obscure, and we interpreted him as claiming not that the concept of a priori
knowledge is incoherent, but that it is difficult to give a plausible account of how a
priori knowledge possible. The perspective of metaphysical naturalism has been
thought to bolster this view. The concept of knowledge, being epistemic, seems
banned from appearing unreduced in a naturalistic theory; it will therefore need
analysing into naturalistically acceptable terms if it is to be legitimately employed.
Now, many have thought that a plausible naturalistic account of knowledge will be
a causal one; it will invoke an epistemically significant causal relationship between
the knower and the thing known. As Benacerraf argued in his 1973 paper
"Mathematical Truth", this view causes problems in accounting for a priori
knowledge.
Benacerraf's intention in this paper is to highlight the tension between
giving a perspicuous account of mathematical knowledge and adopting a semantics
of mathematical knowledge claims that is continuous with the semantics of
empirical knowledge claims. We have, he suggests, good reason to prefer an
account of the semantics of mathematical knowledge claims that will ascribe to both
(1) There are at least three large cities older than New York
and
(2) There are at least three perfect numbers greater than 17
the logical form of:
(3) There are at least three FGs that bear R to a.30
The truth value of (1), which uncontroversially has the form of (3), can be
determined through standard application of the Tarskian recursive definition. The
30 Benacerraf 1973: 663.
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Tarskian definition explains truth in terms of concepts of reference and satisfaction.
Application of the definition requires that we interpret the predicates, objects and
relations of (3) realistically, that is, that we take there to be genuine objects, bearing
the relevant predicates, which stand to each other in the specified relation. To
assimilate (2) to (3), then, requires that we take a realistic view of mathematical
propositions, interpreting these propositions as being about certain mathematical
objects, predicates and relations. Benacerraf notes that such a realistic view of
mathematics, which he calls the "standard view", is unacceptable to some. The
alternative view, which he calls "combinatorial", is exemplified by Carnap's attempt
to distinguish empirical from logic-mathematical propositions on syntactic grounds.
The leading idea of combinatorial views is that of assigning truth values to
arithmetic sentences on the basis of certain (usually proof-theoretic) syntactic
facts about them. Often, truth is defined as (formal) derivability from certain
axioms [...] In any event, in such cases truth is conspicuously not explained in
terms of reference, denotation or satisfaction. The "truth" predicate is
syntactically defined.31
Combinatorial views do not treat (2) as having the logical form given in (3). The
motivation behind combinatorial views, Benacerraf suggests, is epistemological: the
standard view, though it has the advantage of treating mathematical discourse with
the same semantic apparatus as ordinary empirical propositions, adopts a
metaphysics of the objects of mathematical discourse which leaves it mysterious as
to how we have mathematical knowledge. For we have no account of what
epistemically significant relations can hold between cognitive subjects and the
objects of mathematics as construed realistically.32 However, combinatorial views
suffer from not giving an account of how the possession of a privileged syntactic
property bears on the truth value of a proposition; the failure of Carnap's attempt to
set up an analytic theory of a priori knowledge exemplifies the problems with this
approach. Benacerraf takes it that the only viable account of truth is Tarski's;
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treats it realistically.33 But this leaves us with the problem of accounting for
mathematical knowledge.
Benacerraf's observations constitute a significant problem for a naturalistic
account of a priori knowledge. We will see that in the development of theories of
knowledge, there was a move away from causal theories to reliabilist theories, and
that these latter have better potential to solve, or at least side-step, the problem that
Benacerraf raises.
The results of this chapter so far are as follows. The naturalist framework
within which we will seek to accommodate a priori knowledge can be encapsulated
in three claims: first, that philosophy is not autonomous from science; second, that
philosophical theories must be developed within a scientifically acceptable
ontological framework. (Though we have not committed ourselves as to what
counts as scientifically acceptable, the crucial point is that epistemological concepts
be analysed in non-normative terms.) Third, that the "meliorative" aspect of
traditional epistemology can be retained: that is, that it will not be necessary to
abandon any vestiges of the Cartesian project in favour of a radical Quinean project
of pure description. Following Kitcher, we will call this position "traditional
naturalism". Kitcher would augment our three claims with a fourth: that there is no
a priori knowledge.34 But, as we have argued, it is uninteresting simply to build this
into our definition of naturalism. A more meaningful approach is to see whether
the three claims themselves entail that there is no a priori knowledge; and we have
seen two areas in which we could develop arguments that they do indeed entail
this. First, it could be argued that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge,
and that there is no unrevisable knowledge; second, it could be argued that our
general epistemology leaves no room for experience-independent knowledge. We
will discuss these in the following chapters.
33 Ibid.: 670.
34 Cf. Kitcher 1992: 74-6. Kitcher gives four claims which he takes to characterise what he calls
"traditional" naturalism. The framework I have suggested above is essentially the same as Kitcher's
minus his requirement that there is no a priori knowledge. I suggest that this requirement needs to be
demonstrated on the basis of the other claims: it is not axiomatic.
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The remainder of this chapter discusses Kitcher's attempt to give a
naturalistic theory of a priori knowledge. Before turning to this, however, we
should note that some authors seem to have taken the loss of autonomy by
philosophy as raising problems. Quine is often cited as arguing that philosophy,
naturalistically construed, becomes in effect "high level", abstract, theoretical
science, and this is thought to be problematic. But we should note that by the same
token, science must be seen as "low level", specific, natural philosophy: this seems
to be a view of the relationship between science and philosophy with a longer and
more respectable history than the view which takes philosophy to be an
autonomous discipline, concerned exclusively with conceptual analysis.
The blurring of the distinction between science and philosophy does not
entail that the sorts of knowledge claims made by these two camps cannot in
general be distinguished. It is right, I believe, to take philosophy, broadly
construed, to be dealing with questions susceptible to answer a priori. Where the
empiricists erred was in assuming that the only theory of the a priori could be an
analytic one; this error having been accepted, the assumption became entrenched
that the subject matters of philosophy and science are also distinct. The perceived
difficulties with seeing philosophy as continuous with natural science stem from
specifically empiricist considerations which we have no good reason to accept.
Naturalised epistemology and a priori knowledge
The contemporary project of providing a naturalised account of a priori knowledge
was inaugurated by Philip Kitcher in The Nature of Mathematical Knowledgef
Kitcher's account is particularly interesting for our purposes, since he gives a clear
definition of a priori knowledge within a naturalistic framework. Clearly, then, he
does not find the concept of a priori knowledge obscure or incoherent: however, his
account has the consequence that we in fact possess very little a priori knowledge.
Kitcher divides the problem into two sub-problems: the first involves giving
a naturalistic theory of knowledge in general; the second involves giving an account
35 Kitcher 1983.
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of the notion of experience-independence. The solutions to these two sub-problems
are then to be combined to give an account of experience-independent knowledge:
that is, a priori knowledge. Further, Kitcher takes it that these two sub-problems
can be answered independently of each other: in fact, as we will see, he proposes to
leave the first to "general epistemology", taking only the outlines of a solution as a
framework within which to develop a solution to the second.
The central problem faced by theories of knowledge in general is that of
explaining the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. Following
Kitcher, we can use the term warrant to refer to whatever property makes that
difference. Warrant is the property X which solves the equation:
Knowledge = True Belief + X.
A warranted true belief is, by definition, an item of knowledge. Naturalistic
(Kitcher also calls them "psychologistic") theories of knowledge assume that for a
belief to possess warrant is a matter of it having a certain aetiology, that is, a certain
causal history. As Kitcher puts it:
[On] a psychologistic account... the question of whether a person's true belief
counts as knowledge depends on whether the presence of the state of true belief
can be explained in an appropriate fashion. The difference between an item of
knowledge and mere true belief turns on the factors which produced the belief -
thus the issue revolves around the way in which a particular mental state was
generated.36
Certain beliefforming processes, then, are such that, under certain circumstances, they
warrant the beliefs they produce. This suggestion, that warrant is a function of
aetiology, leads Kitcher to refine the general equation for knowledge given above,
by building in the claim that warrant is conferred by appropriate belief forming
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(1) S knows p iff p is true, S believes p, and S's belief in p was produced by a
process which is a warrant for it.37
Strictly speaking, this "normal form" will not do, since we must recognise the
following points. First, that a belief which was appropriately produced, and so is
warranted at the time of production, can lose that warrant at a later stage; second,
that a belief that was inappropriately produced, and so is not warranted, can gain
warrant at a later stage (perhaps as new evidence comes in, and new belief-forming
processes become available). Kitcher's account, which locates warrant purely with
context of production, faces counterexamples based around these two points.
However, it is a simple matter to augment Kitcher's "normal form" so that these
counterexamples are removed: let a belief be warranted at a time just in case it is
appropriately sustained at that time, let an appropriate process which sustains a
belief be a warrant for that belief, and let production be a special case of
sustaining.38 Since this problem with Kitcher's account is superficial, and since it is
common for naturalistic theories of warrant to couch their accounts simply in terms
of production, I will not refer to this point again.
In line with his strategy of dividing the problem of a priori knowledge into
two sub-problems, Kitcher does not give any detailed suggestions as to what
properties a process must have in order to be "appropriate"; this he seeks to leave to
general epistemology.39 Having defined knowledge as (roughly speaking)
warranted true belief, Kitcher goes on to use the concept of warrant as an undefined
primitive in giving an account of a priori warrant. Arguably, Kitcher's most
significant methodological advance is that of reducing the problem of explaining a
priori knowledge to the problem of explaining a priori warrant. Since a priori
knowledge is a species of knowledge in general, intuitively described as
37 Ibid:. 17.
38 Cf.: Summerfield 1991: 94 n.31.
39
Although subsequent authors have tended to assume that Kitcher meant his account to be reliabilist,
it is worth noting that Kitcher does not explicitly say this in his 1983 presentation. There is, however,
strong indirect evidence that he did have reliabilism in mind: see for example his endorsement of
Goldman's epistemology at Kitcher 1983: 18 n.6. In later work Kitcher has made this assumption
explicit (Kitcher 1992: 75-6).
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"experience-independent" knowledge, it is plausible to think that the a priori
warranting processes will be a species of warranting processes in general: they will
be the experience-independent processes. Kitcher's hope - and this hope is shared
by authors who have developed his ideas - is that an account of experience-
independence can be given independently of an account of warrant in general.
The task of defining a priori knowledge therefore becomes the task of
defining a priori warrant: that is, of setting the standards which warrants must meet
if they are to be experience-independent. And so we come to the second of
Kitcher's sub-problems, that of explaining the notion of an experience-independent
warrant. Unlike his treatment of the concept of warrant in general, Kitcher seeks to
give a detailed solution to this problem.
As Kitcher points out, we must take care in giving an account of experience-
independence. It will not do to claim that a process is experience-independent just
in case it could have produced a warranted belief given any background of
experience: for this would entail that the process can produce a warranted belief
given a background of no experience, and it is plausible that given such a
background, no belief forming processes would exist at all, let alone produce
warranted beliefs.40
What is required is an account of experience-independence that will allow
an appropriate role for experience: the account must respect the insight that we can
know certain conceptual truths a priori, even though experience was required for us
to acquire the concepts involved in those truths. In order to develop such an
account, Kitcher introduces the idea of a sufficient life. The total sequence of
experiences S has had up to time t is S's life at t. A life is sufficient for S for p just in
case S could have had that life and gained sufficient understanding to be able to
grasp p.41 We cannot, though, use this notion to give a definition of a priori
knowledge as follows:
S knows p a priori just in case S knows p and for any life, sufficient for S for
p, S could have that life and still know p.
40 Kitcher 1983: 21.
41 Kitcher 1980: 5.
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This proposed account has the consequence that where S knows p a posteriori, but
could have known p a priori, then S knows p a priori. But this is unacceptable: it is
possible to know a priori propositions a posteriori.42
In looking for an account that works, Kitcher proposes to appeal to Kant's
theory of mathematical knowledge through "pure intuition" and so give an account
of the notion of experience-independence in general, and then to use Kant's
suggestions, suitably formalised, in the definition of a priori warrant. In doing so,
he does not seek to endorse Kant's theory: rather, he takes it to be illustrating the
sorts of properties which belief forming processes must have if they are to be
considered experience-independent. Kitcher writes:
On Kant's theory, processes of pure intuition are supposed to yield a priori
mathematical knowledge. Let us focus on a simple geometrical example. We are
supposed to gain a priori knoweldge [sic] of the elementary properties of
triangles by using our grasp on [sic] the concept of triangle to construct a mental
picture of a triangle and by inspecting this picture with the mind's eye. What are
the characteristics of this kind of process which make Kant want to say that it
produces knowledge which is independent of experience? I believe that Kant's
account implies that three conditions must be met. The same type of process
must be available independently of experience. It must produce warranted belief
independently of experience. And it must produce true belief independently of
experience.44
Kitcher incorporates these three conditions in the following definition:
(2) S knows p a priori iff S knows p, and S's belief in p was produced by a
process which is an a priori warrant for it.
(3) a is an a priori warrant for S's belief in p iff a is a process such that, given
any life, sufficient for S for p
(a) some process of the same type could produce in S a belief in p;
(b) if a process of the same type were to produce in S a belief in p then it
would warrant S in believing in p;
42 Cf. Kripke's discussion of gaining arithmetical knowledge a posteriori, via a calculator or computer
(Kripke 1980: 35, discussed in chapter one of this thesis).
43 Kitcher 1980: 23.
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(c) if a process of the same type were to produce in S a belief in p then p
is true.44
The analysis is intended to show that if S knows p a priori, then S could know p
whatever background of experience she has had, provided that that experience is
sufficient for S to acquire the concepts in p. Two observations in particular are
pertinent.
First, regarding the individuation of types of processes, Kitcher says no more
than that our intuitive principles of type-individuation must be respected.45 An
account which allowed the process of forming a belief in p after hearing a lecture,
and the process of mentally running through a proof of p, to be tokens of the same
type, would, he suggests, violate these intuitive principles. Tie writes that his
analysis is meant to be read as a challenge to the apriorist.
If someone wishes to claim that a particular belief is an item of apriori
knowledge then he must specify a segment of the causal ancestry of the belief,
consisting of states and events internal to the believer, and type-identity
conditions which conform to some principle (or set of principles) of classification
which are standardly employed in our divisions of belief forming processes [...].
If he succeeds in doing this so that the requirements in (3) are met, his claim is
sustained; if he cannot, then his claim is defeated.46
Second, the modality incorporated into the definition by the inclusion of the
word "could" in (3a) needs specifying. Without the modal operator, a claim that a is
an a priori warrant would be defeated by exhibiting a scenario in which a never
operates and so never produces any beliefs at all. But the required sense of
possibility is not mere logical possibility, else (3a) would too weak. Kitcher
suggests that the sense of "could" required should be restricted to possibilities in
which the subject concerned has the "kinds of cognitive capacities distinctive of
humans".47 The idea behind (3a) is that in a world W (where W is a world in which
S has a life sufficient to grasp p) a process a could produce belief in p in S just in case
44 Kitcher 1980: 9-10; 1983: 24.
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there is at least one possibility relative to W in which S has the kinds of cognitive
capacities distinctive of humans, and a does produce a belief in p.
This reference to human-style cognitive capacities is to be built into
conditions (3b) and (3c), which are to be modified accordingly.48 Kitcher notes that
this introduces vagueness as to which worlds are to be counted as relevant, but this
vagueness mirrors our ignorance as to what distinctively human cognitive
capacities are, and is neither avoidable nor objectionable.
It will be useful to illustrate Kitcher's definition with examples. We will
consider two cases: one where Kitcher's account tests positive for apriority, and one
where it does not.
For the first illustration, let the proposition p believed by S be that expressed
by the sentence "I exist", as tokened by S. Intuitively, the process a that produces
the belief in the actual world confers warrant on it: hence S knows p, and the first
conjunct of condition (2) is met. Further, it seems clear that the process a -
presumably a process of self-reflection - is such that a process of the same type can
function and produce belief in p in any situation in which there is a background of
experience sufficient for S to have grasped the concepts involved in p, and in which
S has the kind of cognitive capacities distinctive of humans: hence (3a) is filled.
What is more, there seems to be no way that a process of the same type as a could
fail to warrant the belief in p, should it produce it; hence (3b) is filled. And finally,
owing to its indexical character, p cannot be falsely tokened, so whenever a
produces a belief in p, p is true. Hence (3c) is filled, and so S knows p a priori.
For the second illustration, let p be a complex mathematical truth. We can
allow that in the actual world, S comes to believe p by proving it; hence, in the
actual world S knows p. However: it seems to be possible that S could have a life
sufficient to grasp p, and a be available for S to arrive at a belief in p, and yet fail to
warrant S's belief in p. Consider a situation in which S proves p, but then is misled
by authoritative sources into thinking that her proof is incorrect (Kitcher calls this a
social challenge to knowledge49). Although her proof is correct, the authority of the
48 Ibid.: 27.
49 Ibid, see esp. chapter two.
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sources is such that S is not warranted in believing that her proof is correct, and
hence, though a is available, it does not confer warrant on the belief it produces.
Hence, it seems, p is not known a priori.
This is a central and striking feature of Kitcher's definition of a priori
knowledge: mathematical truths - at least those more complex mathematical truths
susceptible to social defeat - are not known a priori.
Albert Casullo has objected that Kitcher's definition implausibly requires
that a priori warrants be independent of their "standing conditions", where the
standing condition for a process is the "complex neurophysiological state of a
person which is nomologically necessary for a process to produce beliefs in that
person."50 He considers a counterexample to Kitcher's clause (3a) which is as
follows.
Let a be the belief forming process consisting in the process of reflecting on
the concepts of triangle, line, etc.; let a single brain state N be nomologically
necessary for a subject to employ a, but not necessary for S to acquire the concepts
of triangle, line, etc.; and let p be the belief that no two sides of a triangle are parallel.
Now, suppose that in the actual world, S has a life sufficient to grasp p, and comes
to know p by using process a. Suppose that in some world W*, nomologically
identical to the actual world down to the neural level, S gains all the concepts
necessary to grasp p but lacks N. Hence, in W*, S has a life sufficient to grasp p, but
process a is not available to S. Hence, by (3a), a was not an a priori warranting
process. But we have stipulated a and p in such a way that it just does seem that in
the actual world, a warrants belief in p a priori. Hence, Casullo thinks, (3a) is
implausible and must be modified."
It seems likely, however, that Kitcher's remarks about the modality appealed
to in his definition can handle this objection. In W*, S is unable to reflect on the
concepts of line, triangle, etc., to arrive at the belief that no two sides of a triangle are
parallel. But it seems arguable that the ability to engage in this sort of geometrical
reflection is a cognitive ability which is distinctively human. If this claim can be
50 Casullo 1988: 202.
51 Ibid.: 203.
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made out, it is open for Kitcher to claim that W* does not represent a possibility in
which S has the kinds of cognitive capacities distinctive of humans, and that it is
therefore not relevant to whether a is an a priori process.
In response it could be argued that the mere unavailability to S in W* of
process a is not a sufficiently large change to S's cognitive capacities to warrant
describing her as not distinctively human. But it is unclear whether we can make
much headway with this problem by debating such examples: as we noted, we do
not have a precise conception of what counts as distinctively human cognitive
capacities, and without a precise conception we are unable to evaluate Casullo's
objection to Kitcher. If Casullo's claim that Kitcher's clause (3a) must be modified is
to be upheld, it will have to be supported by other arguments and it is not clear
what these would be. I will therefore put this problem on one side.
Although Kitcher thinks that the concept of a priori knowledge is coherent,
his account of the concept of experience-independence is so strong that the majority
of things commonly thought to be a priori turn out not to be. In effect, then, Kitcher
seems to vindicate the view that the naturalist must be hostile to a priori
knowledge. Following the suggestions of authors who have commented on
Kitcher, we will proceed by challenging the notion of experience-independence to
which he appeals. To this end, in the next chapter, we will first locate Kitcher's
ideas within a more general taxonomy of accounts of experience-independence;





Kitcher's chief methodological insight is that the central problem for naturalised
theories of a priori knowledge is that of giving a plausible account of what it is for a
warrant to be experience-independent. This chapter embarks on the project of
giving such an account, drawing from Kitcher in three further ways. First, Kitcher's
own account of experience-independence will be used as a point of departure, and
through raising problems with Kitcher's account, a more plausible theory will be
developed. Second, Kitcher's notion of "warrant" - where a belief is warranted just
in case it is produced by a belief forming process with appropriate characteristics -
will be retained. Third, Kitcher's hope that an account of experience-independence
can be given independently of considerations of the theory of knowledge in general
will be maintained for as long as is practical. Ultimately, though, his attempt to
segregate the issues in this way will prove untenable.
This chapter begins by sketching the options available to us in characterising
the notion of an experience-independent warrant. Having done this, we consider
whether the notion of unrevisability is suitable for characterising experience-
independence. The first problem in determining whether it is suitable is to get a
clear idea of what "unrevisable" means; this, it will transpire, requires an extended
discussion of the concept of evidence. Having clarified what "unrevisable" means,
and hence having clarified what is at stake in claiming that a priori knowledge is
unrevisable, we turn to look at the arguments for and against that claim.
Experience-independence
We begin by giving a brief survey of the different ways in which a warranting
process could be thought to be experience-independent. Current literature supplies
three options in this regard.
Unrevisability
(i) The first option analyses experience-independence in terms of the inputs to the
belief forming process which is the warrant. On this account, a warranting process
is independent of experience if it has nonexperiential inputs: accordingly, we shall
say that on this option, experience-independence is analysed in terms of
nonexperientiality. It is not immediately obvious what the notion of "nonexperiential
input" will involve; however, we will not discuss this problem until chapter nine.
(ii) The second option analyses experience-independence in terms of the strength of
the warrant conferred on a belief produced by the belief forming process. On this
account, a warranting process is independent of experience if the beliefs it produces
are unrevisable.' Roughly speaking, a belief is unrevisable just in case it would never
be rational to give it up. As we will see, this rough definition masks some serious
problems.
(iii) The third option analyses experience-independence in terms of the reliability of
the warrant. On this account, a warrant is independent of experience if it is
infallible, that is, if it never attaches to a false belief. A priori warrant is infallible
just in case no false beliefs are ever a priori warranted. In what follows, infallibilism
will be the view that a priori warranting processes are infallible.
The first of these three accounts is the minimal notion of experience-
independence: intuitively, a belief forming process that needs experiential input in
order to produce warranted beliefs is certainly not experience-independent. The
minimal notion of experience-independence can be augmented by one or both of
the remaining options to produce a stronger account. Kitcher, as we will see, builds
all three into his account of experience-independence; later authors have sought to
defend an account of experience-independence defined solely in terms of the
minimal notion.




As noted, this chapter is centrally concerned with the second notion of
experience-independence, that is, unrevisability. Whether infallibility is a suitable
notion for defining experience-independence will be treated of in the following
chapter. The discussion of infallibility will expose a serious problem for the
naturalistic theory of knowledge in general, which is addressed in chapters seven
and eight. Having addressed this problem, we return, in chapter nine, to the
minimal notion of experience-independence.
The concept of unrevisability
We define "unrevisable" for a belief as follows:
(1) in w, S's belief in p is unrevisable iff there is no situation accessible from zv in
which it is rational for S to give up her belief in p.2
Following Casullo3, we will refer to the thesis that a priori knowledge is unrevisable
knowledge as "(UT)":
(UT) If S's belief in p is warranted a priori then S's belief in p is unrevisable.
This definition of "unrevisable" draws from an account offered by Putnam.
Putnam writes: "...an unrevisable statement is one that one would never be rational
to give up".4 But this definition stands in need of clarification. Our attention should
be drawn to the accessibility relation appealed to in (1). If this relation is set too
weak, virtually no beliefs will count as unrevisable. Even a proponent of (UT) will
want to admit that there are truths now known a priori that it was rational not to
believe in at a time before the beliefs became warranted: it may well not be rational
for S, as a six-year-old, to believe in Pythagoras' Theorem, even though S may come
2 It is common in characterising unrevisability to draw a distinction between prudential and epistemic
rationality; it is the latter sense of "rationality" which is appealed to here. It may be prudentially
rational to give up a belief when faced with a serious threat, but this would not bear on the epistemic
status of the belief.
3 Casullo 1988.
4 Putnam 1983: 98.
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later in life to know that theorem a priori. If S somehow found herself back in her 6-
year-old cognitive state, augmented only by a belief in Pythagoras' Theorem, it
might well be rational for S to give up that belief. If unrestricted, the accessibility
relation will generate an unrevisability thesis that requires that a priori truths are
always rationally believed; but it is unfair to the proponent of (UT) to lumber them
with such an implausible thesis.
We need a principled way of strengthening the relation, so as to generate an
unrevisability thesis which has at least initial plausibility. A temporal restriction -
such that only situations which occur subsequent to the formation of the putatively
unrevisable belief are accessible - will not help. On such a restriction, (UT) becomes
the thesis that a priori knowledge, once acquired, can never be lost; but this too
seems to be an unreasonably restrictive thesis: intuitively, it seems plausible to
allow that at some point in time S can prove Pythagoras' Theorem and so come to
know it a priori, and then at a later time forget how she proved it and so cease to
know it. We can forget things: and if S forgets enough it could well become rational
for her to give up her belief in Pythagoras' Theorem.
A more promising approach would begin by recalling that the concept of
unrevisability was appealed to as a way of explaining the concept of experience-
independence; with this in mind, we might consider restricting the accessibility
relation by appeal to conditions on S's evidence in the situations to be deemed
accessible. The intuitive idea that we are trying to capture is that an unrevisable
belief is one which, once acquired, cannot be dislodged by the accumulation of
additional evidence. This suggests that the accessible situations should be those
wherein S's evidence for p is undiminished. This generates an unrevisability
thesis according to which an item of a priori knowledge is supported by the
evidence in such a way that no further evidence can undermine it, leaving open the
possibility that it can be undermined by loss of evidence. That is, we have the
following definition:
(2) in w, S's belief in p is unrevisable iff there is no situation accessible from w in
which S's evidence for p is undiminished and in which it is rational for S to
give up her belief in p.
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Clearly, this is the sort of unrevisability thesis that we are interested in. However,
the suggestion carries with it a number of problems.
First, it calls for a way of reidentifying the specific evidence for a belief in
situations where the totality of evidence is different. This will be problematic, for
what a proposition p is evidence for depends on the context. Is the proposition Beth
is going out the door at the back of the hall evidence that she is going to get the ball? If
we have just decided to play football, and I know that the ball is kept in the
cupboard at the back of the hall, then it may be. If I am holding the ball in my
hand, then it is not. If the present account of accessibility is to be adopted,
therefore, some care will have to be taken to give an account of the reidentification
of evidence in different situations. Since I doubt that the concept of unrevisability
can be of much help in defining experience-independence, I do not propose to
attempt such an account.
Second, the plausibility of the definition of "unrevisable" given in (2) is
sensitive to what we take evidence to be. On an historically influential view of
evidence, evidence is a form of experience; a common variation on this theme has it
that evidence proper is not misidentifiable. To deny this latter claim seems to
generate a regress. For, suppose that my evidence was misidentifiable; then, to be
sure that a given item was part of my evidence, I would need more evidence; but to
be sure that another given item was part of this new evidence, I would need more
evidence, etc." This regress needs to be stopped "with a bullet", by the postulation
of a level of evidence which has a privileged epistemic status: we cannot be wrong
about it.
This conception of evidence - as an epistemically significant experience
which "is what it appears to be" - has consistently eluded attempts to clarify it, and
it would be unwise to yoke our notion of unrevisability to a potentially incoherent
notion of evidence.6 A more promising account, developed by Williamson,
identifies S's evidence with the set of propositions S knows.7 Williamson calls this
5 See Williamson 1997:721.




thesis E=K. The thesis that all and only knowledge is evidence is equivalent to the
conjunction of three claims: (i) all evidence is propositional, (ii) all propositional
evidence is knowledge, (iii) all knowledge is evidence.8 Williamson argues for (i)
and (ii) by identifying the central functions of the concept of evidence and seeing
what serves them.
Arguments for (i)
The concept of evidence is central to inference to the best explanation,
probabilistic reasoning and the evidential exclusion of hypotheses. In inference to
the best explanation we choose between hypotheses on the basis of which of them
best explains our evidence9; but what hypotheses explain is propositional: hence
evidence is propositional.
The conditional probabilities of hypotheses h and h* on evidence e can be
compared by calculating the inverse probabilities of e on h and h*; this involves
assigning probabilities to evidence; but where, as in the present case, the probability
in question is a measure of the evidential status of a belief, what is assigned a
probability is a proposition. Hence, again, evidence is propositional.
Evidence e rules out an hypothesis h iff e But the premises of an
argument are propositions, hence, evidence is propositional.
Arguments for (ii)
Again, Williamson argues via considerations of inference to the best
explanation, probabilistic reasoning and the evidential exclusion of hypotheses.
When we prefer h to h* because h explains e better than h* does, we are
standardly assuming e to be known; if we do not know e, why should h's capacity
to explain e confirm h for us? It is likewise hard to see why the probability of h
on e should regulate our degree of belief in h unless we know e. Again, an




10 Williamson 1997: 731.
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The possibility of performing a "Russellian Retreat" at this point makes it necessary
to consider this argument more closely. A "Russellian Retreat" is a retreat, typically
under sceptical pressure, from claims about knowledge to claims about justified
belief." In the present context, the possibility seems open to argue that not all
propositional evidence is knowledge, through attempting to demonstrate that the
central functions of evidence can be subserved by something other than knowledge.
The obvious candidate here is justified true belief; in response, Williamson argues
that justified true belief cannot discharge the functions of evidence in the way that
knowledge can.
Suppose that balls are drawn from a bag, with replacement. [Ajssume that
someone else has already made the draws; I watch them on film. The following
situation can arise. I have seen draws 1 to N; each was red (produced a red ball).
I have not yet seen draw N+l. I reason probabilistically, and form a justified true
belief that draw N+l was red too. My belief is in fact true. But I do not know
that draw N+l was red. Consider two false hypotheses:
h: Draws 1 to N were red; draw N+l was black.
h*: Draw 1 was black; draws 2 to N+l were red.
It is natural to say that h is consistent with my evidence and that h* is not. In
particular, it is consistent with my evidence that draw N+l was black; it is not
consistent with my evidence that draw 1 was black. Thus my evidence does not
include the proposition that draw N+l was red. Why not? After all, I have a
justified true belief that it was red. The obvious answer is that I do not know
that draw N+l was red; the unsatisfied necessary condition for evidence is
knowledge.12
Hence, it seems implausible that something less than knowledge can subserve the
functions required of evidence.
Arguments for (iii)
Since, intuitively, we want as much evidence as possible, the burden of proof here is
on those who would deny that all knowledge is evidence."
"
Wright 1991.




However, this claim generates a problem for the present conception of
unrevisability. Given component (iii) of E=K, the claim that all knowledge is
evidence, it follows that every item of knowledge is evidence for itself.14 Hence, the
proponent of E=K is committed to the claim that it is right to respond to the
question "what is the evidence for e?" by citing e. It would certainly be strange to
respond to the question "what is the evidence for e?" in this way; however, to
establish a counterexample to E=K we will need to show more than that it is strange
that e is evidence for e: we will need to show that it is false. But as Grice has
pointed out, that an utterance is strange is not sufficient for it to be false: it may
simply be inappropriate in the conversational context.15 Appealing to this
distinction, Williamson maintains that the strangeness of answering "e" to the
question above shows only that the response would be inappropriate, not that it is
false, e is indeed evidence for e.
However, the claim that each item of knowledge is evidence for itself, in
conjunction with the current definition of "unrevisable", entails that all knowledge is
unrevisable. We can show this by arguing as follows, for an arbitrary p.
(i) S knows p. Assumption
(ii) S's belief in p is unrevisable iff there is no situation in Abbreviated definition of
which S's evidence for p is undiminished and in unrevisability
which it is rational for S to give up her belief in p.
(iii) If S knows p then it is not rational for S to give up her Conceptual truth
belief in p.
(iv) Every item of knowledge is evidence for itself From E=K
(v) p is part of S's evidence for p. From (i) and (iv)
14 Ibid.: 735.
15 Grice 1989. We should not think that this is a distinction of interest only to philosophers, as the
following quotation illustrates:
"Who's the girl you want it for?"
"She's about the same age as us," Christopher said and, since Oneir was looking at him for a
further explanation and he was fairly sure Oneir was not going to believe in someone called the
Goddess, he added, "I've got this cousin called Caroline." This was quite true. Mama had once
shown him a studio photo of his cousin, all lace and curls. Oneir was not to know that this had
nothing whatsoever to do with the sentence that had gone before.
From The Lives of Christopher Chant by Diana Wynne Jones.
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(vi) In every situation in which S's evidence for p is Obvious consequence of
undiminished, p is part of S's evidence. (v)
(vii) In every situation in which S's evidence for p is E=K, applied to (vi)
undiminished, S knows p.
(viii) There is no situation in which S's evidence for p is From (iii) and (vii)
undiminished and in which it is rational for S to give
up her belief in p.
(ix) S's belief in p is unrevisable From (ii) and (vii)
But p was arbitrary: therefore all knowledge is unrevisable.
The claim in line (iii) might be contested: but if it is false then its
contrapositive is also false. The contrapositive is the conditional: if it is rational for S
to give up her belief in p then S does not know p; but this seems supported by the
commonplace observation that "knowledge excludes doubt". Therefore it seems (iii)
must be sustained, and, if we grant E=K, we can only respond to this argument by
placing a further restriction on the accessibility relation in the definition of
unrevisability. One way of imposing this further restriction would be to appeal to
Williamson's notion of the independent evidence for a proposition. The independent
evidence for p is evidence that one could have for p without knowing pf One could
infer from the independent evidence for p to p, but this inference is clearly such that
the addition of further evidence can undermine it.17 Since a revisable item of
knowledge is precisely one that can be undermined by additional evidence, this
seems to capture what we need of the concept of unrevisability without making all
knowledge unrevisable: an unrevisable item of knowledge is one that no additional
evidence could undermine.
The completed definition of unrevisability is therefore as follows:
16 Williamson 1997:735.
17 The independent evidence for p is defined as the evidence that one may have for p without knowing
p\ if one's evidence for p included p itself, then one could not fail to know p on the basis of one's
evidence for it. Hence it is not unreasonable to assume that one may often, though not always, know p
on the basis of the independent evidence for it.
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(3) In iv, S's belief in p unrevisable iff there is no situation accessible from w in
which S's independent evidence for p is undiminished and in which it is
rational for S to give up her belief in p.
The definition still suffers from the earlier problem of reidentifying the evidence for
p in situations where the total evidence is different; but as before, since I do not
think that an appeal to unrevisability can help us give an account of experience-
independence, I propose to let this pass.
Though it is valuable to have a clear account of the concept of unrevisability,
the rough formulation given in (1) will in fact be all we need for the following
discussion. Therefore, I will revert to that formulation in what follows.
The unrevisability thesis
We now turn to examine arguments for and against the unrevisability thesis.
Referring back to Kitcher's definition of a priori knowledge given in the previous
chapter, it is easy to see that Kitcher adopts the notion of unrevisability as a
criterion of experience-independence. For, assume that an a priori warranting
process a produces in S a revisable belief in p; then, a has produced a belief such
that there is a possible evidential situation e in which it is rational for S to give up
the belief in p; so, in e, S is not warranted in believing in p; hence, in e, a process of
the same type as a could produce in S a belief p and not warrant S in believing in p.
So by Kitcher's clause (3b), a was not an a priori warranting process. Thus, on
Kitcher's definition, all beliefs produced by a priori warranting processes are
unrevisable.
So, clearly, Kitcher endorses (UT). The question is: what justification does
he offer for this?
Kitcher's attempt to motivate the unrevisability thesis
(UT) is not a trivial thesis. For a start, it is quite plausible that knowledge in
general is revisable. That is, the following proposition is false:
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If S knows p, then S's belief in p is unrevisable.18
So (UT) does not fall straight out of considerations of knowledge in general. Nor
does (UT) follow from uncontroversial propositions regarding knowledge in
general and a priori warrant, as Casullo illustrates by considering the following
claims:
(i) A priori warrant is experience-independent warrant.
(ii) The existence of a priori knowledge entails that there is experience-
independent warrant sufficient for knowledge.
(iii) The general concept of knowledge does not require that possession of
warrant sufficient for knowledge entail unrevisability.
(iv) It is not the case that if S is warranted a priori in believing p then S's belief in
p is unrevisable.
This is not meant as an argument, but as an illustration. These propositions are
consistent, and (i), (ii), and (iii) are plausible observations about knowledge and a
priori warrant. Yet (iv) is the negation of (UT). So if (UT) is to be established,
special argumentation will have to be adduced.'"
Why, then, does Kitcher think that (UT) is true? As we saw in the previous
chapter, he takes it that his definition of a priori knowledge captures the features
that had made authors such as Kant want to claim that a priori knowledge is
experience-independent knowledge. But - even granting Kitcher's interpretation of
Kant's epistemology - the reference to Kant is so far no more than an argument from
authority: we have been given no reason to accept Kant's views on experience-
independence. However, Kitcher has an independent argument for defining
experience-independence in terms of unrevisability, which we will now consider.
As noted in the previous chapter, Kitcher's intention in his 1983 work is to
argue against apriorism about mathematical knowledge by showing that most
18 Casullo 1988: 188.
19 Ibid.: 198-190. I have substituted "warrant" for Casullo's use of "justification", to avoid potential
confusions regarding issues that will be resolved in the following chapter.
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mathematical knowledge is revisable, and so fails the criteria for a priori knowledge
set out in his definition. Having made his case for this, Kitcher considers the charge
that his definition of experience-independence imposes unreasonable requirements
on a priori knowledge, and that a reasonable definition of a priori knowledge can
be framed that concedes its revisability. He then writes:
To make this concession is to abandon the fundamental idea that a priori
knowledge is knowledge which is independent of experience. The apriorist
would be saying that one can know a priori that p in a particular way, even
though, given appropriate experiences, one would not be able to know that p in
the same way. But if alternative experiences could undermine one's knowledge
then there are features of one's current experience which are relevant to the
knowledge, namely those features whose absence would change the current
experience into the subversive experience. The idea of the support lent by kindly
experience is the obverse of the idea of the defeat brought by uncooperative
experience. To reject condition (3b)... would be to strip apriorism of its
distinctive claim.20
Kitcher's claim is striking. In effect, he is arguing that the minimal account of
experience-independence, given in terms of nonexperientiality, cannot be
distinguished from the apparently stronger account in terms of unrevisability! To
see this, note first that it is generally held that beliefs which are produced by
experiential processes are revisable. Hence, the following conditional seems to be
true:
Vp (p was produced by an experiential process —> p is revisable)
Kitcher argues for the converse of this as follows. Assume that S's warranted belief
in p is revisable. Then there is some feature of experience e such that if e obtains, S's
warrant is defeated. Hence, if S's belief in p is warranted, then S's experience lacks
e. If e is a feature of experience, then the lack of e is also a feature of experience. So,
that S's experience lacks e must be considered causally relevant to the production of
S's belief in p. Hence, there is a feature of experience which must be considered
20 Kitcher 1983: 88-9.
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causally relevant to the production of S's belief in p. Hence S's belief in p is
produced by an experiential process. But p was arbitrary. Hence we seem to have
established:
Vp (p is revisable —> p was produced by an experiential process).
These two conditionals combine to generate the following claim:
Vp (p is revisable <-» p was produced by an experiential process).
Whence, clearly, all and only unrevisable beliefs are produced by nonexperiential
processes. Hence, Kitcher concludes that any attempt to capture the notion of
independence from experience must build in unrevisability.
Summerfield, however, has argued that Kitcher's argument conflates
different notions of "dependence". Summerfield maintains that though Kitcher may
be right to say that the lack of e must be considered a feature of experience, he is
wrong to claim that the lack of e must be considered causally relevant to the
production of S's belief. Her point turns on recognising that there is an intuitive
difference between the cause of an event, the background conditions against which
the cause was efficacious, and further conditions which, had they obtained, would
have blocked the ability of the cause to produce the effect. Although it is not a
straightforward matter to make this difference precise, it is likely that any
satisfactory account of causation will have to respect it.21 In general, where event22 c
causes event e at time f, and for a condition x which does not occur but which could,
by occurring at t, have prevented c from causing e: the fact that there is a
counterfactual situation in which x does occur at t and so blocks c causing e does not
make x part of the cause of e in the actual world.
21 Summerfield 1991: 43.
221 assume that the casual relata are events; a defence of this assumption would take us beyond the
remit of this thesis, nor do we have to establish this for the present point to retain its force.
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An example might make this clearer. A bin fire in a building causes a
conflagration which razes that building to the ground; had the building been
flooded the bin fire would not have caused the conflagration; but the non-obtaining
of the flooding does not thereby become part of the cause of the conflagration. It
remains simply a condition which, had it obtained, would have prevented the
conflagration. The intuitive distinction between cause and background condition
gives us a reason to deny causal status to the non-floodedness of the building.
Analogously, the non-occurrence at the moment of the formation of a belief
in p, of experiences e which would prevent the formation of that belief, cannot be
taken as showing that p is produced by an experiential process. Summerfield's
observations give us a principled way of maintaining the distinction between
unrevisability and nonexperientiality; and so blocking Kitcher's argument for
(UT).23
Castillo's argument against the unrevisability thesis
We now move on to arguments that (UT) is not just unsupported, but actually false.
Objections to (UT) have been developed by Casullo.
Casullo notes first that it is natural to think that there is a distinction
between experiential evidence and nonexperiential evidence; further, it is natural to
think that the fact that a belief is revisable in the face of nonexperiential evidence
need not count against that belief's being warranted a priori. Casullo sees this
observation as pointing to a distinction between "strong" and "weak" unrevisability
theses:
(SUT) If S's belief in p is warranted a priori then S's belief in p is unrevisable in the
light of any future evidence.
(WUT)If S's belief in p is warranted a priori then S's belief in p is unrevisable in the
light of any future experiential evidence.24
23 See also Casullo's attribution to Kitcher of "symmetry thesis" about confirming and defeating
evidence, and his counterexamples to such a thesis: Casullo 1988: 197-9.
24 Casullo 1988: 190.
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Casullo thinks that the strong version is particularly implausible. He writes:
Clearly, (WUT) is more plausible than (SUT). For suppose that S's belief that p is
justified on the basis of nonexperiential evidence and it is acknowledged that p
might be rationally revised in light of further nonexperiential evidence. In such a
case it does not appear plausible to maintain that S's justification is not a priori.
(WUT) is more promising since one can argue that if S's belief that p is revised in
light of experiential evidence then that belief is not independent of experience in
the requisite sense.25
Accordingly, Casullo quickly rejects (SUT) and directs the bulk of his arguments
against (WUT). However, an argument due to Edidin suggests strongly that the
distinction between (SUT) and (WUT) is untenable. Edidin's argument can be read
as showing that a belief is strongly unrevisable if it is unrevisable at all. The
argument, recast to fit present terminology, is as follows.26
Let S have an a priori warranted belief in p; suppose S's belief in p is
revisable in the face of nonexperiential evidence. Then, there is no reason why S
could not acquire evidence which warrants her in believing that p is revisable by
nonexperiential evidence and which warrants her in believing that such evidence
could be obtained by persons other than herself. Then let T be an individual whom
S believes to be extremely authoritative regarding beliefs susceptible to warrant by
nonexperiential evidence, and let S know that T is familiar with S's warrant for
believing p. T then says that she possesses nonexperiential evidence that
undermines S's warrant for believing p, though she does not say what that evidence
is. Given S's respect for T, S would be irrational to persist in believing p; hence this
is a situation in which it is rational for S to stop believing p. And the evidence
which leads her to do so is testimonial, and therefore experiential.27 Hence, if S's
belief in p is revisable in the face of nonexperiential evidence, S's belief in p is also
revisable in the face of experiential evidence, and therefore not unrevisable at all.
25 Ibid.
26 Edidin 1984: 190.
27 This assumes that testimonial evidence is experiential evidence. This assumption is not uniformly




If a warranted belief is not unrevisable in the face of both experiential and
nonexperiential evidence, it is not unrevisable at all. Contraposing: if a belief is
unrevisable it is unrevisable in the face of both experiential and nonexperiential
evidence; that is, it is strongly unrevisable. So, if Edidin's argument is sound,
(WUT) does not represent a stable unrevisability thesis, and we should reject the
suggestion that a priori knowledge can be characterised by (WUT). (SUT) is the
only tenable unrevisability thesis: in effect, the thesis (UT);z/sf is the thesis (SUT).
We should note, though, that there does indeed seem to be an intuitive
distinction between experiential and nonexperiential evidence. Nonexperiential
evidence seems to be just that sort of evidence which can produce a priori
knowledge."8 The argument above does not show that there is no distinction
between these two sorts of evidence. What it shows is that a belief must be
unrevisable in the face of both sorts of evidence if it is unrevisable at all.
The crucial parts of Casullo's argument, then, are his considerations against
(SUT). Casullo proposes the following case as a counterexample to (SUT).
A Mary is able reliably to discriminate between valid and invalid inferences on
the basis of reflective thought. Mary wonders whether "p^q" entails "-p—>-
q" and at t concludes that it does. Later, a counterexample occurs to her
which leads her to reject the belief she held at f, and to believe instead that
"p—>q" entails "-g—>-p".29
(Note that it would not do to respond to this case by saying that Mary's erroneous
belief at t shows that she is in fact not reliable: intuitively, warrant can be conferred
28 This distinction is not universally accepted: see for example Butchvarov 1970. Whether we allow a
distinction between a priori and non-a priori evidence depends on one's theory of evidence. For
Quine, for example, evidence is the stimulation of sensory receptors (Quine 1969: 75); on an account
such as this, it would make little sense to speak of a priori evidence, since a priori connotes
"nonsensory". On Williamson's 1997 account of evidence, one's evidence consists of all and only the
propositions that one knows; Williamson's account therefore allows for a distinction between a priori
and non-a priori evidence: one's a priori evidence is all and only one's a priori knowledge.
29 Casullo 1988: 191.
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by processes which are reliable but not infallible.30) Casullo makes five claims about
case A; three are banal, viz.:
(a) Mary's belief at t is based on a nonexperiential process a which is reliable
but not infallible;
(b) a process of the same type as a leads Mary to conclude that the belief she
held at t is mistaken, and leads her to a correct belief;
(c) Mary's conclusions as stated in (b) are warranted beliefs.
The final two are controversial:
(d) Mary's belief at t was a warranted belief;
(e) Mary's belief at t was warranted a priori despite later being revised.
In favour of (d) Casullo cites the following case, which seems to be analogous in all
relevant respects to case A:
B Mary sees a sheet of paper on the table and on that basis forms the belief
that it is square. A second closer examination reveals that two of the sides of
the sheet of paper are slightly longer than the other two. On that basis,
Mary rejects her former belief about the shape of the paper and comes to
believe that it is rectangular.31
Casullo argues as follows.
Since the circumstances under which Mary perceived the page were normal and
Mary is a reliable discriminator of shapes, her initial belief is warranted. The
fact that our discriminatory powers sometimes fail us does not entail that beliefs
based on shape-perception are not warranted. Furthermore, if such beliefs
typically are warranted, we do not single out particular cases as unwarranted
merely because they are false. Some other relevant difference must be cited such
that the perceiver was impaired or the environment was gerrymandered.32
30 This intuition is challenged in the following chapter.
31 Casullo 1988: 191.
32 Ibid. I have again substituted "warranted" for Casullo's "justified", to retain continuity with the text.




From this it seems to follow that we must assent to (d). The proponent of (UT) must
therefore deny (e): that is, it must be claimed that although Mary's belief at t is
warranted, it is not warranted a priori, simply because it was revised. But, Casullo
claims, this is very implausible. The process which leads Mary to revise her belief
is, like the process which leads her to form it, nonexperiential. If we then deny that
Mary's belief at t is warranted, we are ignoring the factor that is the chief
determinant of apriority.
To this it might be objected that Casullo simply begs the question against the
proponent of (UT). For the proponent of (UT), nonexperiential production is
precisely not the sole determinant of whether a belief is a priori: it must also be
unrevisable. But this charge of question begging only has force if we have
independent reason to believe that (UT) may be true; and our recent consideration
of Summerfield's arguments suggest that no such reason is forthcoming. Therefore
the charge of question begging in this context can be discarded.
Flowever, as Casullo points out, case A could be objected to on the grounds
that it assumes that a priori warrant is fallible: that is, it assumes that there can be a
priori warrant for false beliefs. Now, the proponent of (UT) must certainly claim
that a priori warrant is infallible. To see this, let us assume both the thesis (UT), and
that a priori warrant is fallible: and now suppose S has a false but a priori
warranted belief in p. It follows from (UT) that S can never revise her belief in p,
that she can never discover that her belief is false. But this is not a condition that we
would think governs the sorts of beliefs we normally say are known a priori.
Suppose S is an expert mathematician and convinces herself she has proven some
very complex mathematical proposition p, which is in fact false; if her pseudo-proof
is a priori warrant conferring, and a priori warranted beliefs are unrevisable, then
S's mistake will be uncorrectable! But since S was able to arrive at the belief in the
first place, we are inclined to suppose that she has the ability to correct her belief if
it is wrong. So the unrevisability of a priori warranted beliefs and the fallibility of a
priori warrant are two doctrines it is implausible to hold simultaneously. Thus,
someone who accepts that a priori knowledge is unrevisable must suppose that a
priori warrant is infallible; so Casullo's assumption that there can be a priori
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warranted false beliefs threatens to beg the question against the proponent of (UT)
in another way. Further, this charge of question-begging is dialectically more
serious since we have not yet seen any arguments for or against infallibilism.
Casullo tries to sidestep this problem by suggesting that other cases can be
set up which make the same point as case A, but which do not assume that a priori
warrant is fallible. In an attempt to show this, Casullo offers the following case,
meant to make the same point as case A, without assuming that a priori warrant is
fallible.
C Charlie believes p entails q on the basis of a valid proof Pr Since the proof is
a result of reflective thought, Charlie's belief is warranted nonexperientially.
But now suppose that (a) there exists a pseudo-proof P2 from p to -q; and (b)
that if this pseudo-proof were brought to Charlie's attention he would not be
able to detect any flaws in it or to discount it in any other fashion.33
Casullo intends to argue from this case to substantially the same conclusions as
before. He asks us to imagine that P2 is never brought to Charlie's attention: hence
Charlie's belief that p entails q remains warranted despite the fact that it would be
revised if P2 did come to Charlie's attention. Charlie's belief is revisable, and it
seems on the surface that that no false beliefs need to be warranted for this example
to go through. Hence, Casullo concludes, there can be a priori warranted beliefs
which can be revised.
But on reflection we might well be concerned that Casullo has failed to
remove the assumption that a priori warrant is fallible. A priori warrant is
infallible, recall, just in case a priori warrant never attaches to a false belief. But the
process of following the pseudo-proof P2 must be capable of conferring some
positive epistemic status on Charlie's false belief that p entails -q if it is to be capable
of forcing Charlie to revise his true belief that p entails q. Now, P2 is a mere pseudo-
proof, therefore the process of following it is probably incapable of conferring any
real positive epistemic status on beliefs. But it must be capable of conferring some
apparent positive status on Charlie's belief that p entails -q: in some sense, Charlie is
justified in believing p entails -q after following the pseudo-proof, since as far as he
33 Ibid. : 192.
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is concerned P2 is a legitimate proof. So the process of following the pseudo-proof
seems capable of conferring some form of positive epistemic status on a false belief.
The question is whether this status is that of being warranted.
Our difficulty here is that we have not yet developed the conceptual tools
needed for distinguishing real from apparent positive epistemic status34, and that
we need those tools in order to evaluate whether Casullo is successful in removing
the assumption that a priori warrant is fallible. I propose, therefore, to set aside this
line of argument and turn to alternative arguments against (UT) which do not make
assumptions about the fallibility of a priori warranting processes.
The argument from the revisability of knowledge in general
Perhaps the strongest reason to believe that a priori knowledge is revisable derives
from considerations from the theory of knowledge in general, and so is obscured by
Kitcher's proposal that the analysis of "experience-independence" proceed
independently of the wider theory of knowledge. The relevant consideration is that
all knowledge is revisable. Given that a priori knowledge is knowledge, this suggests
a very quick argument for the revisability of a priori knowledge: all knowledge is
revisable, a priori knowledge is knowledge; therefore, a priori knowledge is
revisable. We can call this "the argument from general revisability".
The proponent of (UT) might object that the claim that all knowledge is
revisable simply begs the question against (UT). Again, this point would have
some force if we had seen a plausible argument for (UT); given that we have not,
the charge of question-begging is weak.
However, whether the argument from general revisability is ultimately
convincing depends on the way that first premise is established. The premise is
often called "Peirceian fallibilism": this is the thesis that we should hold all our
knowledge in as modest a way as possible, never considering any piece of
knowledge that we have as immune to revision.3" It is not clear, though, that this
34 The distinction between warrant and the intuitive notion of justification is discussed in the following
chapter.
35 Cohen 1988, Casullo 1988.
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formulation really motivates the view that all knowledge is revisable, as opposed to
the view that all knowledge should be considered revisable: it is consistent with our
holding that a belief is revisable, that it is in fact unrevisable. The premise is also
associated with Quine's holism, which we have already discussed at length.
However, we can eschew the details of Peirceian interpretation or further exegesis
of Quine, for the premise is supported directly by the naturalistic framework we
have adopted.
According to the naturalist framework, knowledge is produced by belief
forming processes with a certain characteristic. Pending further discussion in the
next chapter, let us take it that this property is reliability; a reliabilist is someone
who endorses this view of the nature of the desired characteristic. To see how the
reliabilist framework supports the view that all knowledge is revisable, we must
first note a further distinction between types of revisability. There are two ways in
which experience might lead us to revise beliefs that we take ourselves to know.
Where warranting process a produces in S a belief p: we call direct defeaters,
experiences that provide S with reason to believe that p is false; and we call indirect
defeaters, experiences that provide S with reason to believe that a is not an
appropriate (i.e.: reliable) belief forming process.16 This leads us to recognise a
distinction between two types of revisability:
S's belief in p is directly revisable iff there is an evidential situation in which
S's evidence gives S reason to believe -p.
S's belief in p is indirectly revisable iff there is an evidential situation in which
S's evidence gives S reason to believe that S's belief in p is not warranted.
If a belief is directly revisable then it is indirectly revisable but not vice versa; one
can have evidence that one's belief is incorrectly formed without having evidence
that one's belief is false.
36 This distinction is due to Casullo 1988: 204.
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Now, we are calling cases wherein an authoritative source gives us (possibly
misleading) reason to think that we do not know the things we took ourselves to
know, cases of social challenge to knowledge.37 The belief forming processes apt for
producing knowledge are, on the naturalistic account, realised by
neurophysiological processes, and we rationally have to respect the
pronouncements of neurophysiologists on matters of neurophysiology. Hence,
there are individuals who are in a more authoritative position with respect to our
brain processes than we are, and we are rationally required to respect what they say
on these matters. It follows that the vast majority of our knowledge is vulnerable to
social challenges, for neurophysiologists can always give us (possibly misleading)
reason to think that the processes that produce our knowledge are not reliable. And
this observation applies equally to a priori knowledge. As Casullo writes:
...it can be plausibly argued that if one has constructed a valid proof for a
particular theorem then the warrant conferred on the theorem by the process of
constructing the proof cannot be defeated by experiences such as the testimony
of authorities or the results of a computer programme. If one has a proof in hand
then one is warranted in being suspect about the sincerity or competence of the
alleged authorities and computer programmers. But when we turn to indirect
defeaters the situation changes radically. First of all, it is generally granted by
proponents of reliabilism that the warrant which a reliable process confers on S's
belief that p is defeated if S has reason to believe that the process is not a reliable
one. Secondly, the reliability of any cognitive process is a matter which is open
to empirical investigation. Hence, there is some set of possible experiences which
would justify us in believing that it is unreliable. Here it is crucial to recognise
that even if a belief forming process is in fact reliable, it does not follow that the
available evidence will warrant us in believing that the process is reliable.33
Hence, it seems that even a priori knowledge is revisable, though Casullo admits
that it is only indirectly revisable. However: indirect revisability is sufficient for
revisability.
One obvious way of challenging this argument is to observe that the claim
that all knowledge is revisable is just false. There are some beliefs which do seem to
37 The terminology is Kitcher's (Kitcher 1983) and was introduced in the previous chapter.
38 Casullo 1988: 205.
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be totally unrevisable: for example, the Cartesian cogito; or the belief that not every
sentence is both true and false at the same time.39 However, these examples can do
little to help the proponent of (UT). There seems to be far more a priori knowledge
than these two cases, and it is not at all clear how reflection on these two cases will
motivate the claim that a priori knowledge is in general unrevisable knowledge.
Recent literature contains two further ways of responding to the argument
from general revisability. First: Casullo's argument turns on the suggestion that we
can imagine cases in which we would revise our a priori knowledge. This appeal to
imaginability has been challenged. Second: Casullo allows, very plausibly, that a
priori knowledge is immune to direct defeat. Some have thought that this alone is
sufficient to establish negative conclusions about a priori knowledge.
We will deal with these in turn.
Indirect revision and imaginability
Casullo assumes that beliefs in propositions susceptible to logical or mathematical
proofs are immune to direct defeat: hence all interest devolves onto whether such
beliefs are also immune to indirect defeat. The strategy for showing that all
knowledge is revisable turns on the following claims: belief forming processes will
be realised by neurophysiological processes; so, for any token process a it is easy to
imagine cases in which our warrant for believing in the reliability of a is indirectly
defeated by possibly misleading but ostensibly authoritative empirical evidence,
which challenges our confidence in the reliability of token neurophysiological
processes which realise it.
There are two ways in which we could object to this appeal to the
imaginability of defeating cases to motivate the view that knowledge is indirectly
revisable: (a) it could be denied that such defeating cases actually are imaginable; or
(b) it could be asserted that although they are imaginable, such cases are not (in the
requisite sense) possible.
39 See Putnam 1987: 101, also Putnam 1983, chapter six.
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Strategy (a) must do more than simply gainsay the suggestion that a priori
knowledge can be indirectly defeated. One possibility might be to hold that
supposed cases of defeat are misdescribed. Consider a case in which a token
process a produces in S a belief in a logical truth. A defeating circumstance might
involve S being told by authoritative neurophysiologists that her ability to reason
logically had been impaired, that a was realised by a wholly unreliable brain
process: as a consequence, S's warrant for her belief in the logical truth is defeated.
Against this it might be maintained that, since logical truths are at stake, in such
circumstances S would actually be warranted in retaining her belief in logical truths
and assuming that the scientists had somehow got it wrong. But this is question-
begging and moreover independently unconvincing. Whatever canons of
rationality we employ, there are possible circumstances in which experience is so
recalcitrant that we are led to give them up. In such circumstances the very concept
of rationality is undermined, a fortiori it is not rational for us to maintain any of our
beliefs.
Strategy (b) is more interesting. Perhaps there is a way to maintain that
defeating cases are imaginable without allowing that they are genuinely possible.
Something along these lines is developed by Field, who holds, first, that a notion of
a priori knowledge not incorporating an unrevisability requirement is too weak to
be of interest but, second, that we must respect the intuition that cases of indirect
defeat of a priori knowledge are imaginable.40 Field tries to reconcile these
requirements by arguing that imaginable defeating circumstances, though
imaginable, are not genuinely possible. Ffe draws an analogy with set theory.41 It is
consistent with our belief that standard set theory is consistent that we can imagine
circumstances in which we became convinced that a contradiction could be drawn
from it. The fact that we can imagine such a case does not render set theory






Now, the suggestion that imaginability does not entail genuine possibility is
plausible42; the question is whether it finds application in the present case.
Misleading evidence is both imaginable and genuinely possible: this is indisputable.
And misleading evidence is all that is needed to set up cases of indirect defeat of a
priori knowledge. Field maintains that we must first find a principled way of
distinguishing genuine from misleading evidence, and so maintain that a belief is
only "genuinely" revisable if there is no "genuine" evidential situation in which it
would be rational to give it up. Field does not suggest how this is to be done, but
holds that unless we allow that there is some way of doing it, we trivialise a priori
knowledge by allowing too quick an argument for revisability. But his position is
unconvincing, for it is not at all clear that it is possible to draw the requisite
distinction. For purposes of rational assessment, all evidence is on a par. Thought-
experiments involving misleading evidence are set up in just such a way that it
seems we have, rationally, to take the misleading evidence into account. Without a
principled way of distinguishing genuine from misleading evidence, strategy (b)
fails. So Field fails to undermine Casullo's argument that a priori knowledge is
indirectly revisable.
Direct revision and scepticism about a priori knowledge
Setting aside Field's argument, we can consider a second way of responding to
Casullo. This involves trying to show that the concession that a priori knowledge is
not directly revisable is still enough to induce scepticism about a priori knowledge.
In essentials, this is Devitt's strategy.43 Devitt maintains that Quine's thesis of
holism is meant to establish the claim that all knowledge is directly revisable. He
writes:
Quine's revisability thesis is surely concerned only with [direct revisability]: "no
statement is immune to revision" (Quine, 1953, p.43) in that experiential evidence
42 Genuine possibility is constrained by the modal and nomological structure of the world, and the
claim that the set of imaginable things is a subset of the genuinely possible things is certainly




might directly bear against it. The thesis is simply concerned with the relation
between evidence and statement not with the relation between evidence and the
view that a particular person (or even a particular community) has thought well
about the statement.44
Granting for the moment that all knowledge is directly revisable, we can take Devitt
to be arguing for a Quinean scepticism about a priori knowledge in the following
manner:
(i) All knowledge is directly revisable
(ii) A priori knowledge is not directly revisable
So, (iii) There is no a priori knowledge.
This argument has power since it turns on a premise - (ii) - which a proponent of
revisability such as Casullo is willing to grant: as we saw in the recent quotation,
Casullo finds it plausible that having arrived at a belief in p via a proof, for
example, renders that belief immune from direct revision.
The way to resist this argument, of course, is to reject the revamped first
premise. There are two ways of rejecting this premise: one moderate, one radical.
The moderate way is to argue that Quine does not manage to sustain the claim that
all knowledge is directly revisable. There are two ways in which we might try this.
One way would be to point out that Quine's revisability thesis is meant to be
supported by his holism, and then argue that Quine does not manage to establish
holism. Alternatively, we could grant Quinean holism, but argue against Devitt's
interpretation: it is indeed not obvious that Quine is to be read in the way Devitt
suggests, and indeed Quine's remark about "pleading hallucination" to reject
experiences which tell against a favoured theory suggests strongly that he has
failures of cognitive processes in mind, as well as direct defeat.
These moderate options are, I think, promising, and could well be explored
by proponents of revisability who wish to reject Devitt's argument. However, I
want to consider a more radical way of responding to Devitt's argument: this
44 Ibid.: 48. What Devitt calls "evidence that someone has not thought well about a statement" is
equivalent to what we are calling "indirect defeat".
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response consists of arguing for a very strong denial of premise (i): it is proposed to
argue that no item of knowledge is directly revisable.
This claim seems problematic: in characterising a priori knowledge as
revisable but only indirectly revisable, there is a tendency to assume that this in
itself picks out a distinction between a priori knowledge and knowledge in general.
This tendency is certainly implicit in the most recent quotation from Casullo:
Casullo writes that possession of a proof of a proposition renders belief in that
proposition immune to direct defeat, implying that a warrant for a belief derived
from something less than a proof leaves that belief still open to direct revision.
But it is wrong to draw a distinction between knowledge and a priori
knowledge in point of direct revision: a paradox due to Kripke, which turns on the
principle of the closure of knowledge under known entailment, makes this point.1'
The principle of closure is as follows (writing "K " for " is known"):
Kp,K(ph7) (= Ktp46
Now, clearly, if p is true then all evidence against p is misleading; but if S
knows p then p is true. Hence, for any p which S knows, S should be able to reason
as follows:
(1) I know p
(2) I know (p is true entails all evidence against p is misleading)
(3) I know that all evidence against p is misleading.
But if S knows that all evidence against p is misleading then there is no evidential
situation in which S's evidence can give S reason to believe -p. But then, by the
definition of direct revisability, S's belief in p is not directly revisable.
The argument is sound; yet p was arbitrary. Hence it seems that no item of
knowledge is directly revisable. Further, the only principle used to establish this
45 This setting up of the paradox is drawn from Lewis 1996.
46 The principle is discussed further in the following chapters.
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conclusion was the principle of closure of knowledge under known implication.
We will return to this principle later; suffice for now to say that adoption of the
principle seems motivated by very general considerations about the concept of
knowledge. The claim that no item of knowledge is directly revisable, then, seems
to be central to the concept of knowledge, and I think that despite its paradoxical
appearance, we must accept it. The appearance of paradox can be lessened, and
perhaps dispelled, once we have gone into more details about the general theory of
knowledge.
Conclusion
We have found no difference between knowledge in general and a priori
knowledge in point of either direct or indirect revisability. The naturalistic theory
of knowledge, which links the warrant for a belief with the causal ancestry of the
belief, renders all knowledge open to social challenges by experts47, and hence
renders all knowledge indirectly revisable. To this extent, Kitcher is right to take
cases of social challenge to knowledge as showing that mathematical knowledge is
revisable. Where he fails is in giving us any reason to think that a priori knowledge
is unrevisable knowledge. The revisability of a priori knowledge therefore seems to
be something that naturalistic theories of a priori knowledge will have to accept.
However, the claim that knowledge is immune to direct defeat seems to have been
established on the basis of very general considerations of the concept of knowledge:
it is therefore something that must be accepted by all theorists of knowledge,
naturalistic or otherwise. Therefore we cannot even adopt the very weak position,
that while a priori knowledge is only indirectly revisable, knowledge in general is
either directly or indirectly revisable. All knowledge is indirectly revisable; and no
knowledge is directly revisable.
It seems, then, that we should not appeal to the concept of unrevisability in
explaining the "experience-independence" of a priori knowledge. This leaves us
47 All - bar the two anomalous cases noted on page 117.
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with an account of experience-independence in terms of the minimal notion alone,
or that notion augmented by the stipulation that a priori warrant is infallible. The
following chapters argue for a position as regards infallibility analogous to the one
taken here on revisability: it will be claimed that no difference can be drawn
between a priori warrant and warrant in general in point of fallibility. Having
established this, and dealt with a problem which arises, we turn in the final chapter





The third option available to us in explaining "experience-independence" was to
appeal to the concept of infallibility. On this account, experience-independence is
analysed in terms of the notion of nonexperientiality combined with the
requirement that the experience-independent warrant never attach to a false belief.
We will say that a property of beliefs is infallible just in case necessarily every belief
that has it is true. That is, we adopt the following definition of infallibility (for
property of beliefs cp):
cp is infallible iff Vp(tpp—is true).1
To say that a priori warrant is infallible is, then, to say that no false belief can be
warranted a priori.
On Kitcher's definition, the infallibility of a priori warrant is required
directly by clause (3c).2 However, the argument that Kitcher offers for adopting
clause (3c), and hence the requirement of infallibility, is less explicit than his
argument for adopting unrevisability. In favour of clause (3c), he cites an intuition:
The intuition is that a priori warrants must be ultra-reliable: if a person is
entitled to ignore empirical information about the type of world she inhabits
then that must be because she has at her disposal a method of arriving at belief
which guarantees true belief. (This intuition can be defended by pointing out
that if a method which could produce false belief were allowed to override
1 We might wonder whether the modal requirement could be dropped, and whether only the material
truth of the conditional cpp—>p is required for infallibility. To see that the stronger version is needed,
consider a blackboard B with a true proposition written on it; then, the predicate " is written on
blackboard B" is infallible. Intuitively, this is not what we want. Roughly speaking, the difference
between the non-modalised and the modalised version of the infallibility requirement is that between
"X didn't produce a false belief' and "X couldn't produce a false belief.
The grade of necessity appealed to has not been specified. This problem will be deferred
until the discussion of relevance in the following chapters.
2 See chapter four.
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experience, then we might be blocked from obtaining knowledge which we
might otherwise have gained.) In my analysis, the intuition appears as (3c).3
There are two proposals here; the first, coming before the parenthesis, is of little
help as it stands: it amounts merely to an intuition in favour of infallibilism. But
this quotation from Kitcher comes in the context of a critique of an argument that
only necessary truths are knowable a priori. Roughly stated, the argument Kitcher
criticises is as follows:
Assume S knows p a priori. Her knowledge is independent of her
experience. Hence S can know p without any information about the kind of
world she inhabits. So, necessarily p.4
Kitcher writes that this argument turns on a misconstrual of the intuition, cited
above, that a priori warrant is infallible. This, perhaps, suggests that Kitcher has in
mind the following argument for the infallibility of a priori warrant, which is
structurally similar to the rejected argument just sketched. For a priori warranting
process a:
Assume (i) a could warrant a false belief
so, (ii) in some possible world, a does warrant a false belief
so, (iii) in order to find whether a warrants a false belief in
this world, we have to inspect our world
so, (iv) in order to use a, we have to inspect our world
so, (v) a is not an a priori belief forming process
so, (vi) no a priori belief forming process could warrant a
false belief.
This argument, however, is unconvincing. The weak point is step (iv). It is weak
because there is no reason to think that the epistemic efficacy of a belief forming
process depends on our having checked to see if it is appropriate. Quite the
3 Kitcher 1983: 29-30.
4 Ibid.: 29. His critique of this argument, which does not concern us here, turns on counterexamples to
it such as the proposition expressed by an utterance of "I exist". Such propositions are arguably
knowable a priori; they are also contingent.
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contrary: the guiding idea behind Kitcher's psychologistic account of knowledge
seems to be a shift to a view that the epistemic efficacy of our belief forming
processes is independent of whether we know them to have the appropriate
properties. After all, we do not, now, know what the appropriate properties are, yet
we do possess knowledge. So step (iv) is unacceptable.
A second argument for the infallibility of a priori warrant is proposed in the
parenthesis towards the end of the quotation. Here Kitcher defends his claim that a
priori warrant is infallible by suggesting that if false beliefs could be warranted a
priori then we might be "blocked from obtaining knowledge which we might
otherwise have gained". But this suggestion has weight only if we are willing to
assume that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge. In the case of ordinary
knowledge and ordinary warrant, we tend to think that we can allow that some
false beliefs get warranted, for we are also inclined to think that other processes will
be available to identify and correct warranted false beliefs when they occur. The
operative assumption here is that ordinarily warranted beliefs are revisable, and it
is only because Kitcher thinks that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge
that he thinks that a priori warrant must be infallible. Once we drop the
unrevisability assumption, we have no reason to think that a fallible notion of a
priori warrant would commit us to the possibility of false beliefs that we were
unable to correct, and so no reason to adopt infallibilism.6
No further argument seems to be forthcoming for the infallibility of a priori
warrant. Indeed, many authors take the fallibility of a priori warrant to be easily
established.6 Thus, in Casullo's case B, in the previous chapter, it is assumed that
perceptual warrant is fallible, and Casullo takes there to be a significant analogy
between case B, and case A, where Mary arrives at a false belief through a process
of reflective thought, such that it is obvious that a priori warrant is also fallible.
In the same vein, Summerfield considers an expert mathematician, a highly
reliable prover of mathematical truths.7 Summerfield takes it that on the rare
5 The previous chapter discussed a related point.
6 Casullo 1988, Summerfield 1991.
7 Summerfield 1991: 55-6.
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occasion where the mathematician executes a flawed proof, and so comes to believe
in a falsehood, the process of following that flawed proof must be taken as an
instance of a generally reliable process type. Hence, she concludes, since it was
produced by a reliable process, the false mathematical belief is warranted.
So Casullo and Summerfield take it that a priori warrant, like warrant in
general, is fallible. But they are wrong to do so. This chapter will argue that all
warrant is infallible; it will follow that a priori warrant is infallible. This conclusion
will be established not on the basis of any specific considerations of the concept of a
priori knowledge, but through reflection on the general theory of knowledge. By
way of introducing the argument that warrant is infallible, it will be useful to begin
by emphasising the difference between warrant - which we are using as a technical
term - and the more intuitive notion of justification.
Justification
Following Kitcher, we are using the term "warrant" as a placeholder for whatever
property X solves the equation: Knowledge = True Belief + X. Some authors use the
term "justification" in this capacity, but this is unhelpful, since we already possess
strong intuitions about the concept of justification. These intuitions, however, are
not wholly determinate (as we will shortly see) and have been deformed by the
pressure brought to bear on the concept of justification as a result of its employment
in what is called the "traditional" analysis of knowledge. On the traditional
analysis, knowledge is taken to be a combination of truth, belief and justification.
That is:
(JTB) S knows p if and only if p is true, S believes p and S's belief in p is justified.
p must be true since it is intuitively inconsistent to assert simultaneously that S
knows p and that p is false: this is to say that knowledge is factive, only truths can
be known. The assumption that p must be also believed is central to the project of
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giving a reductive analysis of knowledge. Typically, the state of knowing p is taken
to be a hybrid of a mental and a metaphysical state.8 The metaphysical aspect of the
state is given by the requirement that p be true; the fundamental mental aspect is
that p be believed. Believing is assumed to be more fundamental that knowing, and
the task of understanding knowledge is taken to be the task of showing what extra
conditions must be met for a belief to be known.
The conditions of truth and belief are not, however, jointly sufficient for
knowledge since, uncontroversially, there can be true beliefs that are not known.
Plato's Theaetetus contains an early demonstration of this: a skilled advocate may
convince a jury of the Tightness of his case through force of oratory alone; but while
the jury may through this method come to believe truly in the Tightness of the
advocate's case, they do not possess knowledge that he is right." True belief needs
to be qualified by something else to give a full analysis of knowledge, and the
traditional model suggests that this third factor is justification. This requirement is
acutely difficult to clarify. There are probably (at least) three notions of justification
which can lay some claim to being intuitive. The fundamental distinction is
between regulative and nonregulative conceptions of justification.'0 A regulative
norm provides rules and precepts which an agent can use to guide her actions; a
nonregulative norm provides standards against which actions can be judged, but
does not supply guidelines for the agent to follow from the first-person point of
view. A regulative standard of epistemic justification governs what a subject thinks
she ought to believe given her evidence; a nonregulative standard of epistemic
justification is used to judge whether the agent is right in believing something. It is
not part of the concept of nonregulative justification that the agent be aware of
which of her beliefs are justified in the nonregulative sense, or what the standards
are for assessing them. Roughly, nonregulative justification concerns a privileged
observer's assessment of whether S is right in believing something.
A second distinction, which overlaps the first, is between internalist and
externalist notions of justification. A conception of justification is internalist just in
8 See for example Ayer 1956: 14ff., but cf. Williamson 1995.
9 Theaetetus: 201a-201c. See Burnyeat 1990
10 Goldman 1986: 25.
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case, (for all p) if S's belief in p is justified then S knows it is justified; a conception of
justification is externalist otherwise." The second distinction should not be
conflated with the first. A norm could be regulative without being internalist: one
may be able to follow a rule without being able formulate it precisely, and so
without knowing in every case whether one is following it.12
I am inclined to think that our intuitions about justification are regulative
and internalist13, and that the impulse underlying the traditional analysis of
knowledge is captured most nearly by the following definition of justification:
S's belief in p is justified iff S has good reasons for believing that p is true.
A "good reason" is another justified belief which S, if competent and rational, would
on reflection judge makes p likely to be true. The requirement that a good reason be
one that makes S think that p is likely to be true, as opposed, say, to one which
makes p objectively likely to be true, stems from the regulative role of justification:
justification in the intuitive sense is primarily to do with whether S has done the
right thing by her own lights in believing p - whether S is epistemically responsible in
believing p, or whether she cannot be blamed for believing it. It follows that S can
have good reason to believe something false, and hence false beliefs can be justified:
justification is not an infallible property of beliefs.
The suggestion that a good reason is a belief can be defended by observing
that reasons are essentially things which influence a subject's actions, and the mere
fact that an event occurred cannot influence S's actions unless S also believes that it
occurred.14 The suggestion that a good reason must be a justified belief can be
defended by considering how we would react in a case in which S, on being asked
for her justification for her belief in p, cites another belief q, but that on being asked
" This is not the only way of formulating the distinction, but it captures the general idea. See BonJour
1985 for an account given in terms of "cognitive accessibility".
12 Cf. Wittgenstein 1953: §§208ff; Williamson 1996a, 1997.
131 will use the term "justification" to refer to the regulative internalist sense, unless otherwise
indicated.
14 There is an attenuated sense of "reason" in which this is not so. In this attenuated sense the fact that
Catfish Keith has arranged a gig in Edinburgh can be a reason for me to be cheerful even though I
haven't yet heard about the arrangement, and so neither know nor believe that he is going to perform.
But this sense of "reason" seems to be nonregulative, and I will not consider it further.
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for her justification for her belief in q can say nothing. I suggest that our intuitions
in this case are that S's belief in p was not justified.11
This last requirement, that the justifying beliefs be themselves justified,
launches us on a regress. If any beliefs are to be justified at all, either the chain of
regress must loop around on itself, with all beliefs entering indirectly into their own
justification, or the regression must terminate with a class of basic beliefs which can
confer justification without themselves being justified. The introduction of the
concept of a basic belief invites a specification of the sorts of objects which these
beliefs are about. Many authors have thought basic beliefs to concern a special class
of objects, variously called "sense data", "sense contents", "simple ideas" etc., which
are not misidentifiable. Others have allowed that basic beliefs concern less abstruse
entities: for example, middle sized physical objects. This is not, however, a problem
that we need to resolve here.
Adoption of the first of these positions as to the ultimate source of
justification gives rise to the position known as coherentism. A system of beliefs is
justified if it forms a coherent system.16 Coherentism is not currently widely
endorsed, for the coherentist seems to leave it open that the justification of our
beliefs could float free, and so be as arbitrary as the beliefs of a paranoiac or
conspiracy theorist.17 So long as the paranoiac's system of beliefs is coherent, it
seems that the coherentist must say that they have overall justification; but this is an
uncomfortable position.
To adopt the idea that the ultimate source of justification derives from basic
beliefs is to adopt foundationalism. However, on the present conception of
justification, the adoption of foundationalism about justification raises serious
problems for the JTB model of knowledge. For it seems plausible that basic beliefs,
at least in certain favourable cases, can be items of knowledge.18 But basic beliefs
15 This intuition is what drives Hume's problem of induction. See for example discussion in Bird
1998.
16 See for example BonJour 1985.
17 This objection parallels the standard "Plurality Objection" levelled at coherence theories of
knowledge. See for example Dancy 1985: 113-4.
18
Illustrating this point requires us to take a temporary stand on the nature of the objects of basic
beliefs. Assuming that basic beliefs concern middle sized physical objects: where S has a true basic
belief that middle sized physical object o is before her, and where the prevailing epistemic conditions
are favourable, it seems intuitively right to say that S knows that o is before her. (It also seems that on
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are, on this conception of justification, not justified. Hence we seem to have a class
of cases of knowledge without justification: and the proposed equivalence in (JTB)
fails from left to right: justified true belief is not necessary for knowledge.
Faced with this, some authors have suggested that it is illegitimate to ask
what is the justification for basic beliefs. Clarke, for example, suggests that to ask
someone for their justification for their belief that their memory is reliable is to ask a
question that makes no sense.19 But this is peculiar: there is nothing grammatically
wrong with the sentence: "what justification do you have for believing that your
memory tends to produce true beliefs?"
A better way of responding to this challenge to the JTB model would be to
modify our notion of justification. One way of doing so would be to allow that
experiences, as well as reasons, can justify beliefs. Adopting this view would enable
us to claim that basic beliefs are justified by the experiences which engender them,
and this is a fairly common foundationalist stance on the concept of justification,
although it is not clear whether we should treat this notion of justification as a
technical or as an intuitive concept.
However, the JTB model of knowledge is not thereby saved, for as Gettier
demonstrated, it fails also to give a sufficient condition for knowledge.20 Gettier
inaugurated the project of providing counterexamples to analyses of knowledge;
the project is associated with him to such a degree that the term "Gettier case" has
become synonymous with "counterexample to a mooted analysis of knowledge". A
typical Gettier case is:
D S is in a room with two other people. She has known one of them for years,
and knows that he has always loved Ford cars, that he has always bought
them over other cars, that he has never expressed any interest in driving a
non-Ford car, etc. S also knows that yesterday this friend arrived at work in
his own Ford car, and that he drove into work today (though she didn't see
him arrive). S has, therefore, a justified belief that her friend owns a Ford
car: but in fact he does not, having sold it just that morning. S does not own
a Ford car. However, the second person, who is a stranger to S, does own a
Williamson's conception of evidence, basic beliefs are known since they compose part of their





Ford car. Thus, S has a justified and true belief that someone in the room owns
a Ford car.
S does not know that someone in the room owns a Ford car. Hence, having a
justified true belief is not a sufficient condition for having knowledge. Moreover,
the relaxed notion of justification does not identify a necessary condition for
knowledge either: for even allowing experiences to justify beliefs, we do not seem
to be able to give a noncircular explanation of how we are justified in relying on
perception or memory.21 Since we can get knowledge through these channels,
though cannot justify our reliance on them, we will have cases of knowledge
without justification. The claim that modified-justification is unnecessary for
knowledge can be backed up with specific examples: a terrified student sits down to
an exam, his mind a blank, but is able to produce the right answers; in his state of
confusion he is not able to give reasons for his right answers, but nevertheless it
seems right to say that he knows them.
Another proposed modification to the concept of justification is to link the
justification of a belief to the metaphysical probability of that belief being true. That
is, to require that good reasons to entertain a belief are reasons that make the belief
objectively likely to be true, as opposed to ones that make S think it is likely to be
true. This is clearly an externalist view of justification: since S will not always be in
a position to determine whether her reasons do confer metaphysical probability on
her belief over and above subjective likeliness to be true, she will not always be in a
position to know which of her beliefs are justified. However, it seems that the
proposed modification to the concept of justification will not help to shore up the
JTB model of knowledge in the face of case D. The proponent of the externalist
version of the JTB model would propose that on the externalist theory of
justification, it would turn out that S's true belief that someone in the room owns a
Ford car is not in fact justified, and that therefore case D does not present a
counterexample to the JTB model. But this is implausible: S's belief that someone in
the room owns a Ford is based on her having a great deal of positive evidence, and
21 Lewis 1996: 551.
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no negative evidence, for this belief. To deny that S is (externalistically) justified in
her belief is to deny that inferring p from a preponderance of unequivocal evidence
makes p likely to be true, and this is surely controversial. However, the externalist
notion of justification may constitute a necessary condition for knowledge, and we
will discuss Goldman's development of this idea in the following chapter.
These considerations of the concept of justification have been intended to
illustrate the difficulties faced in giving an analysis of knowledge. The project of
the theory of knowledge since Gettier has been to find out what should be
substituted for "justification" to give an analysis of the concept of knowledge. To
prescind from confusions about what the concept of justification really involves, it
is best to introduce a new technical term and to conduct the investigation into the
nature of knowledge in terms of it. This is, of course, the concept of warrant.
Warrant
As already noted, "warrant", as we are using it, is whatever property solves the
equation: Knowledge = True Belief + X. The use of the term "warrant" - a cognate of
the term "justification" - is meant to respect the intuition behind the traditional
appeal to justification, that a true belief is known if it is believed for the right
reasons. The preceding considerations indicate that strong subjective reason is not
good reason enough: it is not the case that a belief is warranted just in case it is
justified. The naturalistic shift endorsed by Kitcher is to interpret "right reasons"
not epistemically but metaphysically - as with the externalist conception of
justification, warrant will be connected with metaphysical as opposed to epistemic
probability. Roughly speaking, a proposition p is metaphysically probable just in
case it is objectively likely to be true relative to the way in which it came to be
believed.
The crucial property of warrant is brought out by considering the inferential
structure of the Gettier case D. The structure of case D is as follows: S has a justified
false belief of the form Fa; Fb is a true proposition which S has no way of knowing is
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true; and we allow that justification for belief in a proposition is transmitted across
to the logical consequences of that proposition. As, in classical quantificational
logic, any proposition can validly be weakened according to the inference schema
Fa |-3xFx, S's justification for her false belief in Fa transfers over to her belief in 3x¥x;
the proposition 3x¥x is true, because Fb is true, but S's justified true belief that 3x¥x
is not an item of knowledge. From this we can identify two relevant assumptions
underlying the Gettier case:
(i) justification can attach to false beliefs
(ii) justification is transmissible across logical entailment.
(ii) must be handled with some care, but becomes very plausible when
suitably restricted. The principle of transmission of justification can be formulated
as follows (writing "J " for "S is justified in believing "):
Ja, (or f=P) HP •
So formulated, the principle is implausible; for, let a and P be mathematical truths
such that a entails P, where a is very simple and P is immensely complex.22 It may
be that while S is justified in believing in a, S is not only unaware of, but in fact
incapable of grasping, the proposition a|-p. It is then highly implausible that S is
justified in believing in p. Flowever, restricted to cases where S can grasp a and P
and knows the relation between them - as is the case in the Gettier case under
discussion - the principle gains plausibility. This plausibility derives from the
affinity between the restricted formulation and the principle of the closure of
knowledge under known implication. The principle of the closure of knowledge is,
as we have seen:
Ka, K(a f=P) f=Kp.
The restricted principle of transmission is:
Jot, K(a |=P) hJP-
22 See Dretske 1970, Stine 1976.
135
Infallibility
The principle of closure is very plausible, though it has been contested, chiefly by
Nozick and Dretske; their doubts about closure, however, are not now widely
shared.23 Suffice to say that (ii) needs reformulating: the second principle
underlying Gettier cases is as follows:
(ii') justification is transmissible across known logical entailment.
It is because the intuitive concept of justification makes (i) and (ii') true, that
we can generate counterexamples to the suggestion that knowledge can be analysed
in terms of truth, belief and justification. Generalising: any account of the concept
of warrant which makes true the appropriate reformulations of (i) and (ii') will be
susceptible to Gettier cases structurally isomorphic to D. Hence, whatever account
of warrant we endorse, it cannot be that that account makes true both the following
propositions:
(zei) warrant can attach to false beliefs
(uui) warrant is transmissible across known logical entailment.
The plausibility of the principle of closure makes it extremely likely that
whatever account of warrant we develop, it must be transmissible across known
logical entailment - that is, it must make (zeii) true.24 It follows, then, that no concept
of warrant respecting (i) will escape Gettier cases isomorphic to case D. The idea is
this: since any conception of warrant which makes (zci) and (zeii) true will be
susceptible to Gettier cases, and (zeii) is very plausible, we cannot - if we want to
avoid Gettier cases - give an account of warrant which makes (zei) true. So we must
deny that warrant can attach to false beliefs.
23 Dretske 1970, Nozick 1981. Closure is defended in, for example, Stine 1976, Cohen 1988, DeRose
1995, Lewis 1996. See chapter eight.
24 To this it could be objected that the concept of warrant, as we are using it, is a technical term, and so
our intuitions about whether it is closed under known logical entailment do not apply. It would be
difficult to give a fully worked out response to this objection; however, it seems likely that the
property of warrant must turn out to be some form of natural property and it is not easy to see how it




As before, a property of beliefs is infallible just in case necessarily only true
beliefs can have it. The conclusion to be drawn from the present discussion is this:
warrant is infallible. This conclusion is also urged by Zagzebski, whose account
generalises on the considerations given above.25 Zagzebski's account of the general
structure of Gettier cases does not require any inferences to be made, and so does
not depend on any account of principles of transmission of warrant. Given an
account of warrant such that false beliefs can be warranted, we construct a
counterexample to a definition of knowledge employing that notion of warrant as
follows: (i) allow subject S to have a false belief in p; (ii) allow that S's false belief is
warranted with sufficient strength such that a true belief so warranted would be
known; (iii) ensure that the falsity of p does not depend on any systematically
describable feature of the situation which might be ruled out by features of the
analysis of knowledge independent of warrant (for example: "bad epistemic luck"26);
(iv) emend the case by allowing that, by an independent case of bad luck, p is
actually true. Hence, we have a case of warranted true belief which is not
knowledge.27
Warrant is infallible. It follows that the initial formulation of the definition
of knowledge in terms of warrant has a redundant clause. Since possession of
warrant for a belief guarantees the truth of that belief, we need not devote a
separate clause of the definition of knowledge to the requirement of truth. The
concept of warrant needed to explicate the concept of knowledge is such that:




Paradoxically, having identified bad epistemic luck as the feature that prevents us from developing
an analysis of knowledge, Zagzebski tentatively proposes an account of knowledge essentially as
follows: S knows p iff S believes in p, p is true, S's belief is warranted, and S is not epistemically






This result is extremely significant, but also problematic. It is significant
because if all warrant is infallible, then a priori warrant, as a subset of warrant in
general, is also infallible. So Kitcher is right that a priori warrant is infallible: but
the reason why he is right totally undercuts the project of explaining "experience-
independence" in terms of the concept of infallibility. All warrant, whether a priori
or not, is infallible. Though Casullo and Summerfield are wrong to suppose that
the fallibility of a priori warrant is an easy consequence of the fallibility of warrant
in general, they are right to think that a priori warrant is no more or less reliable
than warrant in general. No difference can be drawn between a priori warrant and
warrant in general in terms of whether false beliefs can be warranted. So, an
account of "experience-independence" which incorporates infallibility will not help
us characterise a priori knowledge.
The result is problematic because it is not clear how a naturalist theory of
knowledge will respect it. It is natural for the naturalist to appeal to the method of
production of a belief to explain its epistemic status: but all our sensory and
inferential processes produce occasional false beliefs, so none of them is infallible.
This is not yet a problem, since we must distinguish the idea of warrant being
infallible from a belief forming process being infallible: given that our normal
processes are fallible, there must be more to being a warranted belief than just
having been produced by one of the normal sensory or inferential processes. Some
extra condition or conditions must also be filled, and we should note that whatever
these extra conditions are they will have to be shown to be scientifically acceptable
if the concept of warrant - and, by extension, the concept of knowledge - is to be
naturalistically admissible. We will consider whether this condition has been met
after looking at the naturalist's proposed solution to the problem of the nature of




Kitcher's strategy for explaining a priori knowledge has two parts. One part
involves giving an account of experience-independence; the other involves giving a
naturalistic theory of knowledge in general. Solutions to these are intended to be
combined to give an account of experience-independent knowledge - that is, a
priori knowledge. We have seen that these two sub-projects cannot be carried out
independently, for results from the general theory of knowledge affect what
account we can give of experience-independence. But in exploring how these
projects interact, we have uncovered a problem for any theory of knowledge in
general: this is that warrant, whatever that property may be, cannot attach to false
beliefs. Chapters seven and eight assess the prospects for giving a naturalistic
account of infallible warrant.
Kitcher, as well as many authors who have followed him in giving
naturalistic accounts of a priori knowledge, has turned to reliabilism, and in
particular Goldman's writings on reliabilism, to find an account of warrant and
knowledge in general.1 The general idea behind reliabilism can be illustrated by
considering the following case:
E S uses astrology to form some belief p. p is in fact true, and S has complete
subjective justification for her belief, having been convinced of the efficacy
of astrology through being raised in an community where astrology was
common, having seen apparently reliable results many times before, being
versed in the underlying pseudo-theory, etc.
S does not know p. The obvious explanation for S's failure of knowledge in
case E is that there is something wrong with the belief forming process S used to
form her belief. The astrological divination process does not confer any real
metaphysical probability of truth on S's belief. A belief can be said to be
metaphysically probable just in case it is objectively likely to be true relative to the
1 Cf: Kitcher 1983, 1992; Casullo 1988; Summerfield 1991.
Goldman's reliabilism
way that it was brought about. This is equivalent to saying that the astrological
divination process is unreliable as a method of producing true beliefs. A belief forming
process is reliable just in case it produces a high proportion of true beliefs.2
Generalising: if S's belief in p is produced by an unreliable belief forming process, S
does not know p. Contraposing: if S knows p then S's belief in p is produced by a
reliable belief forming process. This gives us a necessary condition for a belief
forming process to confer warrant on the beliefs it produces: a belief forming
process a confers warrant on the beliefs it produces only if a is reliable.
As we have already mentioned, an account of this sort is generally thought
to be what Kitcher has in mind when he appeals to "appropriate" production. The
reliabilist is one who seeks an analysis of warrant in terms of reliability. Reliabilist
theories fall into two groups: on a process-reliabilist theory, a belief p produced by a
belief forming process a is warranted just in case a is reliable; on a tracking theory,
the reference to processes is left out, and a belief p is considered warranted for S just
in case there is a high degree of correlation across a range of possible worlds
between S's believing in p and p's being true.3 Unadorned tracking theories are not
generally considered to be promising, and we shall follow Kitcher and others in
concentrating on reliable process theories.4 Process-reliabilist theories of knowledge
are the most plausible implementation of naturalised epistemology, and the best
worked out process-reliabilist theory is generally taken to be Goldman's.
Goldman's general intention throughout his epistemological work is to reduce
epistemic concepts such as knowledge and justification to nonepistemic concepts
such as reliability, belief and truth."
The present challenge is for the reliabilist to give an account of warrant on
which warrant is infallible. The basic problem they have to address is that it is
2 Authors do not tend to take a stand on just what proportion of truths is required for reliability, but,
intuitively, the appeal to reliability imports a proportion significantly greater than 50%, but less than
100%.
3
The taxonomy is from Goldman 1986.
4 The general problem is that tracking in counterfactual situations can be gerrymandered; see
Goldman's "smiling stranger" example (Goldman 1986, ch.2); see also Fogelin's discussion of
Dretske's subjunctive account of sufficient reasons (Fogelin 1994, ch.4). Nozick, the author of an
influential tracking theory, recognises the problem and adds a reference to processes to his tracking
theory (Nozick 1981).
5 See esp. Goldman 1992: 105-7.
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consistent with a belief's being produced by a merely reliable belief forming process
that the belief be false. If the reliabilist is to give a full analysis of knowledge they
will have to introduce into their definition a compensating mechanism such that, on
the occasions that a reliable belief forming process produces a false belief, that false
belief is not warranted. In the following discussion we will look at three candidates
for such a mechanism. The first is a requirement of a causal connection between the
subject's belief and the fact that the belief is about; the second is a requirement that
a reliable process be one which is able to discriminate between the actual situation
and relevant counterfactual situations; and the third is a requirement that the belief
to be warranted be justified (in some sense of "justification", possibly not the
intuitive sense, as we will see). The second of these has the best chance of success,
and discussion of it will continue into chapter eight. However, even this, the best of
the three options, faces serious problems: for it is not clear whether the requirement
can be cashed out in a way that is naturalistically acceptable.
We begin by looking at the causal requirement. In fact, the causal theory of
knowledge is really a prototype reliabilist account and has no serious chance of
success. We discuss it in order to introduce the main problems that reliabilism must
address.
"A Causal Theory of Knowing"
The causal theory of knowledge6, which Goldman advanced prior to the
development of his more complex reliabilist accounts, requires that a causal
connection obtain between the belief that is an item of knowledge and the fact that
it concerns.7 Goldman's theory is a development of Grice's suggestion that
perceptual knowledge depends on the presence of a causal link between the subject
and what the subject observes: it is the presence of this link that confers warrant on
the subject's beliefs about her perceptual world.8 Goldman generalises Grice's
6 Goldman 1967.
7 Goldman's theory is couched in terms of fact-causation, and I adopt his framework for ease of




account by attempting to develop the underlying idea into an account of other sorts
of knowledge, such as knowledge through memory and inference. Goldman's
initial formulation of the idea is as follows; discussing an example structurally
identical to case D, he writes:
...one thing that seems to be missing in this example is a causal connection
between the fact that makes p true (or simply: the fact that p) and [S's] belief of p.
The requirement of such a causal connection is what I wish to add to the
traditional analysis.9
This suggests that Goldman adopts a definition of knowledge as follows:
S knows p if and only if: p is true, S believes p, S's belief in p is justified, and
there is a causal connection between the fact p and S's belief in p.
If by "justification" Goldman means the intuitive concept of justification, this
definition will not work: where p is a basic belief there will be situations where S
knows p but does not have a justified belief in p. Later in the paper, however,
Goldman gives a different formulation. Slightly, and harmlessly, recast, it is:
S knows p if and only if the fact p is causally connected in an "appropriate"
way with S's believing p 10
where "appropriate" remains to be explained. This formulation does not require
that a subject has a justification for her beliefs and so is not vulnerable to objections
based on considerations regarding the justification for basic beliefs. Goldman
assumes that knowledge through perception, memory, inference, etc., can all be
reconstructed as appropriate causal processes. Note that a direct causal link - such
that a belief is warranted just in case it is one of the causal effects of the fact that it
concerns - cannot be what is meant by "appropriate" since there can be knowledge
of the future, and it is unlikely that future events can have causal effects on the





know p where her belief in p is caused by facts in the causal ancestry of p - that is,
S's belief in p, and the fact p, have a common cause. For example, seeing a missile
flying towards a building, S forms a true belief that she is about to experience an
explosion: this belief counts as knowledge on Goldman's view since it is caused by a
fact that is (partially) causally responsible for her experience of the ensuing
explosion - namely, the fact that the missile was flying towards a building.
"Appropriate" causal connection therefore encompasses indirect connection.
Goldman's 1967 account passes the requirement of infallibility: for it is not
possible to be causally connected - appropriately or otherwise - with a fact that does
not obtain. Hence, on Goldman's 1967 account of what it is for a belief to be
warranted, if a belief is warranted it is true. However, Goldman's 1967 account is in
other respects unsatisfactory. For one thing, it seems unable to explain a priori
knowledge. Benacerraf's objections apply squarely to an account of a priori
knowledge couched within a causal theory of knowledge, for it is very hard to see
how the typical objects of a priori knowledge can enter into causal relations.
The causal theory faces further objections. Consider the following case:
F S has a certain belief p about her early childhood, but her parents tell her
that her belief in p is false, and that her memory of the occurrence of p is
mistaken. Despite the attempted deception, S continues to believe in p. S's
belief is true and her memory is working perfectly."
S does not know p, though were it not for her parents' attempted deception she
would know it: her knowledge has been undermined by the attempted deception,
which leaves her belief in the trustworthiness of her memory unjustified.12 Since S's
memory is in fact working perfectly, she is appropriately causally connected with
the fact about her childhood, and yet does not have knowledge. So there must be
more to knowledge than simple causal connection; sometimes, at least, knowledge
can be defeated by lack of justification.
" Based on an example from BonJour 1985.
12 Note that this example does not show that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge: we
have already excluded this possibility by offering counterexamples to the JTB model of knowledge.
The example does show that knowledge is in some cases sensitive to justification, however: just how
sensitive, we do not know.
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A further problem with Goldman's 1967 account is illustrated by the
following case:
G S is driving along a road, and believes that she sees a barn, based on the fact
that she seems to see the front of a barn that she is passing, and that she has
no reason to believe that visual conditions are abnormal. Visual conditions
are in fact normal, and in fact there is a real barn before her. However,
unknown to S she is in a region of the country where many fake barn
facades have been erected, such that if S had been looking at a barn facade
she would still have believed she was looking at a barn, and it is pure luck
that S is now looking at a barn.13
S does not know she sees a barn. This seems to be due to a combination of two
factors: first, that it is just good luck that the object in front of S is in fact a barn,
since the majority of apparent barns in the area are mere facades. Second, that if
there had been a fake barn in front of her she would still have believed that she saw
a real barn. The fact that her belief is only true by luck undermines her knowledge,
even though her visual belief forming processes are functioning normally and so, it
seems, are reliable.
The 1967 account does not have the resources to explain why S does not
know in case F or case G. Let us say that in case F S's knowledge suffers internal
defeat; this terminology is suggested by the intuition that the feature of the case
which defeats S's knowledge is something internal to S's cognitive perspective.14 In
case G we will say that S's knowledge suffers external defeat: the feature of case G
which defeats S's knowledge is something outside her cognitive perspective.
Goldman's 1967 account, then, fails to give an adequate account of internal or
external defeat of knowledge. What we need, then, is an account of warrant that
13 This example discussed by Goldman 1976, and attributed originally to Carl Ginet.
14 The idea of an object being "internal to S's cognitive perspective" is closely related to the possibility
of S being directly aware of that object. As BonJour (in his entry on "Externalisrri/Internalism", in
Dancy and Sosa 1993) points out, it seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for an object to be
internal to S's cognitive perspective that it be a mental object. Not necessary, since on direct realist
views of perception nonmental features of the world can be the objects of direct awareness; not




not only preserves its infallibility, but also gives rise to a definition of knowledge
which is immune to counterexamples based on internal and external defeat.
The development of Goldman's epistemological theory from the causal
theory to the account in Epistemology and Cognition has two strands: one, addressed
in the paper "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge", involves modifying the
causal account to deal with external defeaters; the other, picked up in "What is
Justified Belief?", involves modifying the causal account to deal with internal
defeaters. The two strands are reconnected in the account in Epistemology and
Cognition. We will discuss the 1986 account after a survey of the prior papers,
which will highlight the problems which the 1986 account must overcome. Our
intention is to see whether the modifications Goldman proposes in these papers will
provide us with the mechanisms needed to develop a working reliabilist account of
infallible warrant.
"Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge"
In this paper Goldman is explicitly concerned with modifying the causal theory of
knowledge to deal with counterexamples based on external defeaters.13 He intends
to deal with external defeaters by developing an account of perceptual knowledge
using the concept of a "relevant perceptual alternative". The general idea is that for
S to know p, S must be able to discriminate situations in which p is true from
perceptually equivalent states of affairs in which p is false. A first formulation of
this idea is as follows:
X knows p only if the actual state of affairs in which p is the case is
discriminable by X from every relevant possible alternative in which p is not
the case.16
15 Goldman 1976: 772-3. Here he considers the "fake-barns" case and writes that his causal analysis
cannot handle it.
16 Ihid.\ 774. Goldman actually writes "a relevant possible alternative", as opposed to "every". This is




Goldman sees the relevant alternatives account of knowledge as closely connected
to the account of knowledge in terms of reliability. As he writes:
To be reliable, a cognitive mechanism must enable a person to discriminate or
differentiate between incompatible states of affairs. It must operate in such a
way that incompatible states of the world would generate different cognitive
responses. Perceptual mechanisms illustrate this clearly. A perceptual
mechanism is reliable to the extent that contrary features of the environment
(e.g., an object's being red, versus its being yellow) would produce contrary
perceptual states of the organism, which would, in turn, produce suitably
different beliefs about the environment. 7
This suggests strongly that Goldman takes it that a process is reliable jnst in case it is
able to discriminate between incompatible states of affairs.18 We should note that an
account of knowledge in terms of reliability has the potential to provide an
explanation of a priori knowledge, for, since a reliable connection does not in
general have to be a causal connection, there seems to be no conceptual problem
with the idea of being reliable about the objects of a priori knowledge.19
The initial formulation of Goldman's idea needs cashing out with an account
of discrimination, and with an account of relevance. We will deal with these in
turn.
Discrimination
On Goldman's account, external defeaters undercut knowledge because the subject
cannot discriminate the actual situation from a possible alternative situation in
which their belief is false. If subject X cannot discriminate (by perception alone) a
state of affairs 9 from state of affairs k, then (p and k are perceptually equivalent for X.
The concept of perceptual equivalence is to be explained using the concept of a
perceptual state ofaffairs: on Goldman's account this is an ordered triple, consisting of
17 Ibid.: 771.
18




(i) an object; (ii) the set of all properties of that object (some but not all of which
need to be perceptually accessible properties); and (iii) a specification of the
environmental features which have a bearing on the way the object appears to the
subject - he calls this a DOE relation (Direction-Orientation-Environment relation).20
Using the notion of a perceptual state of affairs, a first suggestion at the relationship
between perceptual equivalence and discriminability can be stated:
(PE1) For subject X, objects b and c, maximal set of properties / and K, and DOE
relations R and R*: <b,J,R> is a perceptual equivalent, for X, to <c,K,R*> iff X
cannot discriminate between <b,f,R> and <c,K,R*>.
As Goldman points out, this definition of a perceptual state of affairs is strictly
speaking inadequate: a full specification will need to take account of the state of
functioning of the subject's perceptual organs, and the subject's powers of attentive
discrimination. A full discussion of these factors can be passed over, but one point
is particularly important: while (PE1) does not require that <b,f,R> and <c,K,R*> be
qualitatively identical perceptual states of affairs, the similarity between them cannot
be weakened too much, or intuitively non-equivalent perceptual states of affairs
might be classed as equivalent.21 We need a stable account of perceptual
equivalence which stops short of qualitative identity. Goldman's proposed solution
to this is that qualitative identity of perceptual states of affairs can be dropped so
long as no features relevant to the formation of the belief in question are thereby
rendered discriminable. The full definition of perceptual equivalence then
becomes:
(PE2) If object b has the maximal set of nonrelational properties / and is in DOE
relation R to subject X at time t, if X has some percept P at t that is
perceptually caused by b's having / and being in R to X at f, and if P
noninferentially causes X to believe (or sustains X in believing) of object b
that it has-property F, then
<crK,R*> is a perceptual equivalent of<b,J,R>for X at t relative to property F iff
(i) if at t object c had K and were in R* to X, then this would
perceptually cause X to have some percept P* at t,




(ii) P* would rioninferentially perceptually cause X to believe (or sustain
X in believing) of object c that it has F, and
(iii) P* would not differ from P in any respect that is causally relevant to
X's F-belief.22
In moving from (PE1) to (PE2) Goldman avoids a problem which he has
apparently not recognised. As we saw above, Goldman wants to give a reductive
definition of knowledge; to be successful, then, the definition arrived at must not
appeal to any epistemic concepts. DeRose, however, has suggested that an appeal
to "discrimination" masks a tacit appeal to the concept of knowledge.23 Applied to
present case, DeRose's point is that to say that S cannot discriminate state of affairs
cp from state of affairs k is to say no more than that in k, S does not know she is not in
cp. If this is right, Goldman is barred from appealing to (PE1); however, as DeRose
goes on to point out, Goldman's second formulation of perceptual equivalence
avoids appeal to discrimination by appealing to what the subject would believe in
counterfactual situations where her sensory stimulation was different.
The analysis of perceptual equivalence is used in giving a general analysis of
perceptual knowledge.
At t X noninferentially knows of object b that it has property F iff
(1) for some maximal set of nonrelational properties / and some DOE relation R,
object b has (all the members of) J at t and is in R to X at t,
(2) F belongs to /,
(3) (A) b's having / and being in R to X perceptually causes X at t to have
some percept P,
(B) P noninferentially perceptually causes X at t to believe (or sustains X
in believing) of object b that it has property F, and
(C) there is no alternative state of affairs <c,K,R*> such that (i) <c,K,R*> is
a perceptual equivalent of <b,J,R> for X at t relative to property F, and (ii) F
does not belong to K.
(4) X's propensity to form an F-belief has an appropriate genesis.24
22 Ibid.: 783.




The explicit appeal to "relevance" has been dropped, but is implicit in clause
3(C): here, the appeal to an "alternative state of affairs" is clearly meant to import an
appeal to relevant alternative states of affairs. On this definition, clause 2 requires
that that which is known be true; clause 3(B) requires that that which is known be
believed. If we abstract from the truth clause we are left with Goldman's 1976
account of warrant. A belief is warranted, on this account, just in case: (i) it is
caused by the fact which the belief is about (clause 3(A) and 3(B)); (ii) there are no
relevant perceptually equivalent defeaters (clause 3(C)); and (iii) the propensity to
form the belief is appropriately brought about (clause 4).
The discussion of Goldman's account of perceptual knowledge needs
completing by a discussion of relevance, and by an explanation of clause 4.
Relevance
It is crucial to Goldman's account that he offer a satisfying account of relevance. If
the set of alternative situations is left unrestricted, it will include situations in which
the subject is a brain in a vat, being perfectly deceived through computer-driven
simulation, into believing that she is not a brain in a vat but living a perfectly
normal life. Brain-in-a-vat style sceptical scenarios are defined as being
perceptually equivalent to the actual situation: if the set of alternative situations is
left unrestricted then clause (3C) can never be filled, and Goldman's definition of
perceptual knowledge will issue in scepticism. The tuning of the "relevance"
relation is therefore crucial to an account of perceptual knowledge which appeals to
relevant alternatives. If the relevance relation is set too weak, and certain
intuitively non-relevant possible situations are treated as relevant, the account will
undergenerate (that is: it will not test positive for knowledge in cases which
intuitively are cases of knowledge). If the relevance relation is set too strong, and
certain intuitively relevant possible situations are treated as non-relevant, then the
account will overgenerate (that is: it will test positive for knowledge in cases which
intuitively are not cases of knowledge).
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Further, it is crucial for Goldman that relevance turn out to be
naturalistically acceptable, that is, definable in non-epistemic, non-normative terms.
Goldman suggests that the relevant alternatives are determined by the context -
physical, linguistic and psychological - in which the subject is embedded.2" Though
Goldman does not give a fully worked out theory of relevance, he does suggest that
certain "regularities" govern what is to be counted as relevant. We can summarise
his suggestions as follows. For circumstances 9 and k:
• if, given k obtains, it is likely (p obtains, then (p is relevant to k;
• if 9 is similar to k, then 9 is relevant to k;
• if S believes 9 is relevant, then 9 is relevant.26
Goldman's account of relevance, however, is left deliberately vague and unfinished;
Goldman does not commit himself to these suggestions, nor does he suggest that
they are exhaustive. We shall return to the problem of relevance in the next
chapter.
Clause 4
Clause 4 is needed to rule out counterexamples such as the following:
Suppose Sam's "schemata" [an hypothetical iconic set of features used for
perceptual recognition] of Judy and Trudy have hitherto been indistinct, so Judy-
caused percepts sometimes elicit Judy-beliefs and sometimes Trudy-beliefs, and
similarly for Trudy-caused percepts. Today Sam falls down and hits his head.
As a consequence a new feature is "added" to his Judy-schemata, a mole-
associated feature. From now on he will believe someone to be Judy only if he
has the sort of percept that would be caused by a Judy-like person with a mole
over the left eye. Sam is unaware that this change has taken place and will
remain unaware of it, since he isn't conscious of the cues he uses. Until today,
neither Judy nor Trudy has had a left-eyebrow mole; but today Judy happens to
develop such a mole. Thus, from now on Sam can discriminate Judy from
Trudy.27





Although Sam can now correctly identify Judy, intuitively, his first identification of
her at least will not count as knowledge. The structure of this case is as follows:
Sam has the ability to discriminate states of affairs in which the proposition he
believes is true, from relevant counterfactual states of affairs in which it is false (that
is, Sam meets the requirements of Goldman's 1976 analysis, bar clause 4); however,
this ability has been brought about serendipitously, and therefore beliefs produced
as a result of it do not count as knowledge. Let us call the problem of how to
distinguish appropriate from inappropriate methods of belief-production the
problem of deviant causal chains. As Goldman admits, his treatment of the problem
of deviance by the introduction of clause four does no more than identify the
problem. The nature of the problem is clarified, and responses proposed, in his
later work.
In conclusion to this discussion of Goldman's 1976 account of perceptual
knowledge, we should note the following.
First: pending further specification of "relevance" and "deviance", Goldman's
analysis deals with the problem of counterexamples based around external
defeaters. In case G, the possibility that the barn S sees is a fake must be considered
a relevant perceptual alternative which she cannot discriminate from actuality.
Therefore (3C) is violated.28 Note that since Goldman ties the reliability of a process
to its ability to discriminate, it seems that he must say that S's visual belief forming
process is not reliable in case G.
There is no explicit mention of the problem of internal defeaters, though
Goldman's third suggestion as regards relevance suggests an interesting line of
response: perhaps an analysis could be developed on which S's belief that a
defeating circumstance obtains creates that circumstance as an unexcludable
relevant alternative, and so defeats S's knowledge. However, this suggestion will
have to be developed before it can protect the 1976 account from counterexamples
based on internal defeaters. In case F, S does not have knowledge, but there seems




the account of relevance that Goldman provides there seems to be no grounds for
saying that such a situation is relevant. Case F is a case of memory which
Goldman's 1976 theory is not designed to address, but we could clearly develop
perceptual cases that would be structurally equivalent. Intuitively, we are inclined
to say that the reason S does not know in case F is because her belief is unjustified
relative to her total available information (which is, as it happens, misleading). We
should therefore hold out hope that the account of justification in "What is Justified
Belief?" will address cases such as F.
Second: the 1976 account of knowledge secures the infallibility of warrant
through two independent routes. First, it incorporates the feature, central to the
earlier causal theory, that a belief is known only if it is causally connected with the
fact which it concerns. We have already argued that this generates an infallibilist
account of warrant. Further, though, by requiring the absence of relevant
counterfactual defeating situations, Goldman secures infallibility by a second route,
as we will now argue.
Clause (3C) in Goldman's definition of warrant is a requirement that there
be no relevant perceptually equivalent situation in which the perceptual belief in
question be false. That is, Goldman requires that, where S believes p, if there are
any relevant perceptually equivalent situations in which p is false but S believes p
anyway, then S's belief in p is not warranted. Contraposing: if S's belief in p is
warranted then there is no relevant perceptually equivalent situation where p is
false but S believes p anyway. We can express this latter proposition as follows {key:
variables range over worlds; Fw = S's belief in p is warranted in w; G(v,iv) = world v
is perceptually equivalent to and relevant to world zv; Hv = p is true in v):
\/zu (Fw —> -3v{G{v,w) & -Hp))
Given the plausible claim that each world is relevant to and perceptually






that is: in all worlds, if a belief is warranted then it is true. Since the necessity
operator is equivalent to universal quantification over (accessible) worlds, this
conclusion is just the claim that: necessarily, if S's belief is warranted then S's belief
is true. But we have said that a property of beliefs is infallible just in case,
necessarily, it only attaches to true beliefs. Hence, again, on Goldman's account
warrant is infallible.
Third: this account of knowledge is concerned only with perceptual
knowledge. The account therefore stands in need of generalisation to other classes
of knowledge such as knowledge from memory, inference and a priori knowledge.
We will return to this after discussion of the account of justification.
"What is Justified Belief?"
As we have already noted, the reason why S fails to have knowledge in case F is
most naturally described in normative terms. S, we are inclined to say, is simply
wrong to ignore her parents' misleading testimony. She ought to take it into
account, even though in ignoring it she puts herself in what is, objectively speaking,
a stronger epistemic position with respect to her beliefs about the past. S's belief is
not an item of knowledge because it is, in the intuitive sense, not justified; and we
have argued that we can admit this without committing ourselves to the claim that
justification is in general necessary for knowledge.29
Goldman, however, cannot appeal to the notion of normative justification
unreduced: such an appeal would contravene his naturalist principles. Accordingly
29 See chapter six.
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he seeks to give an analysis of the concept of justification in nonepistemic terms.
For Goldman, a certain sort of naturalistically acceptable justification is necessary
for knowledge, and he tries to explain this notion in terms of the concept of
reliability. Reliable belief forming processes, he claims, are such that they confer
justification on the beliefs that they produce. The key question is whether the
notion of justification which Goldman develops can be used to explain internal
defeat.
Goldman understands processes as functions, generating a mapping from
certain input states onto certain output states.30 The possible inputs to the processes
which interest us are beliefs or experiences; the outputs are beliefs. Reliability is a
property of a process type. A process type is reliable iff it has the statistical
property of producing true beliefs to a suitably high degree (just what degree we
require is not stated). As Goldman points out, we need to be able to talk of
processes causing beliefs; but processes are construed as types, and types are
abstract objects which presumably cannot enter into causal relations: so there is
some awkwardness in this. Goldman suggests that the problem is really just one of
sloppy expression.
...when we say that a belief is caused by a given process, understood as a
functional procedure, we may interpret this to mean that it is caused by the
particular inputs to the process (and by the intervening events 'through which'
the functional procedure carried the inputs into the output) on the occasion in
question.31
Some terminology is required before we can state Goldman's definition. A
belief-dependent process is a belief forming process that takes beliefs as at least part
of its input. A belief-independent process is one that does not take any beliefs as its
input. Since the fact that a belief-dependent process produces a false belief when
some of its input beliefs are false does not count against the reliability of that
process, we also need a concept of conditional reliability: a process is conditionally
30 Goldman 1992: 116. ("What is Justified Belief?" was originally published in 1979; page references




reliable iff it is reliable given that its input beliefs are true. Using these definitions,
Goldman's initial recursive definition of "S's belief in p at t is justified" is as follows:
(WJBl)If S's belief in p at t results immediately from a belief-independent process
that is unconditionally reliable, then S's belief in p at t is justified.
(WJB2) If S's belief in p at t results immediately from a belief-dependent process that
is at least conditionally reliable, and if the beliefs (if any) on which this
process operates in producing S's belief in p at t are themselves justified,
then S's belief in p at t is justified.32
This account, however, simply does not touch the problem of internal
defeaters. In case F S's belief in p meets the requirement of this definition but we do
not want to say that it is justified. Goldman recognises this and proposes a
modification to his account. The reason why S's belief in case F is unjustified, he
suggests, is because she has strong evidence that she doesn't, but should have,
used.33 So stated, this diagnosis clearly turns on normative considerations, but
Goldman takes it to be equivalent to the following non-normative claim: there is a
belief forming process available to her (the process of forming beliefs based on
listening to her parents) which S doesn't use, but which would have given
importantly different results had she used it. With this in mind, Goldman
reformulates the base clause principle to address the problem of internal defeat.
(WJB1*) If S's belief in p at t results from a reliable belief forming process, and
there is no reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S which, had
it been used by S in addition to the process actually used, would have
resulted in S's not believing in p at f, then S's belief in p at t is justified.
There are a number of problems with Goldman's account of justification.
First, this reformulated account is still susceptible to counterexample, as the
following Bonjour-style example shows.34
32 Ibid.: 119.
33 Ibid.: 126.
34 From BonJour 1985.
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H S reads p in a respected newspaper and so comes to believe p. In fact p is
false, this being one of the newspaper's rare errors. On the table at which S
is reading, there happens to stand an infallible crystal ball, which, if S had
consulted it, would have revealed the truth about p. S has heard stories
about the powers of the crystal ball but does not believe them and so does
not consult the ball.
Goldman's revised condition for justification is not filled, since the process of
consulting the ball is available to S. So Goldman's analysis has it that S is not
justified in believing p on the basis of the newspaper; but, intuitively, S is justified
in believing in p, since (we may assume) S is justified in discounting fantastical
stories about the powers of the ball. So Goldman's account of internal defeat is
inadequate: he fails to give a reductive account of the concept of justification.
Further, by shifting away from the "caused by the fact" requirement in the
two earlier accounts, Goldman loses the feature of infallibility from his account of
justification. Since, roughly speaking, justification is conferred on a belief when
that belief is caused by a reliable process, on the rare occasion that a reliable process
produces a false belief (as the newspaper did in case H), that belief is justified.35
Since justification can attach to false beliefs it is hard to see how the addition of a
clause requiring justification to a basic reliabilist account of warrant can do any
work in securing infallibility.
The transition to a reliable process account brings with it a further problem,
considered by some to be insurmountable.36 This is the problem of how to
individuate belief forming processes with respect to their reliability. We have said
that a process is reliable just in case the beliefs it produces are metaphysically likely
to be true. But any given belief can be considered to be the outcome of any number
of processes, and these processes will vary widely in the proportion of true beliefs
that they produce, and so vary widely in their degree of reliability. Since we are
linking justification to reliable production, whether a belief is justified will depend
crucially on which process we take it to be produced by.
35 Goldman 1992: 116.
36 Pollock 1986 argues against reliabilism on the basis of the generality problem. I will shortly argue
that Pollock's objections are not convincing.
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This is known as the generality problem. An illustration may help. Say S
spots a pink elephant and so comes to believe that there is a pink elephant before
her. Which process produced S's belief? We may imagine that S's visual acuity is
high, and that the process of S forming beliefs based on what appears to her
visually is extremely reliable: if we take S's belief to be caused by this process, S will
be justified in believing that there is a pink elephant before her. But we could also
assign S's belief to the process of people in general coming to believe that there is a
pink elephant before them after seeming to see a pink elephant before them. This
process, we may suppose, is associated primarily with alcohol detoxification and is
highly unreliable; so if S's belief is a product of this process then it is not justified.
S's token belief that there is a pink elephant before her can be assigned to either of
these processes, and infinitely more. We currently lack a criterion with which to
decide to which process S's belief should be assigned. This problem will be
returned to in the context of discussion of the account in Epistemology and Cognition.
Let us sum up the conclusions drawn from the discussion of Goldman's
earlier accounts of knowledge and justification, in order to identify what problems
the account in Epistemology and Cognition needs to address if it is to be successful.
We need an epistemology that
• secures the infallibility of warrant
• yields a definition of knowledge which excludes counterexamples based on
external defeaters and internal defeaters
• solves the generality problem
• explains the difference between deviant and nondeviant belief forming processes
• leaves room for a priori knowledge.
The account of discrimination and perceptual knowledge has the potential to
address the first two problems via an appeal to relevant counterfactual
circumstances: indeed, given, that the paper on justification gives a very
unconvincing account of internal defeat, it might seem that the most promising
route available to us would be to concentrate on developing the former account.
But an account of justification is also important. As we have formulated it, the
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problem of nondeviance concerns drawing a distinction between different sorts of
processes; the problem is therefore best addressed within an epistemological
framework which assigns a role to processes. The idiom of processes will also be
crucial for the account of experience-independence in terms of nonexperientiality
which we will discuss in chapter nine. However, the introduction of belief forming
processes requires us to address the generality problem. We turn now to see how
Goldman's most detailed account of knowledge addresses these problems.
Epistemology and Cognition
Goldman does not commit himself to a full analysis of knowledge in Epistemology
and Cognition; he gives only a series of necessary conditions. However, he does not
argue that an analysis of knowledge cannot in general be given37, and, indeed, he
even suggests that the possibility of a naturalistic response to certain forms of
scepticism requires that an analysis be given.38 Therefore, I will take the step of
assuming that the necessary conditions Goldman offers are intended to be jointly
sufficient. This assumption may be illegitimate: it may be unfair to press Goldman's
conditions into the demanding role of an analysis. However, if we are unable so to
interpret them then the key question of whether warrant, on Goldman's view, is
infallible, is simply ducked without explanation. So I think we should take
Goldman to be proffering an analysis; by focusing on whether reliabilism can meet
the infallibility constraint we will be able to arrive at a clear view of the serious
problems facing the reliabilist account of knowledge in general.
Knowledge
Goldman's basic necessary condition. for knowledge is, on the surface, much
simplified from the 1976 account. It is:
37 Cf. Williamson 1995 and Botterill and Carruthers 1999, who argue that only necessary conditions
can be given a priori.
38 Goldman 1986: 36.
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(ECl) S knows p only if S's belief in p results from a reliable belief forming
process.39
But, as Goldman points out, this needs filling out by a detailed account of reliability
itself. Goldman argues that the reliability of a belief forming process must be
understood as a propensity of that process to form true beliefs; equivalently, the
reliability of a process type a is given by the proportion of true beliefs produced by
processes of type a in possible situations.40 He distinguishes between two grades of
reliability. A process is globally reliable just in case it produces the required
proportion of true beliefs in an unrestricted class of possible situations; a process is
locally reliable just in case it produces the required proportion of true beliefs in the
class of relevant possible situations.41 Goldman requires both local and global
reliability of the processes which are apt to produce knowledge, though he places
emphasis on the requirement of local reliability. Schematically, local reliability can
be represented as follows:
process a is locally reliable iff in most relevant situations: if a produces a
belief in p then p is true.
The requirement of local reliability, he claims, is drawn from and equivalent to the
1976 account of perceptual knowledge. However, this does not seem to be quite
right: there seems to be a significant difference between them. For the 1976 account
embodied an infallibilist account of warrant. On that account, if S knows p then
there are no relevant perceptually equivalent counterfactual situations in which S
falsely believes p. Schematically, the definition of local reliability arising from the
1976 account is as follows:
process a is locally reliable(1976) iff in all relevant situations: if a produces a
belief in p then p is true.
39 Goldman 1986: 52.
40 The reliability of a process cannot be calculated in terms of the process's performance in the actual
world, since a case of bad epistemic luck could result in an intuitively reliable process only actually




The 1976 and 1986 accounts therefore differ over whether a locally reliable process
can produce a false belief. To emphasise this difference, consider the following
quotation.
For a belief to count as knowledge, I am arguing, it must be caused by a reliable
process. Exactly how reliable I have not said. Nor do I think this can be
answered with precision. The knowledge concept is vague on this dimension,
and an analysis need not impose more precision than the common sense concept
contains.42
To say that a process must be infallible if the beliefs it produces are to count as
knowledge is to give a precise answer to this question: so, Goldman seems to be
claiming not to be committed to the view that belief forming processes are infallible.
On the 1986 account, then, infallibility is not built directly into the requirement of
local reliability. If the account of warrant we are attributing to Goldman is to be
infallibilist, there must be some other mechanism in his account which has the
consequence that when a locally reliable process produces a false belief, that belief
does not get warranted. We shall survey the rest of Goldman's 1986 account of
knowledge to see if this condition is met. The conclusion to be drawn is that it is
not met; however, it could be met by bringing his newer account more in line with
the suggestions offered in the 1976 paper. In the next chapter we will focus on how
Goldman's account of knowledge could be augmented with a worked-out theory of
relevance, and we will ask whether the resulting account is properly naturalistic.
Goldman supplements the necessary condition for knowledge given in
(EC1) in three ways. The first of these is a proposed solution to the generality
problem. The second is a requirement that the belief forming process be
nondeviant, and he sketches a solution to the problem of deviance. The third is the
requirement that the belief produced be justified, and he offers an updated





The generality problem has been taken to be insuperable for reliabilists. Discussing
a reliabilist account of justification (essentially that of Goldman 1992) Pollock
argues that in individuating a belief forming process we have to take all information
into account; as a consequence, each process type will have only a single instance.43
Moreover, included in that individuating information will be facts about the truth
value of the belief produced: hence the reliability of the single instance of the
process expressed as a fraction, will be either 1, if the belief produced is true, or 0, if
the belief produced is false. Hence a process is absolutely reliable if it produces a
true belief; and hence, only processes which are absolutely reliable are able to
confer justification on the beliefs they produce. Let us call this the single case
problem.44
It is not easy to determine what Pollock's objection is meant to come to. He
writes that what is objectionable about this conclusion is that it makes justification
infallible:
This reliabilist criterion entails the absurd consequence that in order for a belief
to be justified it must be true.45
The intuitive notion of justification indeed does not require that justified beliefs be
true; hence Pollock's point would be significant if it could be used to show that
reliabilists are committed to the infallibility of the intuitive notion of justification.
But as we have argued, we cannot take Goldman to be advancing an account of the
intuitive notion, for that notion is not necessary for knowledge, whereas Goldman
seeks to give an account of justification such that justification is necessary for
knowledge. Given that Goldman seems to be using "justification" in a technical
sense, it is not clear whether Pollock's observation counts as an objection to it.
Certainly, if by "justification" Goldman means something like our "warrant",
Pollock's point, if correct, would seem to be a strike in its favour.
43 Pollock 1986: 118.
44 The terminology is from Goldman 1986.
45 Pollock 1986: 118.
161
Goldman's reliabilism
Goldman himself gives a more convincing account of the problem posed by
the single case problem. The problem as he sees it is this: if we individuate
processes so narrowly that any true belief arrived at counts as reliably produced, we
will bring ourselves into conflict with intuition.46 So, guessing is, let us say, not a
reliable belief forming process; hence true beliefs formed by guessing are not
known. But on the maximally precise individuation of belief forming processes
envisaged by Pollock, a token process of guessing truly will indeed count as
reliable, and yet it clearly is not. The problem for reliabilists, then, is to block the
requirement that the maximum amount of information be taken into account in
individuating processes.
Goldman suggests that we have already avoided the single case problem by
taking reliability to be a propensity for tokens of a process type to produce true
beliefs in counterfactual situations.
Now the Single Case problem arises only if global reliability is determined
exclusively by actual frequencies. As suggested... however, a propensity
approach is preferable.47
What he seems to mean is that the definition of global reliability in terms of
counterfactual situations rules out the option of individuating types so narrowly
that they have but one instance. However, he gives no defence of this, and without
a defence his response might seem implausible: after all, a really specific
individuation of a belief forming process type would also specify which single
world that globally reliable process type was instantiated in. Then it will be
trivially counterfactually reliable, relative to that world, given that it issues in a true
belief in that world.
However, we may be able to interpret Goldman more favourably; perhaps
he has in mind something on the following lines. The fundamental idea of
reliabilism is that reliable causation of a belief is a necessary condition for
knowledge. On an influential theory, causation is analysed counterfactually48:





contra Hume, it is claimed that if we cannot talk of the relationship between cause c
and effect e in counterfactual situations then we cannot capture the causal
relationship we ascribe to them in actuality.49 Perhaps, then, Goldman's idea is that
if we individuate belief forming processes so narrowly that each type has only one
instance, we will be unable to draw a distinction between the belief so produced
being produced by accident, as opposed to being caused. We lack any
counterfactual situations to take as a point of comparison, and this is simply to give
up the idea that the belief was caused. Hence the idea of a causal theory of
knowing requires that we individuate processes in a way that allows a degree of re-
identification of the process in counterfactual situations. So, the single case problem
does not arise.
But this still leaves us with the problem of how we should individuate
processes. Goldman suggests, plausibly enough, that we should individuate
process types quite narrowly, in order that we can draw the required distinction
between processes that intuitively do yield knowledge and those which intuitively
do not.50 Goldman's suggestion is as follows: the process type whose reliability
must be taken into account in assessing a token belief for positive epistemic status is
the narrowest process type that was causally operative in producing the belief token in
question.51 Goldman illustrates his proposal with an example of an hypothetical
mechanism for forming perceptual beliefs. We are to imagine that this mechanism
takes sensory information about some object O as input and matches it to various
templates, each representing some category C. There is a value T (where 0<T<1)
such that if the input matches the template of C to a degree T or more, the
mechanism outputs the belief that the object O belongs to category C. If T is very
low, then the mechanism will output the belief that O belongs to C even under
49 The Humean account is reductionist: c caused e just in case there is constant conjunction of c and e
in actuality, with appropriate temporal priority, and we have come to expect es to follow cs (the
metaphysical aspect of causation, the modal relationship between cause and effect, is substituted for by
a psychological property, namely expectation).
50 Goldman 1986: 50.
51 Ibid. It is reasonable to assume that Goldman has in mind a criterion for narrowness as follows:
belief forming process type a is narrower than type (5 just in case a has fewer instances than p.
Though I think this is intuitively clear, strictly speaking a and P will have infinite instances. To
capture the intuitive clarity of the criterion, it is best to shift to an illustration in terms of possible
worlds: a is a narrower type than P just in case the sphere of worlds in which a is instantiated is
smaller than the sphere of worlds in which P is instantiated.
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highly adverse visual conditions, and so even if the mechanism outputs a true belief
that O belongs to C on some specific occasion, the general unreliability of the
mechanism will stop us assigning that true belief the status of knowledge. But we
can also imagine that on some occasion perceptual conditions are good, and the
stimulus from O matches C to a very high degree - say .99. Under these
circumstances, if O does belong to C, and the mechanism outputs an appropriate
belief, we will want to say that the belief is known: but if the process type selected
still includes the very low value of T, the mechanism will not be deemed adequately
reliable. Goldman's suggestion then operates as follows: in the case where the
degree of match is .99, the narrowest process type that is causally operative in
producing the belief is the property of producing-a-belief-when-the-degree-of-
match-is-.99. Although the belief can also be taken to be a product of the wider
process type of producing-a-belief-when-the-degree-of-match-is-T, this process,
since it is wider, is deemed causally inoperative. Thus Goldman's suggestion
allows us a principled way of selecting processes, which fits our intuitions about
whether the belief is known.52
Goldman's suggestion is not arbitrary. As already suggested in connection
with Kitcher's definition of a priori knowledge, there is an intuitive distinction
between the cause of an event, the background conditions against which the cause
operates, and other conditions irrelevant to the causal process. Belief forming
processes are of epistemic interest only in so far as they cause beliefs; since it is their
causal role that is crucial, we need not concern ourselves with more information
about them than is relevant to that role. Pollock's charge that we must take the
maximum amount of information into account in individuating processes would
have us count as significant, information which does not concern the process
considered as a cause. On Goldman's proposal, we count as significant only
information about the process considered as a cause of belief, and this respects the
intuitive distinction between cause, background condition, and irrelevant condition.




The 1986 account provides a more worked out account of deviant processes.
Goldman discusses two ways in which a reliable belief forming process may be
unable to warrant the beliefs it produces.53
First, where a belief forming process takes as input other beliefs, that
process, even if locally and globally reliable, will not confer warrant on the beliefs it
produces unless the input beliefs themselves were warranted. Thus, as Goldman
puts it, whether a given belief is warranted depends on the remote cognitive
ancestry of that belief.
Second, no process, even if locally and globally reliable, will confer warrant
on the beliefs it produces if the process itself was deviantly produced. Let us call a
process which produces belief forming processes a second order beliefforming process.
Goldman now requires that a belief forming process a confers positive epistemic
status on the beliefs it produces only if a was brought about by an appropriate
second order process. The following case illustrates:
J S learns an algorithm A from a wholly unreliable quack mathematician,
Elmer Fraud. The vast majority of algorithms taught by Fraud are defective;
however, A is a rare correct one, and S learns it and uses it to form a true
belief p.54
Intuitively, S does not know p. This is because the second order belief forming
process - that of forming belief forming processes based on instruction by Fraud - is
unreliable. Goldman accordingly proposes an addition to the original condition for
knowledge given in (EC1):
(EC2) An acquired belief forming process can generate knowledge only if it is
acquired or sustained by an appropriate second order process.55
53 Ibid.: 51.
54 Ibid.: 51-2.
55 Ibid.: 52. I pass over Goldman's distinction between belief forming processes and belief forming
methods as a detail we do not need to consider here.
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What is crucial, of course, is the explanation of "appropriateness". Goldman makes
two suggestions, but does not adjudicate between them. First: a second order belief
forming process is reliable just in case the proportion of reliable processes it
produces is very high. Second: a second order belief forming process is reliable just
in case it only generates processes which are more reliable than the ones previously
in use in the same context.56 Note that either of these suggestions will solve the
Judy/Trudy case discussed in the long quotation from Goldman 1976.57 The second
order process of forming belief forming processes through being bumped on the
head is reliable in neither of the senses given here.
The requirement of appropriate higher order justification suggests a regress:
we might think that a higher order process that meets Goldman's stated criteria for
appropriateness would be unable to confer warrant-conferring-status on the belief
forming processes it produces if it itself was unreliably produced. However, this
regress does not have to be infinite or vicious. Goldman suggests that as we ascend
the hierarchy, we come quickly to higher order belief forming processes which are
deep-seated cognitive mechanisms whose appropriateness, or lack of, is something
to be determined by empirical science. These deep-seated processes anchor the
positive status of the processes they produce. Goldman leaves open the possibility
that investigation will reveal that the higher order processes are not appropriate,
and that in fact none of our beliefs has warrant. That this possibility stands is a
consequence of Goldman's naturalism. A successful naturalistic analysis of
knowledge, he claims, can only be expected to show that it is possible that we do
have knowledge; a demonstration that we actually have it - that is, a refutation of a
certain form of scepticism - is not something that can be carried out a priori.68
Both the conditions for nondeviance that Goldman offers have the
consequence that we do not automatically know what we know. It will often not be
possible for us to determine the remote cognitive pedigree of the beliefs our
56 Ibid.: 53.
57 See page 150.
58 Goldman 1986: 55-57 and ch.2.
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processes operate on; in which case, again, we will be unable to determine a priori
whether a given belief which we entertain constitutes a case of knowledge."
Justification
Like the earlier account, Goldman's 1986 account of justification is based on
reliability, and justification is intended to be necessary for knowledge.60 The new
account differs from the old in being developed within a framework of rules
("justification rules" or "J-Rules") and in being augmented by a "no-undermining"
clause. The rule framework is introduced to capture the evaluative aspect of
justification. In saying that a subject's belief is justified, Goldman allows, we say
that the subject is in some sense right to entertain it; however, the concept of
justification embodied in the rule framework is not meant to be regulative or action
guiding.61
A person need not even understand the rules, and if he does, he need not be able
to apply them in the process of belief formation.62
Rather, these rules constitute principles for third-person evaluation of beliefs; they
are standards against which an appraiser can measure a subject's beliefs.
Justification, in Goldman's sense of the term, is not action guiding: it is evaluative
but nonregulative.
Goldman's initial definition of justification is as follows:
(PI) S's believing p at t is justified if and only if: S's believing p is permitted by a
right system of J-rules.63
59 Since Goldman at the same time maintains that we do have knowledge, he is committed to denying








The key question, of course, is what counts as a right system. After an extended
argument by elimination, Goldman opts for the reliabilist criterion. His final
formulation of the criterion is as follows:
(ARI) A J-rule system R is right if and only if R permits certain (basic)
psychological processes, and the instantiation of these processes would
result in a truth ratio of beliefs that meets some specified high threshold
(greater than .50).64
This, in essence, is unchanged from the earlier account, and is still vulnerable to
objections related to case F, as Goldman recognises. In case F, we have suggested, it
is most natural to blame S's lack of knowledge on normative failings. To handle
cases such as F, Goldman introduces the "no-undermining" clause. The completed
definition of justification is then as follows:
(P3) S's believing p at t is justified if and only if:
(a) S's believing p is permitted by a right system of J-rules, and
(b) this permission is not undermined by S's cognitive state at t
It is crucial, of course, that Goldman cash out the no-undermining clause in
non-normative terms. He does this by what seems to be intended as an
enumeration of cases. The three types of undermining he discusses are:
• S's justification for believing p is undermined if S permissibly believes that her
belief in p is not permitted.
• S's justification for believing p is undermined if S impermissibly believes that her
belief in p is not permitted.
• S's justification for believing p is undermined if S believes that conditions C are
not satisfied, where in fact the satisfaction of C is a necessary condition for S's
belief in p to be justified.60
This clause handles case F, since in this case the parental testimony permits S to






no-undermining clause has an ad hoc air: it is not clear that Goldman has identified
a general strategy for dealing with cases of defeat through what we would
ordinarily describe as normative failings. Cashed out, Goldman's clause is
disjunctive (S's justification for believing p is undermined iff: S permissibly believes
that her belief in p is not permitted or S impermissibly believes that her belief in p is
non permitted or etc...). Extra disjuncts could easily be added to deal with new
counterexamples67, but it is not clear that this is a fully satisfying treatment of the
intuitive, normative notion of justification.68 However, further discussion of
whether Goldman's account of justification captures the intuitive, normative, notion
is unnecessary: for his definition is not intended to capture the intuitive notion. As
we have noted, Goldman defines "justification" in a technical sense, clearly not
intended to be even extensionally equivalent to the intuitive one (for in the
technical sense justification is, while in the intuitive sense it is not, necessary for
knowledge). The difference is clear: whether a subject's beliefs are justified in the
intuitive sense has methodological significance for her; a subject's judgements about
which of her beliefs are justified guide her in adjusting those beliefs. But Goldman's
notion of justification plays no such role. It is simply a standard against which a
third person can judge whether S's beliefs are the products of a reliable system of J-
Rules. Mark Kaplan has argued, with some plausibility, that this leaves it very
unclear why anyone should be interested in whether their beliefs are justified in
Goldman's sense.
The problem is that, if it is characteristic of the nonregulative use of "justified"
that it has no methodological import - that there is nothing in the set of rules to
be consciously adopted by an inquirer that calls for her to determine whether any
of her beliefs is justified in the nonregulative use of that term - then it is hard to
see what point there could be to a system of evaluation dedicated to saying when
it is that a person's belief is justified in the nonregulative sense. After all, in the
sense of "justified" in question, it would seem that we might engage in inquiry as
67 Goldman in effect does just this by introducing a distinction between ex post and ex ante
justification to deal with a series of counterexamples from BonJour. I will pass over discussion of this.
Goldman 1986: 111-3; 1992: 127-8.
68 BonJour is the most trenchant critic. See his entry under "Externalism/Internalism" in Dancy and
Sosa 1993 for a summary of objections to Goldman's account of justification; BonJour 1985 contains
more in depth commentary.
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scrupulously and carefully as anyone can, yet never have occasion (and never
suffer for our failure) even to inquire into whether our beliefs are justified!
Moreover [...] if it is characteristic of the nonregulative use of "justified"
that it has no methodological import, it is hard to see on what basis one could
judge [...] that the expression "justified," is being incorrectly applied.6'
While it is crucial for Goldman's naturalistic project that he give a non-normative
analysis of the concept of justification, this project seems not to be served by his
development of a technical notion of justification. The problem Goldman should be
addressing, it seems, is that of how an apparently normative intuitive concept of
justification can have a contingent relationship with knowledge, being neither
necessary (nor, with truth and belief) sufficient for knowledge, but able in some
cases through its absence to undermine it. We will return to this problem, and in
particular the connection between justification (in the intuitive sense) and
relevance, in the next chapter.
Our intention in examining Goldman's notion of justification was to see
whether his justification clauses provided a mechanism which would prevent the
occasional false belief produced by a locally reliable and appropriately produced
and individuated belief forming process from being warranted. Our conclusion
must be negative. Since Goldman defines "justification" by appealing to reliability,
some false beliefs can clearly be justified (to this extent, at least, his notion of
justification matches the intuitive one). This would not be a problem if some
mechanism could be given such that the set of possible justified false beliefs was
disjoint from the set of false beliefs produced by locally reliable, etc., processes, for
then the conditions in Goldman's definition of warrant would interact to block the
possibility of warranted false beliefs. But no such mechanism is offered.
Goldman's 1986 analysis of knowledge
We are now in a position to attempt to state the definition of knowledge we are





to extrapolate one. We will do this by combining the various aspects of his account
as follows:
S knows p iff:
p is true and S believes p and
(i) S's belief in p results from an appropriate belief forming process a;
(ii) S's belief in p is justified.
A belief forming process a is appropriate iff:
(a) a is globally and locally reliable;
(b) a is the narrowest process causally operative in producing the belief in
question;
(c) a was acquired or is sustained by a second order belief forming process
which produces reliable processes, or modifies existing processes so as to
improve their reliability.
Belief forming process a is locally reliable iff
in most relevant situations: if a produces a belief in p then p is true.
Belief forming process a is globally reliable
iff in most situations: if a produces a belief in p then p is true.
S's belief in p is justified iff:
(a) S's believing p is permitted by a right system of J-rules, and
(b) this permission is not undermined by S's cognitive state at t.
A J-rule system R is right iff:
R permits certain psychological process, and the instantiation of these
processes in normal worlds results in a truth ratio of beliefs that meets some
specified high threshold.
Permission to believe is undermined iff:
S permissibly believes that her belief in p is not permitted or S impermissibly
believes that her belief in p is non permitted or S believes that conditions C
are not satisfied, where in fact the satisfaction of C is a necessary condition
for S's belief in p to be justified or etc... .
Our requirements of a theory of knowledge were that it secures the
infallibility of warrant; yields a definition of knowledge which excludes
counterexamples based on external defeaters and internal defeaters; solves the
generality problem; and explains the difference between deviant and nondeviant
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belief forming processes. Goldman's theory, as presented above, offers responses to
many of these. Counterexamples based on internal defeaters are intended to be
excluded by the no-undermining clause, while the generality problem and the
problem of deviance in general are addressed by the specification of
"appropriateness".
But as regards the requirements that warrant be infallible and that external
defeaters be excluded, the definition is inadequate as it stands. Clauses (i) and (ii)
say what it is for a belief to be warranted; the account of warrant will be infallibilist
just in case it secures the truth of the warranted belief independently of the separate
truth requirement with which the definiens begins. But this account of warrant
does not secure the truth of the warranted belief, for appropriate production and
justification (in Goldman's technical sense) are both fallible, and as we recently
noted, there is no requirement that allows the two clauses to interact in securing
truth.
The problem, of course, is the relaxed requirement for local reliability. By
not requiring appropriate belief forming processes to be infallible in discriminating
truth from relevant falsehood, Goldman loses the infallibility which we argued is
built into the 1976 account. But this failure to define local reliability in terms of
local infallibility just seems to be a slip on Goldman's part. In the next chapter,
therefore, we will look at the prospects for strengthening the requirement of local
reliability to bring it into line with the 1976 account, and of giving the definition of
"relevance" with which that account needs to be completed. It will be suggested
that the account of knowledge which arises is only dubiously naturalistic, and
therefore only dubiously acceptable to Goldman.
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Process reliabilism and contextualism
Authors in the tradition of explaining the a priori inaugurated by Kitcher have tried
to develop naturalistic theories of a priori knowledge within a reliabilist framework
drawn from Goldman. They have taken it to be obvious that a priori warrant, like
warrant in general, is fallible, and hence that it is wrong to appeal to the concept of
infallibility in explaining experience-independence. But in chapter six we saw an
argument, based only on assumption of the closure principle for knowledge, that
the property of warrant is infallible. If this argument is sound, it is indeed wrong to
try to explain the notion of experience-independence by appeal to the notion of
infallibility; however, the reason for this is the opposite of that assumed by Kitcher's
naturalist critics, and moreover reliabilists must now face the problem of explaining
just what infallible warrant is. In the previous chapter we argued that Goldman's
1986 theory does not require warrant to be infallible. If this is right, then Goldman's
1986 analysis of knowledge will face Gettier problems and does not provide a
secure foundation for a naturalistic theory of a priori knowledge. However, we
have also suggested that this problem could easily be fixed by reverting to the
account of local reliability given in "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge",
which apparently does require warrant to be infallible. The purpose of this chapter
is to see how this modification can plausibly be implemented. Having done so, we
will consider whether the resulting account meets the requirements of naturalism.
Our strategy for rendering Goldman's account infallibilist, then, depends on
clause (i) of Goldman's definition. We redefine "local reliability" so as to bring it in
line with the 1976 account, as follows:
Belief forming process a is- locally reliable iff in all relevant situations: if a
produces a belief in p then p is true.
On this account, "appropriate" belief forming processes never produce false beliefs.
This cure might at first seem worse than the disease: our problem was to
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understand how warrant can be infallible, and the solution involves supposing that
appropriate belief forming processes themselves never produce false beliefs. We
noted in chapter six that there is an important difference between warrant being
infallible and appropriate processes never producing false beliefs, and we
suggested that to require the latter seems to lead to scepticism. The key to avoiding
scepticism while requiring appropriate processes to be infallible is to tie
"appropriateness" to the circumstances in which the belief forming process is
employed. As we noted, this is precisely what Goldman's 1976 response to the fake
barns problem seems to do: in case G, we suggested, the fact that S's visual
processes can't distinguish real from relevant fake barns makes S's visual processes
inappropriate in the circumstances. What we need to complete this account is a
theory of relevance that explains this context dependence of appropriateness.
That our account of warrant would require attention to the circumstances of
the knower was to be expected. Naturalists frequently stress the importance of the
"situatedness" of cognitive subjects. Our knowledge-producing processes are
designed by evolution to produce knowledge within environments with certain
characteristics, and their ability to produce knowledge under normal conditions
should not be taken to be undermined by the possibility that the processes go astray
outwith normality.1 For a warranting process to produce knowledge it must be
operating within a favourable environment. The distinguishing features of
favourable environments with respect to typically human knowledge-producing
processes are myriad, including that there is adequate illumination; that the
refractive index of the local medium for the propagation of light meets certain
parameters; that local pressure and temperature is standard; that the environment
supports generalisations based on sampling (that is, that the environment supports
induction); that the local community of knowers is generally trustworthy, etc.
Having recognised the importance of these conditions, it would be implausible to
read the requirement that belief forming processes be reliable as a requirement that
they produce a majority of true beliefs across all situations, since this would be to
' Cf.: Kornblith 1994, Craig 1990, Cohen 1988. This epistemological point has much in common with
the increasingly popular view that our cognitive systems exploit environmental regularities as short
cuts in processing (Clark and Chalmers 1998).
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require that they produce true beliefs in abnormal situations. Hence, a distinction
between relevant and non-relevant situations is also motivated.
However, in appealing to relevance a serious problem arises. The argument,
given in chapter six, that warrant is infallible turned on the acceptance of the
principle of the closure of knowledge under known entailment, schematically:
Ka, K(a (=(3) (=Kp.
It would be extremely problematic if it turned out that the adoption of an account of
knowledge which gives a central role to the notion of relevance is inconsistent with
an adoption of the closure principle. If the closure principle is invalid, then we
have in fact seen no cogent reason to think that warrant is infallible. Yet a number
of authors have taken a "relevant alternatives" account of knowledge to indicate
that the principle of closure is indeed invalid.2 It seems very likely, however, that
the closure principle must be sustained.3 I will first demonstrate the problem, and
then propose the adoption of an account of relevance on which closure is sustained.
Closure and relevance
In his influential paper "Epistemic Operators" Dretske argues that the sentential
operator "knows that " is "semi-penetrating".4 An operator tp is semi-penetrating
iff, where cpp, (p also applies to some but not all of the logical consequences of p.5 To
avoid trivialising his thesis, Dretske adds the condition that the logical
consequences in question must be known consequences; the claim he rejects, then,
2 The locus classicus is Dretske 1970. Famously, Nozick (Nozick 1981) also denies closure, but as
Nozick points out, his account draws heavily from Dretske. Goldman too says that his relevant
alternatives account allows him to avoid sceptical arguments based on closure (Goldman 1986: 56).
3 See DeRose's "abominable conjunction" defence of the principle of closure: DeRose 1995: 27.
4 Dretske 1970.
5 Dretske contrasts semi-penetrating operators with "fully penetrating" operators such as "it is true that
", "it is necessary that ", and with "non-penetrating operators" such as "it is strange that ",
"it is accidental that ", where the operator does not transfer even to the most immediate logical
consequences of the proposition operated on.
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is that the epistemic operator "knows that " penetrates to all the known logical
consequences of a proposition. That is, by claiming that "knows that " is only
semi-penetrating Dretske is denying the closure of knowledge over known
entailment.
Initially, Dretske argues against the validity of the closure principle by
exhibiting a scenario in which, he takes it, closure obviously fails. This scenario is
as follows: S is in a zoo looking at some zebras. Let p be the proposition: the animal
before S is a zebra; let q be the proposition: the animal before S is a mule cleverly
painted to look like a zebra. Now, q is an alternative to p; that is, p entails -q.
Dretske maintains that, intuitively, S knows p; however, to know -q, S would have
to perform certain actions, gather certain evidence, and S has not done this: hence
Dretske concludes that S does not know -q. Since S is in a position to know that q is
an alternative to p, closure appears to fail. That is to say, the deductive closure
argument
(i) Kp
(ii) K{p j= -q)
so, (iii) K-q
seems to have been shown to be invalid. However, as he observes, this example
only convinces if we are antecedently inclined to reject scepticism. A sceptic, on the
other hand, could take the falsity of (iii) to transfer, via modus tollens, over to falsity
of (i): in effect, arguing that S does not know that the animal before her is a zebra,
on the basis of the fact that she does not know that it is not a cleverly painted mule.
So, if we seek to convince the sceptic, we will need another, deeper, reason to think
that closure fails.
Dretske tries to find a deeper reason by drawing analogies between the
epistemic operator "knows that " and other operators for which, he claims, the
corresponding closure principles are not valid. The operators he discusses are "R is
the explanation for ", "R is the reason for S to ", and the subjunctive conditional
"R would not have been the case unless ",6 But as Dretske himself points out, this
6 Dretske 1970: 1017.
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line of argument could be thought weak, since it could be doubted that the logic of
these operators is in the relevant respects the same as that of the epistemic operator.
Moreover, it is not clear that Dretske manages to establish significant negative
conclusions about the corresponding closure principles for these operators. As
Dretske observes, given that we want to analyse knowledge counterfactually, the
operator with the best prima facie chance of being relevantly analogous to the
epistemic operator is the subjunctive conditional "R would not have been the case
unless ". Writing "p=>£/" for "p would not have been the case unless q", the
corresponding closure principle for this conditional is: p=>q, (p—>r): p^>r. Dretske
proceeds by trying to give a counterexample to this inference pattern. It is, he
thinks, easy to imagine a situation in which:
(i) The wall looks green (to S) => the wall is green
(ii) The wall is green entails the wall is not white cleverly illuminated to look
green (to S)
are both true; yet, it is not true that
(iii) The wall looks green (to S) =» the wall is not white cleverly illuminated to
look green (to S).7
But it is extremely difficult to determine whether Dretske can use this example to
show that the closure principle for "=>" is invalid, for it is extremely difficult to
determine what are the semantics for the conditional "p would not have been the
case unless q". The semantics for this conditional cannot be equivalent to the
semantics for the normal counterfactual conditional "if p had been true, q would
have been true", for if we interpret "=>" as the normal counterfactual then the
corresponding closure principle is valid.8 Dretske's counterfactual looks like a
contraposed version of the normal counterfactual, but it cannot be, since
contraposition is not a valid operation for counterfactual conditionals.9 So it is just
not clear how to interpret Dretske's proposed counterexample to closure.
7 Ibid.\ 1020. I have substituted the symbol "=>" for Dretske's own
8 Lewis 1996: 563 n.21.
9 For example: the counterfactual if it had rained it would not have rained heavily can be true; but its
"contraposition", if it had rained heavily it would not have rained is absurd.
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In fact, the operator "R is the explanation for " seems to provide more
secure grounds for the analogy Dretske wants to draw.10 Explanations seem
typically to be contrastive: that is, we do not in general explain "why p" but: "why p
rather than q". Dretske seems clearly right to say that we may have an explanation
why p, and know that p entails q, but not have an explanation why q. For example,
that Brenda was full explains why Brenda did not order dessert; and we know that
Brenda did not order dessert entails that Brenda did not: order dessert and throw it at the
waiter." But that Brenda was full is not the explanation why Brenda did not: order
dessert and throw it at the waiter. Perhaps we simply have no explanation why
Brenda, in her rage about the service, did not take that step. But our inability to
give an explanation here does not undermine the explanation of why Brenda did
not order dessert. This introduction of the new possibility which we can't explain
raises a new set of facts to salience, which our original explanation (that Brenda was
full) cannot explain. But relative to the original set of salient facts, our explanation
seems perfectly in order.
Dretske thinks that the logic of "knows that " has the same structure as
that of "R is the explanation for ". To say that S knows p makes tacit reference to
a set of relevant alternatives which give content to the attribution of knowledge to
S.
To know that x is A is to know that x is A within a framework of relevant
alternatives, B, C, D. This set of contrasts, together with the fact that x is A, serve
to define what it is that is known when one knows that x is A.12
A "relevant alternative", he writes, is an "alternative that might have been realised
in the existing circumstances if the actual state of affairs had not materialized."13
Further, knowledge "penetrates only to those alternatives which form part of the
10 "R is the reason for S to " will also work in this regard.
11 Dretske 1970: 1021.
12 Ibid. : 1022.
13 Ibid. : 1021.
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network structuring the original context in which a knowledge claim was
advanced."'4
Dretske claims not to have given a precise definition of the notion of
relevance.13 However, the most recent quotation suggests that Dretske must tie the
notion of relevance very closely to the notion of penetration. Dretske says that
knowledge penetrates only to those alternatives which are relevant, and it certainly
seems that knowledge will penetrate to all those alternatives which are relevant. It
follows that an alternative is relevant just in case knowledge penetrates to it. So it
seems that Dretske is committed to the following equivalence (for propositions p
and q):
p is relevant to q iff: Kp, K(p [= -q) K-q ,16
If this definition is correct, then any theory of knowledge which appeals to a
distinction between relevant and non-relevant alternatives will be automatically
committed to rejecting closure. Where p entails -q, closure will fail in just those
cases where -q is not relevant to p.
However, as Stine points out, the appearance that the closure principle for
knowledge fails is only sustained because Dretske is willing to evaluate Kp and
K(p -q) against a background of relevant alternatives which is different from that
which licences the assertion of -K-q. But, as we have just seen, Dretske maintains
that reference to the background of relevant alternatives is part of a knowledge
claim, and hence that knowledge claims, even concerning the same proposition, are
non-equivalent if they are evaluated against different backgrounds. Given this
view of knowledge, it is illegitimate to claim that closure fails on the basis of cases
which vary the background against which knowledge is attributed. As Stine writes,
we cannot evaluate a deductive closure argument for validity without holding the
set of relevant alternatives fixed:
14 Ibid.: 1023.
15 Ibid.: 1021 n.6.
16 This point is substantially similar to one made by Cohen 1988.
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This is as it should be; to do otherwise would be to commit some logical sin akin
to equivocation. If the relevant alternatives, which have after all to do with the
truth or falsity of the premises and conclusion [of instances of closure arguments],
cannot be held fixed, it is hard to see on what basis one can decide whether the
argument form is valid or not. And if the set of relevant alternatives is one thing
for the first premise and another for the conclusion, how do we determine what it
is for the second premise, and how does this affect the truth of the second
premise?17
Given Dretske's definition of "relevance", an argument that the closure principle has
not been shown to fail will also be an argument that the relation of relevance is
simply equivalent to the relation of known entailment. Since it clearly is not so
equivalent, we need to redefine "relevance". Stine offers the following condition for
relevance:
(in situation w) an alternative p is relevant only if (in w) there is some reason
to think that p is true.18
As we have noted, if the principle of closure is maintained, Dretske's zoo example
becomes an instantiation of a general form of sceptical argument. The sceptic
performs a modus tollens from the proposition that we don't know that sceptical
scenarios do not obtain to the conclusion that we do not have knowledge of
ordinary propositions.19 Stine wants to maintain closure, but does not propose to
endorse scepticism. Instead she enjoins that, in the zebra case, the sceptic tries to
shift the background of relevant alternatives by claiming that S does not know that
the animal at which S is looking is a cleverly painted mule; however, confronted by
a sceptic who claims this, S can rightfully refuse to allow the background of
relevant alternatives to be changed. If S admits that she does not know that the
animal is not a cleverly painted mule, she.will have allowed the background of
17 Stine 1976: 256.
18 Ibid.: 252.
19 The alternative, to perform a modus ponens from the assumption that we know in ordinary cases,
concluding that we know sceptical scenarios do not obtain, is often described as a Moorean response,
after G.E. Moore's quick refutation of external-world scepticism.
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relevant alternatives to shift, and against the changed background no longer knows
that the animal before her is a zebra; if she refuses to let the background change, she
continues to know that it is a zebra, and relative to that background she knows that
the animal is not a cleverly painted mule.20
Note that in advancing this solution, Stine has to reject Dretske's assumption
that under normal circumstances S does not know that the animal before her is not
a cleverly painted mule. But Dretske's rationale for this was plausible: it was that S
has not, in those normal circumstances, performed any of the operations that would
be required to know such a thing - she has not looked for paint pots, applied paint
remover, etc. On Stine's account, where q is an alternative which is not relevant, -q
is known, but is known vacuously.21 This suggestion is certainly counterintuitive:
some have found it totally implausible.22 However, it may be that the strangeness of
claiming that we know irrelevant alternatives can be mitigated by other factors of
our completed account. The account of relevance I will shortly endorse (Lewis's)
retains Stine's proposal regarding irrelevant alternatives, but renders it more
plausible.
Stine's treatment of relevance is, however, unsatisfactory. It is plausible that
relevance is neither a purely psychological, a purely epistemic nor a purely
metaphysical relation: alternatives can be relevant that we don't think are relevant
(such as in the fake barns case), have no evidence are relevance, and perhaps even
metaphysically impossible states of affairs can be relevant, if the believer does not
realise that they are so impossible.23 Stine's account seems to place disproportional
weight on the epistemic aspect of relevance; accordingly, although we will endorse
Stine's general strategy for combining a relevant-alternatives account of knowledge
20 It is not, in fact, clear that Stine can consistently maintain this, for she suggests, tentatively, that the
background of relevant alternatives is shifted by the very utterance of "q" in the second premise. If the
mere utterance of a proposition is enough to'change the background of relevant alternatives, any
efforts on the part of S to "resist" the shift in background will be futile.
21 In Stine's formulation, non-relevant alternatives are known without evidence. I avoid Stine's own
formulation since it sits uncomfortably with our previous endorsement of Williamson's evidence as
knowledge thesis (Williamson 1997).
22 Cohen 1988.
23
Suppose it is necessary that water is H20. We can imagine S, perhaps faced with a chemistry test,
worrying whether water is H20, and thereby creating as relevant a situation in which water is not H20.
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with acceptance of the closure principle, we still need to locate a satisfactory
account of relevance.
Lewis's account of "proper ignoring"
The most detailed treatment of relevance currently available is given by Lewis in
his 1996 paper "Elusive Knowledge". We cannot simply adopt Lewis's account tout
court: one reason for this is that the theory of a priori knowledge which we will
endorse affords a central place to the role of belief forming processes, and Lewis's
account is not couched in terms of belief forming processes. The intention is to
expropriate Lewis's account of relevance and combine it with the naturalistic
account of knowledge derived from Goldman in order to create a working reliabilist
account.
The basic idea behind Lewis's theory of knowledge is that a subject knows p
just in case her evidence rules out the possibility that p is false. That is:
Subject S knows proposition P iff P holds in every possibility left uneliminated
by S's evidence; equivalently, iff S's evidence eliminates every possibility in
which not-P.24
In practice, though, we just cannot eliminate all the possibilities: we have neither
the time nor the cognitive resources to do a thorough job. This being the case,
Lewis suggests, we allow ourselves to ignore many of the possibilities that really
exist, the better to keep track of the ones we really have eliminated. To ascribe
knowledge is in effect to say:
The possibilities eliminated, whatever else they may also include, at least
include all the not-P possibilities; or anyway, all of those except for some we are
presumably prepared to ignore just at the moment.1
24 Lewis 1996: 551.
25 Ibid.: 563.
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But what a subject may be ignoring and still correctly be said to know depends on
the context in which knowledge was attributed to her. This context-dependence is
what will resolve the tension between the intuition that ordinary belief forming
processes can produce false beliefs, and the suggestion that Goldman's notion of
warrant can be made infallible by requiring that appropriate belief forming
processes never produce a false belief. Lewis expresses this problem slightly
differently, but the idea is the same. As he writes, intuitively
...it seems that knowledge must be by definition infallible. If you claim that S
knows that P and yet you grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility in
which not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all
know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge, of knowledge despite
uneliminated possibilities of error, just sounds contradictory.26
However, he goes on, minimal reflection reveals that our ordinary knowledge
claims are indeed made against a background of uneliminated possibilities of error.
Thus, either we must give up the idea that knowledge is infallible, or we must give
up the idea that ordinarily we have knowledge. Neither option is appealing.
The solution to this paradox, roughly speaking, is that we retain the idea
that possession of knowledge is incompatible with unexcluded possibilities of error,
but allow that certain possibilities of error can be excluded not by ruling them out
with evidence, but by ignoring them. The chief part of Lewis's theory of knowledge
- and the part to be expropriated for our own purposes - concerns what may, and
what may not, be properly ignored in a situation. To this end, Lewis proposes a
series of rules. These are:
Ride of Actuality. The possibility that actually obtains may not be ignored. Hence,
no false proposition may be presupposed27.
Rule of Belief A possibility that a subject believes to obtain, or ought to believe to
obtain, may not be ignored.
26 Lewis 1996: 549.
27 We presuppose a proposition if we ignore all the possibilities in which it is false.
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Rule of Resemblance. If one possibility saliently resembles another, then: if one of
them may not be properly ignored in virtue of rules other than the Rule of
Resemblance, then the other may not.28
Rule of Reliability. Defeasibly, we may ignore the possibility that our ordinarily
reliable belief forming processes mislead us.
Rules of Method. Defeasibly, (i) we may presuppose that a sample is representative
and (ii) we may presuppose that the best explanation of our evidence is the true
explanation.
Ride of Conservatism. Defeasibly, we may ignore the possibilities that people around
us commonly ignore; equivalently, we are permitted to adopt the usual and
expected presuppositions of our community.
Ride of Attention. A possibility that is being attended to is not being ignored.
Hence, if we are wondering whether we may ignore a possibility, we are attending to
it, and so we are not ignoring it.
On a contextualist theory of knowledge, the reference of "knows" in an
assertion of "S knows p" varies with the context of assertion. Two of Lewis's rules in
particular render his account contextualist. First, the Rule of Attention requires that
what a subject must be able to rule out in order for her to know depends on what
situations she is directing her attention to: the more situations to which she is
attending, the more she will have to be able to rule out in order correctly to be said
to know. Second, by the Rule of Resemblance, the standards of similarity which
must be met for a situation to become salient vary with the circumstances of
attribution of knowledge: so, the standards for salience in force in ordinary
circumstances may differ greatly from the standards in force in, say, a court of law.29
I propose to read Lewis's rules for proper ignoring as rules governing what
situations are relevant in a given context; I propose to adopt these as rules for
relevance, and use them to complete Goldman's subjunctive account of reliability.
So: in any given situation a, a possibility w is relevant just in case, in a, w is not
properly ignored. Lewis's account sustains closure for much the same reasons as
does Stine's, while giving a more filled-out and plausible account of the notion of
relevance. For Lewis, the reference of "knows" depends on the context of
28 This requirement is needed to prevent sorites reasoning to the conclusion that everything saliently
resembles everything else, and hence preventing us from ignoring anything.
29
Something like the Rule of Resemblance also seems to be central to Fogelin's contextualist account
of knowledge (Fogelin 1994).
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attribution of knowledge; deductive closure arguments can only be evaluated while
the reference of "knows" remains fixed, as Stine pointed out, and this requires that
we keep the background of relevant alternatives unchanged between evaluation of
the premises and the conclusion. But, by the Rule of Attention, the mere
mentioning of a situation makes it relevant. So, in Dretske's zoo case, the
mentioning of the possibility that the animal before S is a cleverly painted mule
raises it as a relevant unexcluded possibility of error, and while this possibility is
not being properly ignored, S does not know that the animal before her is not a
cleverly painted mule, and hence does not know that it is a zebra. But while the
possibility is properly ignored, S knows she sees a zebra and so also knows, without
having to check, that she does not see a cleverly painted mule. As we have noted,
this is a slightly strange consequence; we will shortly look at the way Lewis
manages to offset this strangeness.
Contextual reliability
We now look at how the theory of relevance drawn from Lewis could be combined
with the reliable-process theory of warrant drawn from Goldman. The solution we
will adopt is, roughly, that where we ascribe knowledge to a subject on the basis of
a belief forming process a producing a belief in p, if we are permitted to ignore all
the situations in which a produces false belief, then a will be warrant conferring.
That is: when knowledge of p is attributed to S, the context of attribution determines
a set of relevant alternatives, and if the attribution of knowledge succeeds, then in
none of those situations does the belief forming process which produced S's belief
in p produce a false belief. Warrant is infallible because appropriate belief forming
processes don't produce false beliefs: scepticism is avoided by adding the
requirement that whether a belief forming process is appropriate depends on the
circumstances of ascription of knowledge.
We now have rules for determining what situations will be relevant in a
context. As we have seen, these rules are context-sensitive in two ways: what is
relevant depends on what the ascriber is (and ought to be) attending to, and on
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what standards of similarity are in force. Now, Goldman's theory is messy: so
messy, in fact, that we might be justified in rejecting it even if we are right to think
that the analysis gives an extensionally correct account of knowledge; for we might
think that a successful analysis of a concept would not just be extensionally
equivalent to the original concept, but would meet certain standards for intensional
equivalence also.30 Fortunately, the adoption of Lewis's rules as rules for relevance
allows us to simplify Goldman's account considerably. For the rules for relevance
double up many of the clauses of Goldman's definition of knowledge.
The rule of actuality requires that truth is always relevant: so we can drop
the extra truth clause in Goldman's definition.31 Further, if we adopt the Lewisian
theory of relevance we do not have to include into the definition of warrant a
separate clause requiring that an appropriate belief forming process is produced by
a reliable second-order process (a process which produces belief forming processes -
see chapter seven). This is because where knowledge is attributed to a subject
whose belief was produced by an unreliably produced belief forming process, the
fact that the process was unreliably produced will create relevant uneliminated
possibilities of error.32
For example, recall Goldman's case of Sam and the twins, Judy and Trudy.33
In this scenario, Sam has a set of perceptual cues for recognising Judy and Trudy,
and up to a certain time t these sets have been indistinct, leaving Sam unable to
distinguish Judy from Trudy. At t Sam hits his head and a new feature is added to
his set of cues for recognising Judy. From t onwards, he will believe someone to be
Judy only if they meet all the previous conditions Sam used to judge to be true of
Judy, plus they have a mole over their right eyebrow. But at f, Judy happens to
develop such a mole. So Sam can now distinguish her from Trudy, but his ability to
so has been brought about so serendipitously that his first recognition of her will
not count as knowledge. Given our knowledge of the way Sam's ability to
distinguish Judy from Trudy was brought about, we should consider a cluster of
30 Cf. Craig 1990, Williamson 1995.
31 Cf. Lewis 1996: 554.
32 Goldman mentions this sort of solution for dealing with deviant production, and passes over it
without comment: Goldman 1976: 789.
33 See chapter seven.
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possibilities relevant: in one, Judy doesn't develop a mole; in another, Trudy also
develops a mole; in a third Sam is rendered less able to distinguish Judy from Trudy
by the bump on the head (perhaps it leaves him extremely short-sighted). Sam can
exclude none of these, and none is properly ignored; therefore it would be wrong to
attribute knowledge to Sam.
It seems plausible that related reasoning would hold for the other case of
unreliable second-order production we have seen, the case in which S is taught a
reliable algorithm by an unreliable quack mathematician.34 So Goldman's 1986
definition can be further simplified: we do not need a separate clause requiring
reliable second-order production.
A third area in which we could seek simplification is with respect to
Goldman's justification clauses. For Goldman, justification is necessary for
knowledge. His main clauses for justification are: S's belief in p is justified iff: (a) S's
believing p is permitted by a right system of J-rules, and (b) this permission is not
undermined by S's cognitive state at t. It seems likely that these clauses can be
assimilated to the Rules for relevance. Clause (a) is, in effect, that S's belief is
produced by a process which is globally reliable (that is, it produces a suitably high
proportion of true beliefs overall); where S's belief is produced by a process that is
not globally reliable, it is clear that one of the Rules will operate to block the
attribution of knowledge to S.35 Clause (b) is, as we saw, disjunctive, and it is not
clear whether Goldman intends it to be complete as it stands, or whether he would
allow further disjuncts to be added to deal with new counterexamples should they
arise. One way in which S's permission to believe -p can be undermined is if S
actually believes -p; here the rule of Attention operates to block correct attribution
of knowledge to S. Similar mechanisms can probably be found which would
assimilate Goldman's other undermining clauses to the Rules for relevance.
However, as we have noted, it is not at all clear why Goldman introduces a
requirement of justification in this technical sense. Justification is naturally taken to
be normative, and in this intuitive sense is neither necessary nor sufficient for
34 Case J from chapter seven.
35 For illustration, see the contextualist treatment of the astrology case, case E: page 189, this chapter.
187
Process reliabilism and contextualism
knowledge.36 Lewis's Rules do include clauses which deal with justification in the
intuitive sense: the Rule of Belief requires that a possibility that S ought to believe
obtains must be considered relevant. But this means that Lewis's account of
relevance is normative: it therefore cannot be acceptable to Goldman as it stands.
We will discuss this problem in more depth shortly; perhaps, though,
Goldman could drop the normative aspect of the Rule of Belief and hope that what
remains of his definition of knowledge contains the machinery needed to deal with
the cases that the absence of the normative concept leaves open. Assuming that he
can, it seems that all we need in the definition of knowledge is the requirement that
the process in question is the narrowest process causally relevant to producing S's
belief, and that the process produces no false belief in any relevant alternative
situation. This suggests a comprehensive rewriting of Goldman's account, which
keeps the spirit of the reliable-process theory, but packs many of his extra
conditions into the relevance-clause. The process-reliabilist definition of knowledge
I suggest Goldman is left with is, then, as follows:
(Q.) S knows p iff: S believes p and S's belief in p results from a belief forming
process a such that:
(i) a is the narrowest process causally operative in producing the belief in
question;
(ii) a produces no false belief in any situation made relevant by the context
of attribution of knowledge to S (where the relevant situations are
determined by Lewis's Rules).37
The contextualised account of reliability explains why S does not know in
the Gettier-style cases we have seen so far, and also deals with some cases that we
have not yet seen. From chapters six and seven, cases D-G are dealt with as follows.
D S is in a room with two other people. She has known one of them for years,
and knows that he has always loved Ford cars, that he has always bought
them over other cars, that he has never expressed any interest in driving a
36 Lewis also makes this point: Lewis 1996: 556.
37 In other words, a is locally reliable (1976 version). On this account, the following property of a
belief is infallible: " was produced by an appropriate belief forming process". The key is that
whether a belief forming process is appropriate depends on the context.
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non-Ford car, etc. S also knows that yesterday this friend arrived at work in
his own Ford car, and that he drove into work today (though she didn't see
him arrive). S has, therefore, a justified belief that her friend owns a Ford
car: but in fact he does not, having sold it just that morning. S does not own
a Ford car. However, the second person, who is a stranger to S, does own a
Ford car. Thus, S has a justified and true belief that someone in the room owns
a Ford car.
Solution: the situation w, in which S's friend has just sold his Ford, while the
stranger does not own a Ford, is a relevant possibility. This is because actuality is
always relevant, and w saliently resembles actuality: in respect of S's friend it
resembles actuality exactly; and in respect of what S knows about the stranger it is
also exactly alike. Hence w may not be ignored, and in w S's inferential process
produces a false belief: so clause £l(ii) fails, and it is not correct to attribute
knowledge of p to S.38
E S uses astrology to form some belief p. p is in fact true, and S has complete
subjective justification for her belief, having been convinced of the efficacy
of astrology through being raised in an community where astrology was
common, having seen apparently reliable results many times before, being
versed in the underlying pseudo-theory, etc.
Solution: the possibility, w, that astrology leads S to believe -p is relevant. Since
astrology does not hook onto any epistemically significant regularities in nature, we
can imagine the astrological divination process producing the negation of the belief
it actually produces without altering any significant aspect of the rest of the world;
hence there is a possibility, w, which resembles actuality in all respects bar S's belief;
w saliently resembles actuality and actuality may never be ignored. Hence w may
not be ignored, and in w the divination process produces a false belief. So Q(ii)
fails, and it would be incorrect to attribute knowledge of p to S.
F S has a certain belief p about her early childhood, but her parents tell her
that her belief in p is false, and that her memory of the occurrence of p is
38 Lewis 1996: 557.
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mistaken. Despite the attempted deception, S continues to believe in p. S's
belief is true and her memory is working perfectly.
Solution: by the Rule of Belief, S ought to believe that the possibility, w, in which her
parents are telling the truth obtains: hence w is relevant, and in it S's memory
processes produce a false belief. So D(ii) fails and it is not correct to attribute
knowledge of p to S.39
G S is driving along a road, and believes that she sees a barn, based on the fact
that she seems to see the front of a barn that she is passing, and that she has
no reason to believe that visual conditions are abnormal. Visual conditions
are in fact normal, and in fact there is a real barn before her. However,
unknown to S she is in a region of the country where many fake barn
facades have been erected, such that if S had been looking at a barn fagade
she would still have believed she was looking at a barn, and it is pure luck
that S is now looking at a barn.
Solution: the possibility, w, in which S sees a fake barn saliently resembles actuality
in respect of the probability that S sees a fake barn, and so w cannot be ignored. In
w, S's belief that she sees a barn is false. So, once more, Q(ii) fails: S's visual
processes are not reliable in this context and it would not be correct to attribute
knowledge to S.
The contextualist version of Goldman's reliabilism can also solve other
problems which affect fallibilist versions of reliabilism. For example, the lottery
paradox40: S does not know that her lottery ticket will lose, even though, by
increasing the number of tickets in the lottery, we can make her chances of winning
arbitrarily low. Suppose S has a friend who is generally trustworthy; intuitively, S
can gain knowledge through testimony from her friend. However, we may so
reduce the chances of S winning the lottery, that the probability of her winning is
39 This solution is not available to Goldman, since we are assuming that he should drop the normative
element of the Rule of Belief and hope that its work can be done by other aspects of the definition. It
seems clear that in this case at least the hope will be born out: by the Rule of Attention, her parents'
attempted deception raises to salience a possibility of error that S cannot exclude.
40 Cohen 1988, Lewis 1996.
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lower than the probability that her friend is lying (we may suppose that the chance
the friend is wrong is 1/104, while the chance of winning the lottery is 1/107). An
account which ties warrant purely to metaphysical probability will have difficulty
explaining how in the lottery case S does not have knowledge, while in the
testimony case she does. But on the contextualist account matters are
straightforward: for each ticket, there is a possibility in which it wins; before the
winner is drawn, each of these possibilities resembles each other perfectly as far as S
is concerned; so either all of these possibilities are relevant or none is; but one of the
possibilities is actual, and may not be ignored; so none of them may be ignored;
hence S does not know she will lose.41 In contrast, the rules of Reliability, Method
and Conservatism allow S to ignore, albeit defeasibly, the possibility that her friend
is mistaken, and so her fallible friend can be a source of knowledge.
Finally, we return to the sceptical argument which Dretske's zoo example
instantiates, once the principle of closure is sustained. The general form of the
argument is given by DeRose (for some ordinary proposition O (in Dretske's case: I
see a zebra), and some sceptical proposition H (in Dretske's case: I see a mule
cleverly painted to look like a zebra)):
(i) I don't know not-H
(ii) If I don't know not-H, then I don't know O.
So, (iii) I don't know O.42
According to Lewis's rules for proper ignoring, the very mention of H in (i) brings
H to our attention; hence by the Rule of Attention H is not properly ignored: hence
H is relevant. And while H is relevant, (iii) is true: for there is a relevant situation
in which whatever process generates our belief in O produces a false belief, hence
41 This solution from Lewis 1996: 557.
42 DeRose 1995: 1.
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Q(ii) fails, and that process is not reliable in the context generated by our attribution
of knowledge.43
As we have noted, Lewis's solution mirrors Stine's in this respect: while H is
not relevant, O is known and hence, by closure, H is known. But as noted in
connection with Stine's account, it can seem counterintuitive to hold that
possibilities can be known while they are ignored. Lewis's account of
contextualism, however, addresses this problem. Lewis points out that knowledge
gained through ignoring possibilities is absolutely tenuous: merely mentioning the
possibility serves to dispel the knowledge.
Do I claim you can know P just by presupposing it?! Do I claim you can know
that a possibility W does not obtain just by ignoring it? Is that not what my
analysis implies, provided that the presupposing and the ignoring are proper?
Well, yes. And yet I do not claim it. Or rather, I do not claim it for any specified
P or W. I have to grant, in general, that knowledge just by presupposing and
ignoring is knowledge; but it is an especially elusive sort of knowledge, and
consequently is it an unclaimable sort of knowledge. You do not even have to
practise epistemology to make it vanish. Simply mentioning any particular case
of this knowledge, aloud or in silent thought, is a way to attend to the hitherto
ignored possibility, and thereby render it no longer ignored, and thereby create a
context in which it is no longer true to ascribe the knowledge in question to
yourself or others. So, just as we should think, presuppositions alone are not a
basis on which to claim knowledge.44
In general, the more possibilities we can rule out, and the less possibilities we have
to exclude by ignoring, the more robust our knowledge will be. Thus, relying on
testimony from some authoritative source may be an efficient way of gaining
knowledge, but the knowledge so gained can easily be undermined. By reflecting
on and finding out more about what the authority said, we are able to rule out more
possibilities for ourselves, and so our knowledge becomes more stable. This is a
consequence of Lewis's account43, and also seems to reflect the behaviour of
43 The form of the example is taken from DeRose 1995, the solution from Lewis 1996. DeRose's own
solution is analogous to Lewis's; but Lewis's account has the advantage that it is meant as a general
theory of knowledge: DeRose's account is more narrowly directed against scepticism.
44 Lewis 1996: 562.
45 Ibid.
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knowledge in real situations. Knowledge through presupposing and ignoring
seems to be a limiting case of this phenomenon: it is maximally unstable
knowledge. The apparent continuity between the everyday phenomenon of the
instability of knowledge, and the strange phenomenon of knowledge through
ignoring, helps to render the latter less strange.
Problems for contextualism
The contextualist strategy has a lot to recommend it, and gives a plausible account
of the knowledge that the closure principle requires we have of presupposed
propositions. Further, by allowing simplification of Goldman's account it deflects
much of the force of the criticism that his account does not capture the intuitive
intension of the concept of knowledge. But contextualism is not without problems,
and these should not go unremarked. I do not propose to give fully worked-out
solutions to these problems; some key issues and problems, with sketches of
suggested solutions where possible, are as follows. We will conclude with a
discussion of whether the contextualist strategy is really open to naturalists.
(1) As we have already seen in the case of knowledge through presupposing
and ignoring, the adoption of contextualism requires that we slightly adjust some of
our peripheral intuitions about knowledge. Some further adjustments are also
required. Lewis considers the question of how it is possible to act rationally
without knowledge: imagine two epistemologists out on a walk while discussing
distant uneliminated possibilities of error which, since by discussing them they are
thereby attending to them, undermine all their knowledge.46 Nevertheless, they
continue to be able to navigate on the walk, and since they are able to navigate, it
seems apt to say that they know where they are. Lewis suggests that we adopt the
view that subjects are compartmentalised, allowing us to distinguish between what
the philosophical compartments of the two walkers know, and what the navigation
46 Ibid.: 564.
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compartments know. If we allow that it is only their philosophical compartments
which are attending to distant uneliminated possibilities of error, we can allow that
their navigation compartments still know where they are. This raises the question
of what the whole compartmentalised thinker knows; a natural response would be
to say that the overall thinker knows p just in case one of her compartments knows
p, but as Lewis points out, this will raise new doubts about the principle of the
closure of knowledge over known implication. For, one of S's compartments may
know p, another know p entails q, and no compartment know q.i? Lewis's preferred
solution is to treat each of the overall thinker's compartments as a different subject,
and so to say that the overall compartmentalised thinker both knows and does not
know where they are. On this view, overall thinkers are treated as composed of
many subjects; whether this idea is ultimately plausible will require further work.
(2) As Lewis points out, the Rule of Resemblance requires a seeming ad hoc
exception.
We must apply the Rule of Resemblance with care. Actuality is a possibility
uneliminated by the subject's evidence. Any other possibility W that is likewise
uneliminated by the subject's evidence thereby resembles actuality in one salient
respect: namely, in respect of the subject's evidence. That will be so even if W is
in other respects very dissimilar to actuality - even if, for instance, it is a
possibility in which the subject is radically deceived by a demon. Plainly we
dare not apply the Rules of Actuality and Resemblance to conclude that any such
W is a relevant alternative - that would be capitulation to scepticism. The Rule of
Resemblance was never meant to apply to this resemblance! We seem to have an
ad hoc exception to the Rule, though one which makes good sense in view of the
function of attributions of knowledge. What would be better, though, would be
to find a way to reformulate the Rule so as to get the needed exception without
ad hocery. I do not know how to do this.48
This seems unfortunate. One way of responding to it might be to appeal to
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one knows. The problem arises in the first place because Lewis allows that S's
evidence can be the same in two situations, W, and W2, which are radically different
in terms of what S knows. Similarity in point of evidence is meant to make the
radically different situation relevant, and so create it as a possibility of error which
cannot be excluded. The ad hoc exception to the Rule of Resemblance is just that we
assert that resemblance between W, and W2 in point of evidence alone need not
make these two situations relevant to each other. But this ad hoc exception might
not be needed if we accept the evidence=knowledge thesis. If
evidence=knowledge, the fact that S's evidence is invariant across W, and W2 entails
that S's knowledge is invariant also. If S's knowledge is invariant then all the
propositions that S knows in W, are true in W2; therefore W2 does not represent an
unexcluded possibility of error.49
This solution, however, is bought that the cost of the possibility of giving a
reductive analysis of knowledge in Lewis's terms. For Lewis, S's evidence is
identified with the S's total perceptions and memory at a given time: S's evidence is
the same between two situations just in case S's total perceptions and memory are
the same in those situations.50 Lewis wants to use this concept of evidence as part of
a reductive definition of the concept of knowledge, and so cannot adopt the
evidence as knowledge thesis on pain of circularity. It may be, however, that
Lewis's account does not avoid circularity in any case: we will shortly discuss
whether the rules for relevance can properly be considered able to contribute to a
reductive definition of knowledge. Putting this on one side, though, the evidence
as knowledge thesis still seems unable to solve the problem for the Rule of
Resemblance, since the two situations - actual, and sceptical scenario - will still
resemble each other in point of evidence in Lewis's sense. Ultimately, then, it is not
really clear how to respond to the problem without the ad hoc exception.
(3) Schiffer has objected that the semantics of knowledge attributions implied
by contextualism is at odds with the way such attributions ordinarily work." We
49 Williamson 1995.
50 Lewis: 1996: 553.
51 Schiffer 1996.
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can illustrate the problem by returning to the sceptical argument form instantiated
by Dretske's Zoo scenario.
(i) I don't know -H
(ii) If I know O then I know -H
(iii) I don't know O.
As we've seen, according to contextualism, the sceptical problem posed by this
argument is dissolved once we realise that the standard required to have
knowledge (that is: the background of relevant alternatives against which our
processes must be infallible if they are to warrant the beliefs they produce) shifts
between (i) and (iii). (ii) is true for any fixed standard; and if we hold the standards
fixed, either (i) will be false (for a relaxed standard) or (i) and (iii) will both be true
(for a strict standard) - though once the standard relaxes again, we will regain our
knowledge of O. Contextualism explains how the standard can shift: it is the mere
mentioning of -H at (i), which, by the Rule of Attention, makes a situation in which
H is true relevant, and so creates it as a possibility which cannot be excluded.
Schiffer holds that this account fails to explain why the sceptical paradox
seemed paradoxical in the first place. Numerous expressions have context-
dependent meaning, but fluent speakers have no difficulty in recognising the
context-dependence, nor in grasping what context is in force on a given occasion of
utterance. This being so, it is at least odd that - if the contextualist is right - the
context dependence of knowledge has gone unnoticed for so long, and that
speakers have so much difficulty realising what context is in force when utterances
like (i) and (iii) are made.
What the contextualist needs to give is a fully worked out account of the
semantics of knowledge attribution sentences which captures the indexical nature
of such sentences, and explains how fluent speakers can be confused by them.
Schiffer considers three ways in which such an account might be developed."2
Hidden indexical account. This assimilates knowledge attribution sentences to
sentences such as "it's raining" or "he's short" which contain "unarticulated
52 Ibid.: 326.
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constituents"53. These are "propositional constituents which aren't part of the
semantic values of any terms in the uttered sentence."54
Thus, an utterance of "It's raining" might express the proposition that it's raining
in London, and an utterance of "He's short" might express the proposition that so-
and-so is short for an NBA centre.
If we adopt the hidden indexical account, we must take it that sentences with the
surface form "S knows p" express propositions of the form "S knows p relative to
background of relevant alternatives N"."5
Indexical verb account. This builds the context-sensitivity of knowledge
attribution sentences directly into the verb "to know". On this account, the verb
itself is indexical; an assertion of "S knows p" expresses the proposition "S knowsN
p", where N gives the background of relevant alternatives against which S is said to
know and is determined by the context of utterance.
Vagueness account. Schiffer takes it that the verb "to know" is vague, and that
the degree of vagueness of a term can vary with conversational purposes.
The verb "to know", like virtually every expression, is vague, and there is a
certain context variability inherent in vagueness. The penumbras of vague terms
can dilate or constrict according to conversational purposes.5"
None of these accounts, he holds, give a satisfactory explanation of how
fluent speakers could be unaware of the context-dependence of knowledge-claims.
Each account seems to entail that the context-sensitivity be obvious to the speaker;
since it is not obvious, Schiffer argues, we must reject these as accounts of the
semantics of knowledge attribution sentences. Schiffer infers that the contextualist
account is unworkable, and concludes that there is no solution to sceptical
paradoxes such as the one above. These paradoxes, he holds, arise because of a
53
Perry 1986.
54 Schiffer 1996: 326.
55 This formulation is changed from Schiffer's: Schiffer writes that the proposition expressed is: "S
knows p relative to standard N", for he is discussing a version if contextualism - DeRose's - which
differs from the account offered by Lewis.
56 Ibid. : 327.
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deep-seated incoherence in our concept of knowledge. One element of the concept
of knowledge allows us to take the evidence of our senses as constituting
knowledge; but another element, acquired late in cognitive maturity, requires that
we cannot object to the sceptic by appealing to the very knowledge that the sceptic
calls into question.57 Sceptical scenarios have force because they bring these two
elements into acute conflict.
Schiffer's objection can perhaps be challenged. The key point he makes is
that contextualism implausibly requires that fluent speakers be unable to recognise
the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution claims, nor be able to determine
what context is in force on a given occasion of attribution. But we should note we
do not require that fluent speakers be absolutely infallible with respect to their own
language. Consider the following sentence: the father of the Pharaoh's daughter is the
mother of the Pharaoh's son. Most people have difficulty in recognising that there is a
reading of it on which it is trivially true.58 There are many other related examples.
The analogy between lexical illusions and sceptical scenarios is not perfect
by any means: a key difference concerns the phenomenology associated with
having the solution to the problems pointed out. In the case of lexical illusions,
once the correct reading is indicated, it is normal for all sense of mystery to vanish.
This is not so clearly the case with sceptical scenarios: one can be led to accept a
solution, but still feel a "pull" towards scepticism when the scenario is described.
One way in which the objection to our response to Schiffer might be met is
to suggest that our capabilities themselves can be undermined in certain contexts:
excessive attention to how we perform an action can leave us temporarily unable to
perform it. Epistemology classes are contexts in which we focus our attention on
the way we understand attributions of knowledge: perhaps this attention is
57 Schiffer suggests that it is this bar against begging the question against the sceptic which explains
why we are inclined to agree that we do not know that sceptical scenarios do not obtain. In claiming
this he breaks with analyses which explain the lack of knowledge by reference to the insensitivity of
one's belief that the sceptical scenario does not obtain (S's belief in p is insensitive iff S would believe
p even if p were false: Cf.: Nozick 1981, DeRose 1995). Schiffer points out that the appeal to
insensitivity seems insufficient to explain why we do not know that sceptical scenarios do not obtain,
for let p be the following proposition: I am not a Brain in a Vat being caused to hallucinate that I am
on a Spanish cruise. I know p\ and yet my belief in p is insensitive: I would still believe p even if it
were false.
58 The father (of the Pharaoh's daughter) is the (mother of the Pharaoh's) son.
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excessive, and in these contexts our ability to spot the "correct reading" of sceptical
scenarios is undermined. This might explain why the sceptical scenarios still feel
compelling even after the contextualist solution has been pointed out to us. Outside
the context of the epistemology class we no longer focus our attention on the way
we use the concept of knowledge and, as Hume pointed out, are no longer troubled
by scepticism.
These suggestions are very vague. A full response to Schiffer would require
giving a detailed semantics for knowledge attribution sentences, and I am unable to
do such a thing here. However, very tentatively, I suggest that the preceding
observations regarding context-sensitivity of abilities and the existence of linguistic
illusions leave us with some reason to think that such an account might be
developed.
Nonreductive naturalism
A final doubt we must consider concerns whether the account of relevance
developed here is naturalistically acceptable. We have already noted that the Rule
of Belief requires that what a subject ought to consider relevant may not be properly
ignored, and that this renders Lewis's account of relevance unacceptable to
Goldman as it stands. However, it seems reasonable for the naturalist to hope that
the normative clause in the Rule of Belief can be dropped and the strain taken by
other parts of the definition of knowledge. But this worry is comparatively minor.
A deeper worry concerns whether we have really excluded the concept of
knowledge in giving our contextualist process-reliabilist analysis: although the
concept of knowledge does not explicitly appear in the analysans of (£2), there is
still a nagging worry: perhaps we don't really understand the analysans any better
than we understand the analysandum.
Consider, once again, the fake barns case: we can imagine a series of cases,
ranging from one in which S is looking at a real barn and there is no nearby
(counterfactually speaking) situation in which the barn she is looking at is fake; and
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ascending to case G, where S is looking at a real barn but there is a very close
possibility in which the barn is fake. At the end of the series corresponding to case
G, we deny that S knows; at the other extreme, we allow that S knows; at some
point as we ascend the series we cross a threshold beyond which the possibility that
she sees a fake is sufficiently high for us to deny, by appeal to the Rule of
Resemblance, that she has knowledge. It does not seem possible for us to determine
where that point is with any accuracy, but this reflects a vagueness in our
attributions of knowledge and is not serious. However, it seems that the analysis
does no work in reducing this vagueness. Presented with a case taken from some
point on the series, we consult our intuitions about knowledge to decide whether S
knows in that case, and it is based on our intuitions about knowledge that we
decide whether the fake barn situation is relevant in that case. The intuitions about
knowledge are primary.
The problem here is not that someone who was not versed in a relevant-
alternatives account of knowledge would be able to pass judgement on whether S
knew in some case drawn from the series without the benefit of being able to apply
the concept of relevance. Such a consideration does not constitute a serious
objection to a proposed analysis, for analyses of concepts are not in general meant
to be easier to work with than the concept unanalysed. There are two standard
motivations for conceptual analyses: one is a hope for increased precision
concerning the conditions of application of the target concept; the other is a desire
for reduction of the concept in terms of some privileged set of terms. The problem
is that the analysis of knowledge in terms of relevance seems to do neither of these.
The consideration of the series of barn cases suggests that the analysis does no work
in clarifying the boundaries of application of the concept of knowledge. I can think
of no cases where my indecision over whether the concept of knowledge applies
can be resolved by appeal to the analysis in (£2). Worse, it is simply not clear that
the account is reductive. Many of the Rules for relevance are hedged, that is, they
contain clauses specifying that they only obtain defeasibly. Further, the Rule of
Resemblance appeals to salient resemblance, and standards for salience are allowed
to vary. But we are not given any rules governing the application of defeasibility
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conditions, or the variation of standards for salient resemblance; and it might be
suggested that no reductive clarification can be given on these issues: that is, that
our ability to apply the Rules presupposes that we grasp the concept of knowledge.
If this is the case then an analysis of knowledge in terms of relevance will not, in
fact, be reductive. Although the concept of knowledge does not explicitly appear in
the analysans, it is there implicitly: the Rules tacitly appeal to the concept of
knowledge in the idea of defeasibility and shifting of standards for salience, and
cannot be used to reduce that concept.
Faced with this, it seems that reliabilists must choose between four options,
none of which is palatable. The first option would be to abandon the attempt to
give a relevant alternatives account of reliability, and to find some altogether
different solution to the problem of external defeaters. It is not at all clear what this
solution would be.
The second option would be to maintain that the concept of relevance is in
fact suitable for giving a reductive account of the concept of knowledge. This
would require working to show that the normative element in the Rule of Belief can
indeed be dropped, and that the application of the hedged Rules is governed by
suitably non-epistemic, non-normative principles. It is not clear whether there is
any serious prospect for success here; the chief reason for adopting this option
would be dismay at the other prospects on offer.
The final two options both involve resigning oneself to the impossibility of
providing a reductive definition of knowledge. We should note that to accept that
the concept of knowledge cannot be reduced is not automatically to give up on the
possibility of providing a naturalistic account of it. For it is a brute fact that not all
concepts must be reducible if they are to be legitimately employed. To deny this
would be to commit oneself to a vicious infinite regress of conceptual analyses.
Botterill and Carruthers suggest that the implausibility of requiring reduction in
general motivates the view that the concepts of natural science do not have to be
reduced to be acceptable.
[W]e should accept that the existence of a variety of special sciences is a
permanent, irreducible, part of our world view, reflecting the way in which the
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natural world is organised in terms of laws and principles operating at different
levels of generality. And then all we need to do in order to naturalise some
property, is show that it figures in the laws of some or other special science, in
whose persistence we have good reason to believe.59
Recall the two parameters governing what can be treated as scientifically
acceptable, given in chapter four. To adopt Botterill and Carruthers's position is to
take a permissive stance on the first parameter: it is to accept properties of high
level sciences without requiring their reduction. However, a permissive stance here
will not be sufficient to allow a nonreduced concept of knowledge to be
naturalistically acceptable, for it seems plausible to say that knowledge is not a
property which figures in the laws of any natural science. If we are to render the
idea of unreduced knowledge naturalistically acceptable we will have to take a
permissive stance on the second parameter, and allow that knowledge, though not
currently part of any scientific theory, has the potential to be so. But, as we have
already noted, longstanding metaphysical commitments bar us from allowing
unreduced appeal to normative concepts in science, and an unreduced concept of
knowledge would be norm-laden. The third option to available to reliabilists, then,
is to reconsider the injunction against allowing normative concepts in science.60 If
this seems too implausible, the only remaining option seems to be to eliminate the
concept of knowledge entirely. But this final option is, in effect, an abandonment of
the project of the naturalist project to reconcile denial of the autonomy of
philosophy from science with acceptance of a meliorative role for epistemology.61
The eliminativist strategy seems to be nothing less than adoption of the idea of
epistemology as pure description, an idea that even Quine, its progenitor, finds
unappealing.
I cannot adjudicate between these four possibilities here; nor is it clear which
way the traditional naturalist should turn. The traditional naturalist must certainly
69 Botterill and Carruthers 1999: 186.
60
Biology is the most plausible candidate for a science which deals with normative concepts.
Biological norms are standardly analysed reductively using the concept of natural selection: a trait has
a function just in case there has been selection for that trait to perform that function in the past.
Whether such a reductive account is tenable is controversial (Cf. Walsh 1998, 2000).
61 See chapter four.
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reject the fourth option, since they want to retain the meliorative role of
epistemology; the second option is most in accord with their principles, but we
have not seen that it has any obvious chance of success; to adopt the first option is
really to resign oneself to despair; and it is not clear where the third option will
lead. For the purposes of this thesis, however, we should note that only the fourth
option gives us reason to doubt the compatibility of a priori knowledge and
naturalism. The fourth option requires the rejection of a priori knowledge because
it requires the rejection of knowledge itself; but while the traditional naturalist
holds out the hope of giving a naturalistic analysis of knowledge, they seem to have
no special reason to reject a priori knowledge.
Conclusion
Once we had established that all warrant, a priori or not, is infallible, the challenge
became to show that a naturalistic account of knowledge could be given at all. This
chapter, and the preceding one, have discussed the problems associated with this
project. We have been seeking to take the core features of Goldman's reliable
process theory of knowledge, augment them with an account of relevance, and so
arrive at an acceptable theory. It turned out that the determination of what is
relevant depends on the context of attribution of knowledge, and we raised doubts
as to whether such a contextualist theory of relevance allowed us to give a properly
reductive account of the concept of knowledge.
Our final position is as follows. Traditional naturalism maintains that it is
possible to combine a view of philosophy as being constrained by science with a
belief that epistemology can play a meliorative role in improving our epistemic
practices. If this is tenable, it must be shown that the concept of knowledge is
naturalistically acceptable: this is standardly taken to require a reductive definition
of the concept of knowledge, and reliabilism is normally taken to offer the best
chance of giving such an account. Our recent considerations indicate that the
reliabilist strategy does not seem likely to be able to provide a reductive definition
of knowledge. This poses serious problems for the project of traditional naturalism:
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the only prospect for success consistent with the fundamental aims of traditional
naturalism seems to be to reconsider whether the concept of knowledge can figure
unreduced in scientific theories. Failing that, traditional naturalism will have to be
abandoned. However, what we have not seen is any reason to doubt whether a
priori knowledge can be accommodated within the framework of traditional
naturalism, assuming that that project can be sustained. For the purposes of the
following, final chapter, we will assume that the project of traditional naturalism
can be sustained, and that there is some naturalistically acceptable notion of
knowledge available to serve as the basis of a definition of a priori knowledge. We





Chapter five opened with a discussion of the options available to us in giving an
account of experience-independence. Since setting out the options we have been
arguing that it is inappropriate to characterise apriority by requiring unrevisability
of a priori knowledge, or infallibility of a priori warrants but not of warrants in
general. A priori knowledge and warrants do not differ in point of unrevisability or
infallibility from knowledge and warrants in general.
Only the minimal notion of experience-independence remains undiscussed.
On this account, a belief forming process is experience-independent just in case it
has only nonexperiential inputs. A belief is warranted a priori just in case it is
produced by an appropriate process which takes only nonexperiential inputs. The
goal of this thesis is to defend the claim that there is no reason for traditional
naturalists to be sceptical about a priori knowledge; this goal would have been
served should we stop here, drawing only the negative conclusion that if we wish
to defend naturalistic apriorism we had better be appropriately circumspect in our
claims about the nature of a priori knowledge and a priori warrant.1 But a more
satisfying conclusion would go further and address some of the problems that must
be faced by an account of a priori knowledge given in terms only of the minimal
notion of experience-independence. Such is the goal of this final chapter. The
discussion will necessarily be incomplete: while we can make some general
observations about the reliabilist conception of nonexperientiality, a full treatment
of the problem would require nothing less than giving a worked-out theory of
minimal apriority (that is: a priori knowledge cashed out only in terms of the
minimal notion of experience-independence). And the task of giving such a theory
is daunting, even once the pitfalls associated with misguided theories of experience-
independence are put behind us. I will discuss only two recent theories of the a
1 Such circumspection would undermine Devitt's doubts about the possibility of naturalised apriorism
(Devitt 1998), and also allow us to evade Kitcher's scepticism about apriorism in mathematics (Kitcher
1983 - discussed in chapters four and five of this thesis).
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priori; theories which, though they offer some interesting observations about
apriorism naturalised, do not supply us with a full and working account of
naturalistic a priori knowledge. Such an account has yet to be offered; the goal of
this thesis will have been achieved if some of the obstacles in the way of an account
have been identified and cleared aside.
Explaining "nonexperiential"
On the minimal notion, experience-independence is analysed in terms of
nonexperientiality. On this account, a token belief forming process is experience-
independent just in case it has only nonexperiential inputs.2 Let us say that a
(token) belief forming process which meets this condition is a nonexperiential belief
forming process. The corresponding minimal notion of a priori warrant is: a belief
is warranted a priori just in case it is produced by an appropriate nonexperiential
belief forming process. A belief is known a priori just in case it is a priori
warranted. The central question for a minimal, naturalist, theory of a priori
knowledge is: what is it for an input to a process to be nonexperiential? Before
addressing this, however, we should mention, if only to reject, a salient alternative
in explaining "nonexperiential".
The alternative is to characterise a process as nonexperiential just in case no
experiences were needed to produce that process: in the terminology of higher order
processes3, this would be to require that the higher order belief forming process
which produced the belief be itself nonexperiential. It is not at all clear whether this
account will work: for one thing, the proposed analysis, a belief forming process is
2 The sense of "nonexperiential" in which we are chiefly interested in a property of process tokens.
This is primarily because we are interested in whether a token belief is warranted nonexperientially,
and what warrants a belief is a token process. There is a sense of "nonexperiential" which applies to
process types - for example, the process (type) of mental arithmetic is presumably nonexperiential -
but by focusing on the level of types we would also be ignoring the possibility that tokens of
experiential process types can produce a priori warranted beliefs. For example, vision is an
experiential process, but we might think, with Kant, that certain instantiations of that process type can
generate a priori warranted beliefs about geometry. I will not explicitly discuss such cases, but we
should not rule them out by treating experientiality as a type-level property.
3 See chapters seven and eight.
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nonexperiential just in case it was brought about by a nonexperiential higher order process,
has the term "nonexperiential" on both sides, and so does not have much potential
to explain "nonexperiential". Further, it seems to commit us to an infinite regress of
higher order nonexperiential processes. And, finally, there can be little doubt that,
say, teaching can be effective in setting up processes which confer a priori warrant:
one can be taught mathematical procedures which will enable one to arrive at a
priori knowledge. But the process of being taught, which is here operating as a
second-order belief forming process, is experiential. So it is not the case that a
process is nonexperiential only if it was produced by a nonexperiential higher order
process. We will not discuss this option further.
We return to the initial suggestion, on which nonexperientiality is linked to
the status of the inputs to a process. This approach to explaining
"nonexperientiality" is very natural, for it is standard to characterise processes by
their typical inputs. So, the visual belief forming process is so-called because it
takes in visual information; the memory belief forming process is so-called because
it takes in stored memories. Standard practice, then, would support the view that
we characterise a belief forming process as nonexperiential just in case it takes
nonexperiential inputs, "a is a nonexperiential process" seems definable using a
three clause recursive definition, as follows (for token belief forming process a, and
belief p):
(1) If a produces a belief in p on the basis of no inputs, then a is a
nonexperiential process
(2) If a produces a belief in p on the basis of only beliefs produced by a
nonexperiential process then a is a nonexperiential process
(3) Nothing else is a nonexperiential process.
Unfortunately, we need to say more than this, because there seem to be cases
where nonexperiential belief forming processes just do take in beliefs produced by
experiential processes in the process of producing nonexperientially warranted
beliefs. For example: S buys seven apples and five pears, and concludes that she
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has bought twelve pieces of fruit; here it looks as if the a priori process of addition
has taken as input some experiences and produced an experiential belief. But this
will seem a problem only for as long as we refuse to separate out the different
processes at work in the formation of S's conclusion; the task for the defender of
naturalistic a priori knowledge is to indicate how the different processes might be
distinguished. A different side to the same problem is set out forcefully by
Goldman. Goldman reminds us that many of the processes we take to provide a
priori knowledge, such as mathematical and geometrical reasoning, do require
experiential inputs if they are to produce warranted belief.
Here is an argument for disputing the general knowability of logic without
perception. Note first that in actual practice logicians learn logical truths by
reading the proofs others have constructed, and constructing their own proofs
with pencil and paper. These activities involve perception. The a priorist would
contend, however, that perceptual reliance on inscriptions is in principle
dispensable. One could, in principle, frame all the relevant representations in
the mind. But is this true? Do human cognitive capacities enable one to
construct, or follow, a complex proof in the mind with sufficient reliability to
qualify for knowledge? That is doubtful. It is universally acknowledged that
short-term, or working, memory is limited in capacity. When this capacity is
exceeded, error rates increase sharply. It seems likely, therefore, that many
phases (even single steps) of a truly complex proof will involve more material
that can reliably be maintained in working memory. Therefore, a logical truth
whose proof involves that degree of complexity can only be known with the help
of external inscriptions, hence, only with the help of perception.4
Goldman concludes that there is no a priori knowledge. The challenge he poses for
the apriorist is to give an account of nonexperiential processes which allows a
certain role for experience in producing beliefs. This problem is, as just noted,
closely related to the "apples and pears" problem given above. In the "apples and
pears" case the experiential input triggers off the processes which result in S's belief
about her total shopping; in the Goldman case of using visual aids to the processes,
the experiences sustain the process as it runs. The common feature is that in both
cases we need to show that the fact that the process seems to have experiential
inputs does not render that process experiential.
4 Goldman 1986: 301-2.
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Goldman does allow that there are simple mathematical, logical and
conceptual truths, beliefs in which can be warranted on the basis of wholly
nonexperiential processes. One response to Goldman's challenge, therefore, would
be to retreat on the scope of our claims to a priori knowledge: to limit the processes
which we will consider a priori warrant-conferring to just those processes which
clearly meet the definition of nonexperiential process given above. This, though,
would be to concede too much. There is a strong intuition that the simple,
undisputed cases of a priori knowledge have significant commonalties with
complex, more problematic cases: the intuition can be expressed as follows: even in
the complex cases where we have to use experiences to achieve a warranted belief,
the experiences are in some sense incidental. This intuition lies at the core of our
concept of a priori knowledge, and should not be given up lightly. Our problem,
then, is to explain how it is that an experience can be incidental to the operation of a
process. There seem to be two possibilities open to us.
(i) We could say that experience is incidental to the operation of a belief
forming process just in case, although we have to use experience to gain warranted
beliefs from the process, an idealised subject could gained warranted belief from
that process without such use of experience. Our need for visual aids, etc., is put
down to the limits of our powers of attention and visualisation; an idealised subject,
it is proposed, has no such limits, and can know anything knowable a priori
without such experiential aids. Experience, then, is incidental to the operation of a
process a just in case an idealised subject could have gained warranted belief from
a without experience.
But this appeal to an idealised subject is unconvincing. We should reflect
that we don't really know what cognitive powers an idealised subject would have:
we have no grasp of what an idealised subject could know a priori that is
independent of our intuitions about our own a priori knowledge. Our assumption
that an idealised subject could not know, say, physical laws a priori is based on the
assumption that experience is not incidental to the process of coming to know such
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things.5 We assume that the idealised subject has a priori knowledge in just those
areas where experience is incidental: but then the specification of the cognitive
capacities of the idealised subject contains an appeal to the notion of the
"incidentality" of experience and cannot explain it. Further, even if an idealised
subject could know p a priori, it would not obviously follow that we know it a
priori. So it seems that the notion of an idealised subject cannot help us to
understand what it is for an experience to be incidental.
(ii) A more promising way of explaining "incidentality" would be via the
suggestion that the experience of a diagram, a written note, a number of apples and
pears, etc., in the a priori warranting of a belief, is just a cue for the initiation or
sustaining of a properly nonexperiential process. As a first approximation, let us
say, following Kim6, that an experience is a cue for a process just in case the having
of that experience is causally relevant to the operation of the process, but not
epistemically relevant to the status of the belief produced. Although the notion of a
cue is widely adopted7, it so far merely reformulates the problem: to make progress,
we need to know how an experience can be causally but not epistemically relevant
to the formation of a belief. Understanding how this is possible seems especially
difficult from the perspective of a naturalised epistemology which ties the epistemic
status of a belief to its method of production. There might not, at first, seem to be
room within such an account for a notion of a cue functioning in the way in which
Kim requires.
Since we have defined "nonexperiential process" in terms of the inputs to
processes, if we are to make sense of the idea of a nonexperiential process having an
experiential cue we must not treat the cue as a genuine input: we need to find a way
to allow cues to be causally relevant to the nonexperiential process without being
5 Goethe, for example, apparently thought that physical laws were knowable a priori through a process
of visualisation (Bortoft 1996); to appeal to an idealised subject in disputing his claim would be to do
no more than appeal to our intuition that such empirical facts cannot be known a priori. Incidentally,
the claim that such empirical facts cannot be known a priori is cast in doubt by the possibility of innate
a priori knowledge, which we will shortly discuss.
6 Kim 1981: 344, 350.
7 For example: Kant's notion of mathematical intuition, Chisholm's account of the role of experience in
"intuitive induction" (Chisholm 1977: 39), and Kitcher's idea of a sufficient life (Kitcher 1983), are all
ways of assigning experience the role of a cue.
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inputs to it. The distinction we need to appeal to seems to be that between a
process and the casual background against which it takes place. We have already
had occasion to appeal to this distinction, without commitment to a specific theory
of causation which validates it. In chapter five we accepted that a bin fire in a
building would not have caused a conflagration if the building had been flooded
with water, without committing ourselves to saying that the non-floodedness of the
building was a cause of the conflagration. However, we should also note that the
non-floodedness of the building is causally connected in some way to the
conflagration - indeed, assuming that all events have a common cause in the Big
Bang, it seems that all events will be indirectly causally connected to each other. If
this is right, then the non-floodedness of the building is causally connected to the
conflagration without being a cause of the conflagration. This sort of distinction
seems apt for explaining the notion of a cue. Tentatively, let us say that an event e is
a cue for a process a just in case e is a prominent event in the near causal
background to a, causally relevant to, but not an input to, a.
Whenever a specific event is claimed to be a cue there will be a temptation to
say that it was in fact a genuine causal input; but it may be that disagreement here
is really disagreement over the way the process in question should be individuated.
For example, a tiny keystone is removed from a bridge, resulting in it collapsing,
and crushing an object beneath it. If we focus on the crushing of the object itself,
the removal of the keystone will appear as a cue: it is causally relevant to the
crushing of the object but not an input into the process-of-crushing (the keystone
itself did not actually crush the object, the bridge did). If we widen our perspective,
the removal of the keystone may start to look like a cause of the crushing: perhaps
the object was a police car, and Don Juan collapsed the bridge to thwart the police
by crushing their car. Here we may want to say that the removal of the keystone
was a cause of the crushing of the car, but we are now individuating the processes
differently. Another example: the waving of a flag signals a driver of a train to
leave the station. Again, if we focus on the process instantiated by the train's
departure, we may say that the waving of the flag was a just a cue: it was the driver
who caused the train to leave the station by pressing the accelerator. From a wider
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perspective, the flag may, say, be considered a cause of the process of the train
leaving on time. So, whether an event counts as a cue or as a causal input into a
process will depend on our criteria for appropriate individuation, but this does not
undermine the idea of a cue: we need some way to individuate processes, and once
we have settled on a way suited to our purposes, some events will count as cues,
others as causes.
This notion of a cue helps us to understand how an experience can be
causally relevant to the production of a belief without bearing on its epistemic
status. The epistemic status of a belief is given by the recursive definition of a
nonexperiential process given earlier. For a belief forming process to count as
nonexperiential we will have to individuate it in such a way that all causally
relevant experiences are counted as cues: they are relegated to the status of
prominent conditions in the near causal background.
On this account, however, it might seem that it is largely a matter of
convention whether we treat an experience as a cue rather than as genuinely
significant to the epistemic status of the output belief. It might seem that an
apriorist would seek an individuation of their candidates for a priori warranting
processes which preserves their nonexperientiality, while an anti-apriorist would
seek to show that input experiences are not merely cues, and that this conflict is
incapable of meaningful resolution. However, while the account of cues just
offered clearly does provide for fluidity in the way processes are individuated, it
would be wrong to claim that whether there are any a priori warranting processes is
purely a matter of convention. For a naturalised epistemologist, the individuation
of belief forming processes will be a matter for cognitive psychology; whether
cognitive psychology will find a place for a priori knowledge will depend primarily
on the theory of minimal apriority which we adopt. Once a working theory has
been found, the question of whether there is a priori knowledge will be decided by
negotiation between that theory and cognitive psychology as a whole, and the
outcome of this process of negotiation cannot be prejudged here. With Rey, I hold
that the question of whether there is a priori knowledge is to an extent an a
212
Nonexperientiality
posteriori question.8 The apriorist may have strong intuitions that there is such
knowledge, but should acknowledge the possibility that cognitive psychology will
reveal that there is just no way to individuate belief forming processes which
renders some of them nonexperiential. Philosophy contributes to this task by
suggesting candidates for nonexperiential belief forming processes - that is, by
offering theories of how a priori knowledge is possible. For the moderate
naturalist, these theories must not appeal to concepts which are not scientifically
acceptable, must not assume that a priori knowledge is unrevisable knowledge, and
must not assume that a priori warrant is infallible in a way that warrant in general
is not. I conclude this thesis by looking at two recent accounts of a priori
knowledge which meet these requirements. The first I find to be unconvincing; the
second I find to raise striking issues about the scope of a priori knowledge
construed naturalistically. Neither of these accounts will receive anything like a full
discussion: I raise them in order to highlight some issues that should be addressed
by future discussions of naturalised a priori knowledge.
Boghossian's implicit definition account
In recent publications, Boghossian has advanced a theory which purports to explain
our a priori knowledge of logic by rehabilitating the concept of analyticity.9
Hitherto, he suggests, philosophers have conflated two separate and independent
notions of analyticity. The analytic explanation of necessity appeals, he suggests, to
a "metaphysical" notion of analyticity, defined as follows:
Sentence A is (metaphysically) analytic iff A's truth value is determined
solely by its meaning, and not by the facts.
Boghossian argues strongly against the analytic theory of necessity, claiming that
the theory is founded on a misunderstanding of the relationship between meaning




Boghossian 1994a, 1996, 1997.
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concept of analyticity, independent of the metaphysical concept, which Boghossian
calls "epistemic analyticity". Roughly speaking, a sentence A which means p is
epistemically analytic just in case: for S to grasp the meaning of A is sufficient for S
to know p. Commitment to the existence of epistemically analytic sentences,
Boghossian thinks, is a concomitant of rejecting the thesis of the indeterminacy of
meaning10; hence, he maintains, philosophers cannot buy into Quine's rejection of
analyticity (where analyticity is taken to be the epistemic notion) while maintaining
that meaning is determinate. After defending the existence of epistemically analytic
sentences in the face of Quinean doubts, Boghossian argues that logic is
epistemically analytic; this is, he holds, because the axioms of logic are implicit
definitions of the logical constants, and he upholds the notion of implicit definition
by distinguishing it from conventionalism and non-factualism about logic. Then,
the implicit definition account of the apriority of logic, in conjunction with the
assumption that synonymy facts are knowable a priori, puts Boghossian in a
position to explain other areas of a priori knowledge by appeal to Frege's account of
analytic truth.
This is Boghossian's proposal in outline11; but we need to look at it more
closely.
The first problem with assessing Boghossian's account of a priori knowledge
is that of getting a clear view of the notion of epistemic analyticity. Boghossian
writes that a sentence A would be epistemically analytic if "mere grasp" of A's
meaning by S "sufficed" for S "being justified in holding" A true.12 We shall take the
idea of "grasping" a meaning as intuitively clear; the same, however, cannot be said
for the idea of "being justified in holding A true"; nor, in view of Boghossian's later
10
Quine 1960 chapter two. There is an extended literature: see for example Miller 1998, Hale and
Wright 1997, Kirk 1986, Hornstein 1982.
" It is a summary of his 1996 and 1997 papers.
12
Boghossian's actual phrasing is as follows:
How could a factual statement S be known a priori by T, without the help of a special evidence-
gathering faculty?
Here, it would seem, is one way: Ifmere grasp ofS's meaning by T sufficed for T'.s being
justified in holding S true.
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comments, for the idea of one condition being "sufficient" for another. We shall
deal with the latter two problems in turn.
In a section devoted to epistemological preliminaries, Boghossian writes:
...we may say that for T to know that p is for T to justifiably hold S true [where S
is a sentence which means p], with a strength sufficient for knowledge, and for S
to be true. And to say that T knows p a priori is to say that T's warrant for
holding S true is independent of outer, sensory experience."
It is clear from this passage that Boghossian takes "warrant" and "justification" to be
interchangeable. This being so, it is appropriate to ask to which single epistemic
concept he intends these terms to refer. We can read Boghossian as implying that
justification/warrant is that property which, had in enough quantity, turns true
belief into knowledge; hence it seems that his justification/warrant is closer to our
concept of warrant than the intuitive concept of justification. However, there are
differences: Boghossian implies that his justification/warrant can be possessed by a
belief, though not in sufficient quantity to turn that belief into knowledge. This
makes it very different from the account adopted in previous chapters, according to
which warrant is a matter of appropriate production: a property which, it seems
plausible, does not admit of degrees. Boghossian also includes a truth clause in his
definition of knowledge; and on our conception of warrant such a clause is otiose.
However: the only place where the concept of justification/warrant enters
Boghossian's account is in the definition of epistemic analyticity; and here it simply
flags whatever positive epistemic status is afforded a proposition subsequent on its
being grasped; moreover, since Boghossian is centrally interested in the epistemic
status of beliefs in logical truths, which are necessarily true, we do not have to
worry about what epistemic property such a belief retains if that belief turns false.
So, as in the summary of Boghossian's account above, we can replace the reference





p will be epistemically analytic just in case: for S to grasp A's meaning is sufficient
for S to know p.
Next: sufficiency. Boghossian's formulation of the definition of epistemic
analyticity suggests strongly that he takes grasp of the meaning of an epistemically
analytic sentence to be a sufficient condition for knowledge of it. This would suggest
that warrant for belief in the proposition expressed by an epistemically analytic
sentence is gained simultaneously with it being grasped. This is a striking claim,
and would clearly be epistemologically significant if it could be made out.
However, Boghossian does not intend "sufficiency" to be read in this sense. For, as
we will see, knowledge of what is expressed by an epistemically analytic sentence is
arrived at by grasping the proposition expressed and making inferences based on it.
Since we may refrain from drawing an inference14 - or even, through conceptual
limitations, be unable to draw it - it cannot be that Boghossian intends "sufficient
condition" by his appeal to sufficiency. That this is correct is clearly brought out by
a reformulation of the notion of epistemic analyticity which Boghossian offers at the
close of his 1997 paper.
My brief here has been to defend epistemic analyticity; and this requires
showing only that certain sentences are such that, if a person knows the relevant
facts about their meaning, then that person will be in a position to form a
justified belief about their truth.1'
The crucial change is the reference to being "in a position" to know. Since the
inferences which mediate between our grasp of the meaning of the epistemically
analytic sentence and our knowledge of it are meant to be a priori (as we will see),
Boghossian must mean, by our being "in a position" to know, that we are in a
position to know without any additional experiential evidence. Hence, fully spelled out,
the definition of epistemic analyticity is as follows:
14 This point depends on our drawing a distinction between an inference and an implication, but that





Sentence A which means p is epistemically analytic iff: no more experience is
required for S to know p than is required for S to grasp p.
This formulation does not, whereas Boghossian's initial formulation seems to, entail
that one knows p if one grasps p. Again, this implication has to be removed because
knowledge of p is arrived at through inferences which one might not make.16 This
formulation also highlights the very close connection between epistemic analyticity
and apriority considered as a property of a proposition. If no more experience is
needed to know p than to grasp p, then p is an a priori proposition. Hence sentence
A which means p is epistemically analytic just in case A expresses an a priori
proposition. So Boghossian's claim to be able to explain areas of our a priori
knowledge by appeal to the concept of epistemic analyticity is tendentious.
Epistemic analyticity can explain a priori knowledge only in a solecistic sense. If
Boghossian does make progress in explaining a priori knowledge, it must be in a
different area of his account.
The potentially interesting part of his account concerns how a sentence
comes to be epistemically analytic. In chapter one we distinguished between the
topic and warrant conceptions of a priori knowledge; on the warrant conception,
which we defended, the notion of an a priori warrant is considered fundamental
and is used to define what it is for a proposition to be a priori. Given a definition of
a priori warrant, we can define what it is for a proposition to be a priori by appeal
to the following equivalence:
16
Boghossian might try to avoid the proposed modification to his account by claiming that, if p is
expressed by an epistemically analytic sentence and is grasped by S, S knows p even where S does not
draw the requisite inferences. This strategy is unlikely to work. First, since one can grasp a
proposition without believing it, one may not even believe p~, hence this strategy requires that we allow
knowledge without belief. Examples of knowledge without belief are rarely convincing: see for
example Goldman's discussions of the Chicken-Sexers and the Bloodsucking Tick in Stich 1975. (The
question of the relationship between knowledge and belief is probably not best approached through
considering isolated examples. Williamson 1995 treats the issue as one of conceptual priority,
suggesting that the concept of knowledge is more fundamental than the concept of belief: belief, he
suggests, might be "botched knowing".) Boghossian could respond by claiming that where p is
expressed by an epistemically analytic sentence and is grasped, p is tacitly believed. An operationalist
notion of belief, such that S believes/? just in case S would assent to p if asked, might seem to support
this: the "obviousness" of the epistemically analytic propositions make them such that S would assent
to them if asked. However, such a notion of belief is very different from the one we actually have:
suppose S believes some universal generalisation, to which there is an obscure counterexample q\ then,




p is a priori iff 03S(S knows p a priori).
As we have seen, Boghossian defines a priori knowledge through reference
to the notion of an experience-independent warrant17: hence it seems he takes the
notion of an a priori warrant to be fundamental. Thus, the claim that a sentence is
epistemically analytic entails, via the second equivalence above, the claim that there
is an experience-independent process available which can warrant beliefs in the
proposition it expresses. What interests us, then, is the nature of this process.
Boghossian's account of a priori knowledge
Immediately before introducing the concept of epistemic analyticity, Boghossian
refers to three classes of statements traditionally thought to be the objects of a priori
knowledge.
...logical statements, exemplified by such truths as:
Either Brutus killed Caesar or he did not;
mathematical statements, such as:
7 + 5 = 12;
and conceptual truths, for instance:
All bachelors are unmarried.
It is not clear whether he takes the contents of these three classes to be exhaustive of
the a priori knowable propositions, though, as we will shortly see, if he does think
this then his account faces problems. In his discussion of epistemic analyticity,
Boghossian makes a significant assumption: he assumes that any explanation of a
17
Boghossian 1997: 333. Quotation reproduced on page 215 of this chapter.
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priori knowledge must appeal to semantic properties of the sentence taken to be
express an a priori proposition.
Turning, then, to the epistemological notion of analyticity, we immediately
confront a serious puzzle: How could any sentence be analytic in this sense?
How could mere grasp of a sentence's meaning justify someone in holding it
true?
Clearly, the answer to this question has to be semantical: something about
the sentence's meaning, or about the way that meaning is fixed, must explain
how its truth is knowable in this special way.18
Boghossian considers two ways in which the way meaning is fixed could make a
proposition a priori. These are: if the proposition is, as he puts it, "Frege-analytic";
or if it is an implicit definition. Boghossian does not consider whether there could
be a third way in which semantic facts could be relevant to a priori knowledge; if
there is a third way, it is certainly not clear what it could be; however, if there is no
third way, Boghossian's account also faces difficulties, as we will see.
The first way in which the way in which meaning is fixed could be relevant
to the epistemic status of a proposition is if that proposition is expressed by a
sentence which is "Frege-analytic": that is, transformable into a logical truth through
intersubstitution of synonyms.18 If both logical truths and synonymy relations are
knowable a priori, propositions expressed by Frege-analytic sentences will be
knowable a priori. If the antecedent of this conditional can be upheld, we will be
able to explain our a priori knowledge of a large class of a priori propositions.
Boghossian says little in defence of his assumption that synonymy relations will be
so knowable, though notes that it is disputed.20 Since the assumption is intuitively
18 Ibid.: 337.
19 The definition of "analytic" given by Frege in Foundations ofArithmetic (Frege 1950).
20
Boghossian writes that on most externalist views of meaning, synonymy facts will not be knowable a
priori (Boghossian 1997: 338): it is not clear that he is right about this. Certainly, causal and
aetiological theories of intentional content have striking consequences for meaning and self-knowledge,
but it is not clear that they force a rejection of the a priori knowability of synonymy facts. This issue is
normally discussed under the heading of externalist self knowledge; much work has gone into showing
that externalism is compatible with privileged self knowledge, see especially Burge 1988, Davidson
1987, Heil 1988, Wright 1994. This having been shown, the issue arises of whether externalism, in
conjunction with the thesis of privileged self knowledge, allows too much a priori knowledge; whether
it allows "privileged access to the world" (Sawyer 1998). The standard formulation of this problem is
219
Nonexperientiality
plausible, we will pass over discussion of it. Clearly, though, an appeal to Frege-
Analyticity is incapable of explaining our a priori knowledge of logic, because the
assumption that Frege-analyticity can explain a priori knowledge depends on the
assumption that logical truths are knowable a priori. Hence, if the appeal to Frege-
analyticity is to be any help, we must provide an alternative explanation of our a
priori knowledge of logic. As noted, Boghossian takes it that any explanation of a
priori knowledge must be semantic, and so turns to the notion of implicit definition
to give the desired account. Before doing so, he gives an extended argument that
the adoption of a sceptical thesis about the existence of Frege-analyticity entails the
adoption of a sceptical thesis about meaning itself. What he says is important and
interesting; however, it is not directly relevant here, and therefore we should turn
immediately to discussion of the core of his theory: the account of the apriority of
logic in terms of implicit definition.
A sentence A is an implicit definition just in case A cannot express a
falsehood without change of language; equivalently, the truth of what A expresses
is constitutive of the meaning of a term that A involves.21 Boghossian notes that it
seems impossible that logical constants could be defined explicitly: any such
definition would presuppose that we had already defined them. Hence, an appeal
to implicit definition seems to be required if we are to define logical constants.
Boghossian endorses the following strategy:
It is by arbitrarily stipulating that certain sentences of logic are to be true, or that
certain inferences are to be valid, that we attach a meaning to the logical
constants. More specifically, a particular constant means that logical object, if
any, which would make valid a specified set of sentences and/or inferences
involving it.22
the Brown-McKinsey argument, of which the first premise asserts that we have a priori self
knowledge. Notably, and contrary to Boghossian's assumption that externalism entails failure of a
priori knowledge of synonymy relations (which would, I am assuming, be closely connected with
failure of a priori self knowledge), most authors accept the first premise of this argument. See,
amongst others, Brown 1995, McKinsey 1991, Brueckner 1992, Boghossian 1997b, Miller 1997,
Sawyer 1998. Discussion of the implications of the discussion of a priori knowledge offered in this






If we adopt the implicit definition strategy as an account of the meanings of logical
constants, then it seems clear how we will account for our a priori knowledge of
logic. Boghossian suggests that the following sort of argument is in place:
(1) If logical constant C is to mean what it does, then argument-form A has to
be valid, for C means whatever logical object in fact makes A valid.
(2) C means what it does.
Therefore,
(3) A is valid.23
Boghossian's setting up of this argument is not wholly satisfactory: the appeal to the
subjunctive in the first premise is unclear, and the expression "C means what it
does" is not a happy one. A more articulated version of the argument might run as
follows, where "A" stands for some sentence expressing a logical truth, "c" for a
logical constant:
(1) A is an implicit definition of "c"
(2) "c" is meaningful
(3) If "c" means c then A is valid
(4) "c" means c





modus ponens, 3, 4
The argument certainly looks valid: though more work would have to be done to
spell out the transitions from (1) to (3) and from (2) to (4), there is no reason to think
that this couldn't be done successfully. The point of the argument, of course, is to
show that (5) is known a priori. For (5) to be known a priori, assumptions (1) and
(2) must also be known a priori; then, their a priori status will transfer to (5).24 If
reference to an argument of this sort can explain how we know logical truths a
priori, then our a priori knowledge of propositions expressed by Frege-analytic
sentences will have been demonstrated. Indeed, Boghossian also hints that he
23 Ibid.
24 To get a priori knowledge of (5) we have to follow the derivation, and so, as we have noted, simply
grasping the meaning of an epistemically analytic sentence is not sufficient for knowing it to be true.
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believes that an argument of this form can be used to explain our a priori
knowledge of classes of a priori propositions notoriously not assimilable to Frege
analyticity: propositions such as "everything red is coloured", etc.2"
On Boghossian's account, then, reasoning according to this inference schema
constitutes an appropriate belief forming process whereby logical truths come to be
known. The process takes as inputs a priori warranted beliefs in (1) and (2), and
consists of cognitive state transitions which produce and confer a priori warrant on
a belief in (5). If this theory of a priori knowledge can be upheld, we will have been
offered a description of a nonexperiential belief forming process - that is, we will
have an account of minimal apriority. Unfortunately, it seems that Boghossian's
theory can make at best a very limited contribution to our understanding of how a
priori knowledge is possible, as the following remarks are intended to show.
As we have noted, for (5) to be known a priori, (1) and (2) must be known a
priori; and yet it has not been shown that we can know (1) and (2) a priori.
Boghossian, of course, recognises this, and as we have seen in a previous quotation2"
intends his account to be understood only as a conditional claim: in effect, that if
knowledge of the premises can be shown to be a priori, then knowledge of the
conclusion will also have been shown to be a priori. The interesting question,
though, is whether there is a serious prospect of vindicating the assumption that (1)
and (2) can be known a priori.
The issue of whether we know a priori that our words are meaningful, and
hence whether (2) is known a priori, is controversial, and for the sake of argument
we would do well to avoid these difficulties by accepting Boghossian's assumption
that (2) is known a priori. It is consistent with this assumption that we do not know
a priori what our words mean, how they got their meaning, or what role sentences
expressing them play in our language. Hence accepting that we have a priori
knowledge of (2) does not require that we accept that we have a priori knowledge
of (1). Further, it does not seem obviously plausible to assume that (1) is known a
25 Ibid.: 339.
26 This chapter, page 216.
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priori. We have seen Boghossian suggest that our a priori knowledge is exhausted
by three classes of truths: logical, mathematical and conceptual. (1) is clearly not a
logical or mathematical truth; and conceptual truths are characteristically
impossible to imagine to be false, while (1) has no such character. (1), in fact,
appears to be a substantive empirical truth about language, and as such seems
likely to be known only a posteriori. Boghossian passes by this problem, claiming
that "there was never any real prospect of explaining apriority merely on the basis
of a knowledge of propositional content."27 However, this response is insufficient.
The difficulty is: if we take seriously Boghossian's suggestion that a priori
knowledge is restricted to knowledge of logical, mathematical and conceptual
truths, then there is no way of explaining how (1) is known a priori. Perhaps, then,
we should not take Boghossian's suggestion too seriously: but then the limitations
of his project become clear. The explanation of a priori knowledge of logic through
appeal to the concept of implicit definition presupposes the existence of a different
type of a priori knowledge, about which Boghossian is silent. In the absence of an
account, his theory tells us little that is substantive about nonexperientiality, or
about a priori knowledge.28
Innate and a priori knowledge
The final account of a priori knowledge we will consider draws from recent
work by Carruthers.29 Carruthers develops a reliabilist account of innate
knowledge, and argues that innate knowledge is a priori knowledge. For our
27
Boghossian 1997: 357.
28 Horwich (Horwich 1997) argues that the procedure of implicit definition can be given a clear
characterisation within the context of a use theory of meaning. On such a theory, our deciding to
regard a sentence containing a term "c" as true commits us to a pattern of regularities regarding the use
of the term "c", and constitutes a genuine implicit definition of "c". Horwich maintains that we can
thereby achieve knowledge that certain sentences containing "c" are true, but that we have to consider
this knowledge as vulnerable to future revision and so not a priori. In this thesis we have argued that
the revisability of a belief p is not sufficient to show that p is not known a priori: hence it seems that
Horwich's claim that his knowledge through implicit definition is not a priori knowledge can be
challenged. Horwich may, then, have raised the possibility of a genuine explanation of a priori
knowledge through the use of implicit definition, within the context of a theory of meaning as use; but




purposes, we do not need to consider whether any actually existing human
knowledge is innate: we shall focus on Carruthers's arguments that innate
knowledge is possible, and that innate knowledge is a priori knowledge.
Carruthers's proposal, if it can be upheld, promises to have striking consequences
for our understanding of a priori knowledge. For as we will see, it is arguable that
if there can be innate knowledge at all, there can be innate knowledge of
substantive propositions30: thus, if innate knowledge is a priori knowledge then
there can be substantive a priori knowledge. An account of a priori knowledge in
terms of innate knowledge therefore has the potential to break sharply with our
intuitions about apriority, and to engender a radical reconception of the notion of a
priori knowledge. The intention here is to see whether Carruthers's account of
innate knowledge can offer us an explanation of minimal a priori knowledge. First,
we must determine what is his account of innate knowledge.
Carruthers assumes that belief is a necessary condition for knowledge, and
that an account of innate knowledge would involve first giving an account of
innateness of belief and then citing a belief forming process which can produce and
warrant such beliefs.31 Accordingly, Carruthers's argument that there is innate a
priori knowledge breaks naturally into three claims: (i) there are innate beliefs; (ii)
there are belief forming processes which warrant innate beliefs; (iii) innate
knowledge is a priori knowledge. We will discuss these in turn.
(i) Innate beliefs.
The idea of innate beliefs has always been controversial; nevertheless, there are
good prima facie reasons for supposing that they are possible. The general idea of an
innate trait is familiar from developmental biology, and the idea of an innate
cognitive trait is relatively uncontroversial from ethology.32 33 Possessing a belief can
30 I will use the term "substantive proposition" to refer to propositions which are contingent, do not
essentially involve an indexical, and which concern specific, mind-independent features of the world.
31 The sort of approach is common. See for example essays by Stich, by Goldman and by Hart in Stich
1975, all of whom proceed by distinguishing the question of whether there are innate beliefs from the
question of whether such beliefs can be warranted.
32 The classic work in this area is by Lorenz; see Schiller 1957.
33 One reason to countenance innate cognitive traits derives from dissatisfaction with a purely
empiricist account of concept acquisition. Carruthers argues that attempts to show that all concepts
can be acquired from experience are unconvincing (Carruthers 1992: chapter 4.)
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be a trait; so perhaps some innate cognitive traits are innate beliefs.34 In seeking to
explain "innate belief" we should start by giving an account of the innateness of a
trait generally.
It would not be a good idea to require of an innate trait that it be present
from the birth of the organism that is supposed to possess it. For one thing, if we
employ such a criterion the suggestion that there are innate beliefs would appear to
be totally implausible, since most creatures seem to be born with very few cognitive
traits: but we have just suggested that the idea of an innate belief is not obviously
implausible.35 Further, we have good independent reason to think that a trait can be
innate despite only appearing later in the process of an organism's development:
human pubic hair, and human language are salient examples. Both are clearly
innate traits, but neither is present from birth. A developmental account of
innateness allows that a trait might be innate in S and yet only make its appearance
subsequent on certain classes of experience undergone by S; this notion of
innateness forms the basis of Carruthers's account of innate knowledge.36
Carruthers does not give an explicit account of developmental innateness,
but suggests that a trait can be innate if it is "innately determined to make its
appearance at some stage in childhood."37 This suggests that we adopt a
dispositional account of innateness, such that a trait is innate just in case an
individual is disposed to manifest it in the course of normal development.38
Perhaps, then, we should develop an account of an innate trait such that innateness
is tied to the idea of development under normal conditions, as follows (for trait t):
t is (developmentally) innate in S iffS develops t in normal environments.
34
Proposed cases of innate belief are often objected to on the grounds that the behavioural phenomena
the appeal to innateness is meant to explain can be explained more parsimoniously by appeal to innate
dispositions and reflexes rather than full-blown beliefs (see, for example, Lewis 1979, Harman 1974).
But that individual cases can be disputed does not undermine the prima facie plausibility of the
general argument that there can be innate beliefs.
35
Compare one of Locke's arguments in the Essay, Book I, which is roughly as follows: an innate idea
would command universal assent; but infants assent to no ideas; therefore there are no ideas which
command universal assent; therefore there are no innate ideas. (Though couched in terms of innate
ideas, it would be a simple matter to rewrite Locke's argument for innate beliefs.)
36 Carruthers 1992: 51-2.
37 Ibid.: 51.
38 See Stich 1975, introduction, for an extended discussion of this idea.
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One natural way to employ this general definition of innateness in defining
innateness of belief would simply be to substitute "a belief in p" for t. However,
some have worried that the appeal to the concept of normality raises problems for
such an account. Our definition of an innate trait leaves it underdetermined
whether some traits are properly innate, as opposed to being acquired in every
normal environment. Stich illustrates this underdetermination by reference to the
difference between an innate disease and a susceptibility.
To suffer from an innate disease is to be disposed to acquire its symptoms at the
characteristic time in the normal course of events. To be susceptible to a (non-
innate) disease is to be disposed to acquire its symptoms under certain special
circumstances. Certain toxic diseases, for example, can be acquired only by
certain people. A susceptible person, when exposed to the toxic substance, will
come down with the symptoms. At the extremes, the distinction seems clear
enough. But notice how the two shade into each other. Suppose a person
becomes ill after ingesting a certain amount of a particular chemical. Suppose
also that the chemical occurs naturally in the drinking water of the person's
community. Is this a case of an illness caused by the substance, or of an innate
disease whose onset can be prevented by avoiding the substance? Vary the
example, now, so that the substance is nitrogen in the air, and ask the same
question.
These examples illustrate a central feature of the notion of an innate
disease. There are commonly a host of necessary environmental conditions for
the appearance of the symptoms of a disease. If these conditions all occur
naturally or in the normal course of events, the symptoms will be counted as
those of an innate disease. But it is often unclear whether the occurrence of a
certain necessary condition is in the normal course of events. So it will often be
unclear whether a person is afflicted with an innate disease or is, rather,
susceptible to a (noninnate) disease.39
Stich suggests that the problem of how to distinguish innate from ubiquitously
acquired traits can be ignored with respect to innate physical traits, since we have a
fairly good intuitive grasp of which conditions should be considered normal for
physical development.40 But he thinks that the problem cannot be ignored with





process of normal development "seem to swell the ranks of innate beliefs beyond all
tolerable limits."41 To illustrate Stich's concern, consider the belief that I have legs:
this is acquired in the course of normal development, but it doesn't seem to be
innate.42 So simple substitution of "a belief in p" for t in the above definition will not
do, for the unadorned definition will leave it too unclear which beliefs count as
innate. Carruthers seems to concur, for he suggests two ways of giving a
developmental account of innate belief, both of which would address Stich's
problem:
[the first sense in which a] belief might be innate [is if] it is acquired in any course
of experience sufficient for forming beliefs at all[...] The second sense in which
an acquired belief might be innate would be if its existence were inexplicable on
any model of learning, its content being such that it could not have been learned
from the experiences that gave rise to it.43
Carruthers seems to favour the second sense in which a belief might be
developmentally innate, and by combining this with the general definition of
developmental innateness given above we might seem to have a way of blocking
the problem which Stich raises. Though Carruthers doesn't take an explicit stand
on his definition of innate belief, it seems fair to interpret him as endorsing an
account as follows:
Belief in p is innate in S iffS develops belief in p in normal environments and
the existence of S's belief in p is inexplicable on any model of learning.
Here, beliefs like "I have legs", which arise in the course of normal development but
which could have been learned on the basis of experience, are blocked from being
innate by the second conjunct. It is not necessary for our purposes that we decide
whether any actual organisms entertain innate beliefs.44
41 Ibid.
4~ Jim Brown suggested this example.
43 Carruthers 1992: 51-2. Carruthers's second sense corresponds to Stich's "input-output" model (see
Stich 1975: ch.l).
44
There is an extensive literature on this. Carruthers 1992 makes a strong case for the existence of
innate beliefs about folk psychology. See especially Stich 1975, Harman 1974.
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This supplementation of the basic definition of developmental innateness is
not wholly satisfactory. First, the extra conjunct seems to give a way of recognising
whether a belief is innate, not give a criterion for it to be innate. Second, the extra
conjunct strays dangerously close to tautologousness: given that "innate" and
"learned" are generally taken to be correlative terms, to say that S's belief is
inexplicable on any model of learning seems to be to say little more than that S's
belief is innate. Finally, we might worry that the proposed definition is too strong.
It does not seem obviously impossible, given that there are innate beliefs, that one
should entertain a belief innately that one could have learned. Carruthers's reason
for ruling out such beliefs is that by showing that a belief could have been learned
one undercuts all reason for thinking it to be innate45: but it does not follow
immediately from this that the belief is not innate. To pursue this possibility we
would need more details about the mechanism of innate belief generation; but
although the definition of "innate belief" we are attributing to Carruthers is not
wholly satisfactory, it is not wholly implausible either. We should assume that
modifications could be made which would meet these worries, and turn to a more
central aspect of the theory of innate knowledge.
(ii) Warrants for innate beliefs.
Even granted the possibility of innate beliefs, it is not obvious that there can be
innate knowledge. Hart, for example, allows for innate beliefs while maintaining
that the idea of innate knowledge is open to a serious objection.46 Hart holds that
justification (in the intuitive sense of the term) is necessary for knowledge. To
possess a justification for a belief one needs to be able to give a reason for holding it;
but innate beliefs, not having been acquired through the standard processes of
learning, will seem to be held arbitrarily, and, he argues, appropriate justification
will not be available for them. Hence they will not constitute knowledge.
Hart's objection has little force relative to the reliabilist conception of
knowledge, whether the contextualist account proposed in this thesis, or the version
45 Carruthers 1992: 53.
46
Hart, in Stich 1975.
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outlined by Carruthers.47 For a reliabilist, though lack of justification can sometimes
undermine knowledge, possession of justification is not a necessary condition for
possession of knowledge. The reliabilist will be willing to accept innate beliefs as
knowledge provided that they were created by an appropriate belief forming
process. Without rehearsing the arguments over the nature of warrant, we will
focus on the requirement that appropriate belief forming processes must be reliable.
Can a reliable process be identified which could generate innate beliefs? Carruthers
thinks there can be.
Innate beliefs will count as known provided that the process through which they
come to be innate is a reliable one (provided, that is, that the process tends to
generate beliefs that are true). There are two possible candidates for such a
process: divine intervention on the one hand, and evolution on the other. We
could maintain, as most classical rationalists did, that innate beliefs are directly
implanted in the mind by a veracious God. Or we could hold that innate beliefs
have been acquired through evolution, via natural selection. Each of these
process would most probably be reliable.43
(Carruthers adds that a naturalist must reject an appeal to divine intervention,
leaving only the process of natural selection.) The idea that evolution can create
and warrant innate beliefs seems originally to have been made by Goldman, who
writes:
In order for an innate belief to qualify as an item of knowledge, it must be
causally related in an appropriate way to the fact to which it corresponds. But
what might such a causal connection be like? What sort of causal process might
this be? The answer, I suggest, is evolutionary adaptation. Suppose there is a
general fact p about the environment of a certain animal species, or about the
relationship between members of the species and their environment. This fact p,
let us suppose, has great survival value for the members of the species. In
particular, recognition or apprehension of this fact by a member of the species is
a crucial factor in ensuring its survival. Under these conditions, it would not be
47 Carruthers 1992: ch.5. Carruthers considers a parallel objection to the one here drawn from Hart,




suprising if, by a process of natural selection, the members of this species
eventually come to be born with the belief that p.49
If we can vindicate the idea that evolution can function as a reliable belief forming
process we will be well on the way to showing that there can be innate knowledge.
Not all the way there, since as we have seen, reliability is only a necessary condition
for a process to confer warrant, not a sufficient one; however, it is such a central
condition that to demonstrate that evolution is a reliable belief forming process
would be to give considerable support to the idea of innate knowledge.
Carruthers (and Goldman, in the paper from which the above quotation
comes) takes the notion of reliability involved in the notion of a warranting process
to be a relatively uncomplicated notion, definable in terms of the statistical
frequency of true beliefs. He suggests that natural selection would meet the
requirement of reliability.
What reason is there for thinking that natural selection would be a reliable
process, supposing that it resulted in some innate beliefs? Notice, first, that true
belief has immense survival value for any organism, such as ourselves, much of
whose behaviour is caused by the interaction of beliefs and desires. For in
general an organism's projects will only succeed if based upon beliefs that are
true. This is not to say, of course, that action undertaken on the basis of a true
belief is guaranteed to succeed.[...] But often (though not always) the failure will
result from the falsity of some other belief.0
As Carruthers recognises, however, the set of beliefs which are valuable for survival
is distinct from the set of true beliefs. Not all beliefs which are valuable for survival
will be true (provided one stays in the appropriate countries, the false belief that all
cars drive on the left of the road may be useful for survival^'); nor are all true beliefs
useful for survival (consider beliefs in certain moral imperatives - perhaps: one
should always aid the weak against the strong). Natural selection will favour
beliefs which are valuable for survival; to uphold the thesis that natural selection
49 Goldman, in Stich 1975: 117.
50 Carruthers 1992: 111-2. Italics in original.
51
Sterelny considers various examples of false but useful beliefs (Sterelny 1990: 131).
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construed as a belief forming process is reliable, therefore, we will have to give
reason to think that, for the innate beliefs, there is a significant correlation between
truth and survival-value."2 Carruthers finds such a reason in the observation that
evolution is a process which operates over long periods of time.
[W]holly false beliefs will not have survival value in the long run, and in
evolutionary selection it is the long run that matters. What seems undeniable is
that organisms (of the sort that act on beliefs) will only survive, in general and in
the long run, if they base their actions on beliefs that are true, or at least close to
the truth. So if any innate beliefs have arisen through natural selection, we
should expect them to be approximately true.53
Clearly, a great deal more work needs to be done to determine whether evolution,
or natural selection, favours truth over useful falsehoods. But for present purposes
we should accept for the sake of argument that if evolution can be considered a
belief forming process producing innate beliefs, then it will be reliable. Carruthers
concludes that innate knowledge is possible; moreover, he claims that we actually
do have innate knowledge of which sentences of our own language are well-
formed, of the general spatiotemporal structure of the world, and of the basic
structure of our own and others' psychology.54 We should note, though, that
although these are candidates for actual cases of innate knowledge in humans, the
potential scope of innate knowledge is very much wider. For it seems very
plausible that in a stable environment, fine-tuned adaptations will confer strong
survival benefits: the more specific an innate belief, the more it could contribute to
the survival of the organism. So it seems that Carruthers ought to accept that it is
possible that there could be innate beliefs which encode very specific information
about the believer's environment. Such beliefs could be in propositions which are
contingent, do not essentially involve an indexical, and which concern specific,
mind-independent features of the world - that is, they could be substantive. So it
seems that the proponent of innate knowledge should accept that such knowledge
is at least potentially of substantive propositions.
52 Lewis 1979 objects on these lines to the assigning of an epistemic role to evolution.
y3 Carruthers 1992: 112.
54 Ibid.\ ch.4, ch.8.
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(iii) Innate knoivledge is a priori knoioledge.
Carruthers takes it to be fairly obvious that innate knowledge is a priori knowledge.
But would innate knowledge, if it existed, at the same time be a priori? In one
sense at least it would be. For, [...] one thing that can be meant by saying that
something is known a priori is that our knowledge of it is independent of
empirical support. In this sense, a priori knowledge is knowledge that has not
been learned from experience, nor requiring support from experience to qualify
as knowledge."5
In explaining the notion of independence from empirical support by appealing to
the notion of not being learned from experience, Carruthers clearly understands the
notion of experience-independence in the sense of "nonexperientiality", and so on
his accounts of innate knowledge and a priori knowledge, it seems that innate
knowledge will indeed be a priori knowledge.54
The striking consequence for the scope of a priori knowledge adverted to
earlier stems from the conjunction of the conclusion to this argument with the point
recently made that innate beliefs can encode specific information about the
environment, and so be of substantive propositions. If evolution reliably produces
innate belief in such a proposition, it will be known innately and hence known a
priori. On Carruthers's account of innate knowledge, therefore, substantive a priori
knowledge is possible.
The crucial question which Carruthers's account of innate a priori
knowledge must face is whether innate knowledge is indeed nonexperiential
knowledge. While we focus on the way beliefs arise in an individual, it does seem
reasonable to say that innate beliefs are acquired nonexperientially, since they are
not learned, but simply appear in the process of normal development. But the
process of individual development is not the process being cited as the warrant for
55 Ibid.: 78.
56 Kitcher (1978) objects to this inference on the grounds that a priori knowledge is, while innate
knowledge is not, unrevisable. We have already seen reason to reject appeals to the concept of
unrevisability in characterising "experience-independence", and will not consider Kitcher's objection.
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innate beliefs: natural selection is meant to be playing this role. And natural
selection is a process which transcends the life-history of any individual creature:
the life-processes of individuals may be thought to compose part of the process of
natural selection, but if it is natural selection which is being cited as a belief forming
process, then the fact that S did not have to learn p to know p does not entail that S
knows p on the basis of a nonexperiential process: what needs to be shown, rather,
is that the process of natural selection itself is nonexperiential, and it is not at all
clear whether this can be shown.
Put very roughly, the way in which a belief in p is meant to come to be an
item of innate knowledge in S through natural selection seems to be as follows. At
some point in the past, one of S's ancestors, call her A, undergoes a random genetic
mutation which leads her, figuratively speaking, to "grow" a belief in p. That
mutation is inherited by A's descendants, and hence S also comes to grow the belief
during the course of her development. Thus far, this is a picture only of generation
and transmission of an innate belief, not an innate warranted belief. It should be
clear that S's innate belief is not warranted, since the process of random mutation
which led to the formation of A's belief in p is not a reliable one. But, so far, the
process of formation of S's belief in p does look wholly nonexperiential. The process
whereby A comes to possess belief in p meets the requirements of our earlier
definition of "a is a nonexperiential process", and there seems to be no reason to
think that the process of inheritance whereby S comes to believe p will undermine
this.57
The picture so far, then, allows S to have an unwarranted, nonexperientially
produced belief in p. The trouble is that in filling out the picture by explaining how
S's belief in p is warranted, it is not at all clear that the feature of nonexperiential
production is retained. The reason why S's belief in p is warranted is supposed to
be that, in the circumstances, p enhances the fitness of the individuals who believe
in it. Crudely speaking, we are to imagine that the rest of the population of which
A is a member dies, without offspring, for lack of belief in p, leaving A alone to pass
57 Environmental factors, such as the fact that S got the nourishment necessary for normal
development, will be causally relevant to the process of S growing the belief; but if we have to treat
these as "experiences" we should be able to relegate them to the status of causal "cues".
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on the genes for that belief to her descendants. But it is not totally counterintuitive
to say that process whereby the non-p-believers came to die is in some sense
experiential, since, lacking belief in p, they fail to cope with what the environment
throws at them. It is just not clear whether we should count S's belief in p as
warranted nonexperientially: A's own belief in p is created and handed on through
nonexperiential processes, but the warrant for the belief is explained by the deaths
of the non-p-believers. It's just not clear how we should individuate the processes
in this scenario, and so it's not clear whether we should count S's belief in p as
warranted nonexperientially. To clarify the situation we would need a much more
accurate picture of the way natural selection works than that given by Carruthers or
Goldman, and I am unable to provide such a picture.
However, there is another, more general reason to doubt that natural
selection can play a role in generating nonexperientially warranted beliefs. This
concerns the propriety of assigning natural selection a role in generating trait
tokens. As we have already mentioned, warrant is a property of belief tokens: the
explanation of how a belief acquires warrant calls for the specification of a process
which explains the presence of that belief token. But it is at least doubtful that
natural selection can be invoked to explain why an individual has the traits they
actually have; rather, natural selection seems to provide an explanation of the
frequency of traits in a population. Sober offers an example which illustrates this.
Admission to a class requires that students be able to read at the third grade level.
Selection for reading ability explains why the class comprises only students who
read at the third grade level, but it does not explain, of any individual child, why
that child reads at the third grade level. Analogously, natural selection can explain
why all opossums have prehensile tails, but cannot explain why this or that
opossum has a prehensile tail.58 Hence, natural selection cannot explain why an
individual has the innate beliefs that they do, and so cannot explain why those
beliefs are warranted.
18 Walsh 1998, discussing Sober 1984.
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These remarks concerning whether natural selection can be treated as a
nonexperiential belief forming process are not intended to be conclusive; clearly, a
great deal more work needs to be done on the issue. However, they suffice to show
that Carruthers's account of innate knowledge is unconvincing as it stands, and
cannot provide a firm basis for a naturalistic account of minimal a priori knowledge
which appeals to the notion of innate knowledge. This is not to say, however, that
an account of innate a priori knowledge cannot in principle be given: some account
of the generation of adaptations must be offered, and it may be that a working
account will substantiate the idea of innate a priori knowledge.59
Conclusion
The goal of this thesis was to support the view that acceptance of naturalism is
compatible with belief in the possibility of a priori knowledge. I claimed in chapter
one that all arguments against this view are based on misconceptions of the
59
When we focused on the way innate beliefs arose in an individual it seemed plausible to describe
them as warranted nonexperientially; this plausibility was undermined by the appeal to natural
selection to explain how these beliefs could be nonexperientially produced and warranted: not only is
natural selection only dubiously nonexperiential, it seems incapable of explaining of any token belief
how it came to be possessed by an individual. Perhaps a more plausible account of innate knowledge
could be given by switching our focus back to the way the process of individual development
generates innate beliefs. Ariew defines innateness by appeal to the developmental biological concept
of canalization, where canalization is "the capacity to produce a particular definite end result in spite
of a certain variability both in the initial situation from which development starts and in the conditions
met with during its course" (Waddington 1975: 99, cited in Ariew 1996: S25). Ariew links the
innateness of a trait to the degree of canalization of that trait: "the degree to which a biological trait is
innate for a genotype is the degree to which a developmental pathway for individuals possessing that
genotype is canalized." (Ibid.) An account of innateness in these terms would be stronger than the
dispositional account: a canalized trait would manifest in all normal environments, but would also
manifest in some environments that deviate from the norm. This gives it the potential to deal with
Stich's worry that the dispositional account makes too many beliefs innate: the belief that I have legs
would not be highly canalized, since there are environments in which I would not develop the belief.
This account also links innateness to the process of development of an individual, so has the potential
of explaining how an individual has the innate beliefs they have. Potentially, an account of innateness
in terms of canalization could give us an explanation of how innate knowledge is possible. However,
on Ariew's account there is no dichotomy between innate and learned traits: rather, innateness comes
in degrees. If innate knowledge is characterised as a priori knowledge, this would seem to require a
conception of apriority on which it too comes in degrees. Such an account would be strikingly
different from the standard view, on which there is a strict dichotomy between a priori and a posteriori
knowledge. The implications of Ariew's account of innateness for the theory of a priori knowledge
would certainly repay further work.
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concepts of apriority and naturalism, but this was tendentious: we could just define
"naturalism" and "apriority" such that a naturalistic a priori is ruled out; what I have
been trying to show is that there is no reason to adopt such definitions.
I have taken it that the core notion of a priori knowledge is that of
nonexperiential knowledge, and that the core claim of naturalism is that philosophy
is not autonomous from science. The autonomy of philosophy, I have suggested,
was bought at the cost of taking philosophy to be concerned only with analytic
truths. The way to deny its autonomy, then, is to follow Quine in attacking the
concept of analyticity, but the vision of naturalism that thereby arises looks very
different depending on whether one also attacks the analytic theory of a priori
knowledge itself. The chief misconception I have been concerned to remove is that
the analytic theory is the only theory of a priori knowledge on offer.
While we retain the analytic theory, denying the autonomy of philosophy
does indeed issue in scepticism about a priori knowledge. But if we reject that
theory then the existence of a priori knowledge remains an open question: we will
need to adduce substantive reasons to think that a priori knowledge cannot be
naturalised (assuming, that is, that one does not follow Quine in the further step of
dropping the normative dimension from epistemology tout court).M "Traditional"
naturalist critics of the a priori such as Devitt and Kitcher realise this, for though
they build clauses requiring scepticism about the a priori directly into their
definitions of naturalism they also seek to defend the inclusion of these clauses on
the basis of the rest of their naturalist theories. Thus, Kitcher argues for scepticism
about the a priori on the basis of a reliabilist theory of experience-independent
knowledge on which the standards for experience-independence are set very high,
requiring unrevisability of the belief warranted independently of experience.
Devitt also argues against a priori knowledge on the basis of unrevisability, and by
claiming that the concept of apriority is obscure.
We've responded to these arguments by maintaining that no reason has
been given in the first place for thinking that a priori knowledge is unrevisable
60
I also think that dropping the analytic theory undercuts most of our grounds for thinking that science
does not deal in a priori knowledge: if we give up the view that mathematics is a body of analytic
truths it seems natural to describe mathematics as a science, and not just in a metaphorical sense.
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knowledge (apart from the sense in which all knowledge, being factive, is directly
unrevisable, as the Kripke paradox shows) and by suggesting that the notion of a
priori knowledge is no more obscure than the notion of a suitably individuated
nonexperiential belief forming process. We haven't seen a theory of what these
processes are, but the idea itself is not obviously unacceptable.
The project of providing a theory of minimalist a priori knowledge remains
the chief issue left outstanding by this discussion. My own feeling is that it would
be more profitable to pursue Carruthers's idea of innate a priori knowledge rather
than Boghossian's attempt to reinstate analyticity. One of the striking consequences
of a working account of innate knowledge might be a vindication of the rationalist
idea of substantive a priori knowledge. This would be to break sharply with the
assumptions about a priority handed down to us by recent empiricists, but looked
at from a longer historical perspective may not necessarily be such a departure from
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